Productivity and employment growth:an empirical review of long and medium run evidence by van Ark, H.H. et al.
  
 University of Groningen
Productivity and employment growth
van Ark, H.H.; Frankema, E.H.P.; Duteweerd, Hedwig
IMPORTANT NOTE: You are advised to consult the publisher's version (publisher's PDF) if you wish to cite from
it. Please check the document version below.
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Publication date:
2004
Link to publication in University of Groningen/UMCG research database
Citation for published version (APA):
van Ark, H. H., Frankema, E. H. P., & Duteweerd, H. (2004). Productivity and employment growth: an
empirical review of long and medium run evidence. (GGDC Research Memorandum; No. GD-7).
Groningen: GGDC.
Copyright
Other than for strictly personal use, it is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the
author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).
Take-down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Downloaded from the University of Groningen/UMCG research database (Pure): http://www.rug.nl/research/portal. For technical reasons the
number of authors shown on this cover page is limited to 10 maximum.
Download date: 12-11-2019
University of Groningen  Groningen Growth and 























Productivity and Employment Growth: 
An Empirical Review of Long and Medium 
Run Evidence  
 
Research Memorandum GD-71 
 




























      RESEARCH 





Productivity and Employment Growth:  
An Empirical Review of Long and Medium 
Run Evidence  
 
Research Memorandum GD-71 
 






















Productivity and Employment Growth: 
An Empirical Review of Long And Medium Run Evidence 
 
 
Background Working Paper for the World Employment Report 2004 
International Labour Office, Geneva 
 
by 
Bart van Ark, Ewout Frankema and Hedwig Duteweerd 





This study argues that the creation of productive jobs is the key to economic growth, social 
development and improvements in living standards. The study provides extensive empirical evidence 
showing that the long run trend has been towards simultaneous growth in per capita income, 
productivity and employment growth. However, depending on the type of indicator and the time 
frame adopted, there are legitimate concerns about the distribution of the productivity and welfare 
gains from growth both within as well as between countries. Following the analysis of the long term 
growth pattern (Chapter 2), the study investigates under which conditions, in which regions and which 
industries a trade-off occurs between productivity and employment growth. In Chapter 3 patterns of 
employment-productivity trade-offs are established across regions and time periods at the macro level. 
Chapter 4 focuses on sectors of the economy. In Chapter 5 the study discusses the policy areas that 
will be most conducive to breaking or reducing the trade-off between productivity growth and 
employment in order to exploit the long run growth potential. We argue that, in addition to sound 
macroeconomic policies, a sensible role for market forces in allocating resources to their most 
productive uses is important. However, the key challenge is to create an institutional environment that 
can alleviate some of the negative effects in the short and medium run while not hampering the 
realisation of the long run growth potential. Support to the creation of social capabilities and national 
innovation systems are important policy areas to achieve this goal. While strengthening an economy’s 
fundamentals in the short and medium run, these also contribute to the virtuous circle of productivity 
growth, employment creation and poverty alleviation, which is the main theme of the ILO World 
Employment Report 2004. 
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The creation of productive jobs is the key to economic growth, social development and improvements 
in living standards. Those economies that today are characterised by the highest incomes per capita in 
the world economy, are also those which have shown the most impressive increase in labour 
productivity growth over the past two centuries. For example, between 1870 and 1998 the twelve core 
countries of Western Europe increased per capita income and labour productivity about nine-fold. In 
the United States, which became the world’s productivity leader by the end of the 19th century, per 
capita income increased more than eleven times and labour productivity increased eight times.1 The 
driving factor behind the rapid growth in productivity in the Western world has been the symbiotic 
combination of investment in human and physical capital and technological progress, which has 
pushed per capita income for the large majority of the populations in these economies far beyond 
subsistence levels. 
 
Despite these undisputed achievements in world economic growth, there have been continuous 
concerns about the distribution of the productivity and welfare gains from growth both within as well 
as between countries. In the past four decades, there has been a widening divergence in productivity 
and per capita income performance between countries. For example, in East and South East Asia 
labour productivity increased 4 times between 1960 and 2001, whereas it increased only 1.6 times in 
Latin America and 1.5 times in Sub-Saharan Africa. Personal income inequality within countries has 
also increased during particular episodes of development, but the general picture points towards a 
much greater diversity in the world income distribution due to between-country inequality than 
within-country inequality. 
 
Hence although there is little doubt that economic and social progress has brought increased welfare 
to the average population in countries that have undergone these transformations, there are winners 
and losers in the process. The interesting question, that has been the theme of the work of many 
scholars, is whether any systematic pattern can be found in terms of groups that benefit or suffer 
under economic growth. This question is not at all new, and can be traced back to the works of 18th 
and 19th century classical economists, including Malthus, Ricardo and Marx, and classical 
sociologists, such as Tönnies and Durkheim. Many of the concerns were fed by the possible negative 
impact of structural changes in the economy and society on the standard of living. For example, the 
greater role of capital in the economy and the rise of the scale and scope of economic activity have 
often been seen as major threats to the effective use and appropriate rewarding of human effort in the 
production of goods and services. However, there have also been many scholars – in particular during 
the late 19th and 20th centuries – who have argued that technological change and increases in 
education are important keys to the creation of better jobs, i.e. jobs that are more productive, better 
paid and that provide security to people to provide themselves with an adequate income. In the 
terminology of the ILO this may be referred to as the creation of “decent” jobs. 
 
                                                 
1 See Maddison (2001). 
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Our concern in this study is threefold: 
· Firstly, we aim to uncover whether and how economic growth and the rise in productivity has led 
to the creation of better jobs. We provide extensive empirical evidence which suggests that the 
long run pattern clearly exhibits a trend of  simultaneous per capita income, productivity and 
employment growth, although there are differences over time and between regions (Chapter 2).  
· Secondly, we investigate under which conditions, in which regions and which industries a trade-
off occurs between productivity and employment growth. In the medium run, trade-offs between 
productivity and employment growth frequently occur, and certain patterns can be established 
across regions and time periods (Chapter 3) and between sectors of the economy (Chapter 4).  
· Thirdly, we identify the policy areas that will be most conducive to breaking or reducing the 
trade-off between productivity growth and employment in order to exploit the long run growth 
potential (Chapter 5). We argue that, in addition to sound macroeconomic policies, a sensible role 
for market forces in allocating resources to their most productive uses is important. However, the 
key challenge is to create an institutional environment that can alleviate some of the negative 
effects in the short and medium run while not hampering the realisation of the long run growth 
potential. Support to the creation of social capabilities and a national innovation system are 
important policy areas to achieve this goal. While strengthening an economy’s fundamentals in 
the short and medium run, these also contribute to the virtuous circle of productivity growth, 
employment creation and poverty alleviation, which is the main theme of the ILO World 
Employment Report 2004. 
 
 
1.2 Further Development of the Main Questions 
 
The main questions posed above lead to a range of related questions, which we will address in detail 
in this report. These related questions include: 
· Which conceptual framework do we need to apply to better understand the relationship between 
productivity and employment growth? In Section 1.3 we introduce a comprehensive overview of 
factors contributing to GDP per capita growth that can be decomposed into labour productivity 
growth and increased labour force participation. Underlying the growth of labour productivity is 
the increase in inputs of factor resources. These include the production factors, such as labour, 
land, and capital, mostly covered in traditional production functions. But it should also cover the 
changes in the quality of these inputs (human capital creation, new vintages of capital, etc). And it 
should include resources that are often missing in a straightforward production function 
framework, such as human capital, knowledge capital, organisational capital and social capital. 
Underlying the input of resources there are a range of factors related to the global and local 
institutional framework (in particular markets, the innovation system and legal arrangements) 
which determine the allocation of these resources. The latter are of crucial importance in 
generating productivity and job growth. 
· Given the limitations in quantifying many of these variables, on which indicators should our study 
be focused in the light of the broader conceptual framework outlined above? Despite the broad 
comparative and empirical framework adopted in this study, our primary focus is on measures of 
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labour productivity and labour input, as well as on the underlying determinants of labour input, 
such as hours, participation rates, demographic developments, and changes in skill structure, etc..2  
· How does a sectoral or industry perspective contribute to our understanding of the trade-off 
between productivity and employment growth? In Chapter 4 we adopt a sectoral perspective, in 
order to establish the impact of structural change. Shifts of productivity resources from low to 
high productivity industries (for example, from agriculture to industry) have strongly featured in 
the development economics literature. More recently the interest has also been in shifts within 
manufacturing (stages of comparative advantage), from manufacturing to services, and (related to 
the latter) shifts of labour towards the informal economy. 
· How should the institutional factors that are crucial in this process be made operational? In 
Chapter 2 we focus on one important determinant that contributes to the realisation of the 
potential for productivity growth, namely the social capabilities for growth (Abramovitz 1986). 
Social capabilities include the capacities of individual human beings (human capital) and the 
political, commercial, industrial and financial institutions. Although the strengthening of social 
capabilities should not be seen as the panacea for the virtuous circle of growth, job creation and 
poverty alleviation described above, it provides important insights into the nature of policies and 
institutional design that matter. In Chapter 5, we also pay attention to the concept of national 
innovation systems, as an approach to support policy focus on innovation, productivity and 
employment creation. 
· How does the time frame we adopt interact with the relationship between employment and 
productivity growth? A short-run approach typically focuses on business cycle aspects with the 
trade-off being absent due to the pro-cyclical nature of productivity and employment growth. The 
short-run perspective will be left out of consideration in this study. In the long run the relation 
between productivity and employment depends on the conditions under which technological 
change and innovation emerge (see Chapter 2). In the medium run, the possibility for a trade-off 
between employment and productivity growth to occur is biggest. The nature of the trade-off 
depends on the elasticities of demand and supply of labour, which in turn depend on institutions 
governing the wage bargaining process, flexibility of labour markets, the incidence of part-time 
and temporary labour, and the nature of technological change (Chapter 3). An issue of 
fundamental importance therefore is that policies and the institutional design need to be focused 
on finding a balance between reducing the social implications of medium-run trade-off, without 
destroying the opportunities for fuelling the virtuous circle of productivity growth, job creation 
and poverty reduction in the long run (Chapter 5). 
 
In addition to these questions, there will be a range of related issues that will be touched upon in this 
report. For example: 
· Does the relationship between employment and productivity fundamentally differ between low 
income countries (“followers”) and advanced economies (‘productivity leaders’)? 
· Can the historical perspective of structural change, and its impact on employment be applied to 
present-day developing economies? 
                                                 
2 In Appendix I we briefly introduce these measures and discuss data quality issues in a comparative framework. 
See also ILO (2003), Chapter 18. 
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· If not, what are the main differences (type of technology used, international dependencies due to 
trade, FDI, etc., divergence between modern and traditional sectors of the economy, etc.)?  
· How does innovation in a broad sense (technological but also organisational innovation) 
contribute to tackling the trade-off between productivity and employment? 
· How does organisational and social capital translate into institutions that drive the economy from 
medium run trade-offs to long run positive influences?  
· Are innovation systems as known for advanced countries applicable to low-income economies?  
· How do these systems cope with the dichotomies between a large reserve of low-productivity 
labour (in agriculture and the informal economy) and small but dynamic group of high-productive 
workers in manufacturing and modern service industries? 
 
1.3 Income, Productivity and Employment: A Conceptual Framework  
 
Figure 1.1 presents the conceptual framework to study the sources of income growth. This framework 
is rooted in a traditional growth accounting framework, highlighting the role of labour input, physical 
capital input and total factor productivity, but with several crucial extensions. Figure 1.1 starts from 
taking GDP per capita as the ultimate measure of economic performance as it is a fairly 
comprehensive – albeit imperfect – measure of living standards. GDP per capita growth is driven by 
an increased input of labour and/or labour productivity growth. Indeed one can simply show that the 
difference in the growth of average per capita income and labour productivity can be accounted for by 
changes in a range of labour market and population indicators (see Chapter 3, Section 3.2). 
 
At the aggregate level labour productivity growth is essentially driven by two mechanisms. The first 
involves shifts of resources from sectors with either low productivity levels and/or low productivity 
growth rates to sectors with high productivity levels and/or high productivity growth rates. This 
process will be referred to as structural change. There is strong evidence that the shift of labour from 
agriculture to industry has been an important source of productivity growth during the early phases of 
structural change. The relationship has not been the same everywhere, however, and depends on 
factors such as the size of the country (and the related openness of the economy) and the relative 
factor endowments (land, labour and capital). It has also changed over time, depending on such 
factors as the nature of technological change and the globalization of the world economy (in particular 
in terms of increased capital flows).  
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In the more advanced countries, there have also been signs of a negative effect of structural change on 
productivity growth, because of the larger role of services in the economy. Also physical capital has 
changed in composition, with a greater share of computer-controlled machinery and ICT equipment. 
With the rise of information and communication technology (ICT), new opportunities for accelerated 
productivity growth in combination with job creation have arisen. These issues will be extensively 
discussed in Chapter 4. 
 
The second source of productivity growth, which tends to be more predominant in the long run, 
concerns productivity growth within individual industries (i.e., manufacturing industries or service 
industries). There are essentially three sources which drive “within industry” productivity growth: 
1) The first and most obvious source is investment in physical capital goods (or tangible capital), 
including machinery and equipment and structures. In particular the distinction between capital 
goods that embody information and communication technology (ICT) versus non-ICT capital has 
become more important during the past two decades (see ILO, 2001). Although the contribution 
of capital to productivity growth will not be explicitly addressed in this study, we will look in 
some detail at the role of ICT and skill-biased technological change in relation to the productivity-
employment trade-off (see sections 3.3 and 4.3 below). 
2) A second source of industry productivity growth is investments in intangible capital. For example, 
the composition of human capital has significantly changed towards a greater share of 
intermediate and high skills away from a predominant share of low skills. Other types of 
intangible capital, which includes resources that embody knowledge, organisational changes and 
relationships with customers, are also an important source of wealth creation. In traditional 
macroeconomic productivity studies, there is only limited attention for intangible capital. It is 
mostly restricted to the role of human capital, which is measured as skills of the labour force, and 
to knowledge capital, which is measured as the stock of R&D. In this study the role of intangible 
capital is primarily addressed by developing the concept of social capability (Chapter 2).3 
3) Labour productivity growth is not only the result of a rise in the amount of tangible and intangible 
inputs per working hour, but also of the efficiency with which these resources are transformed 
into output, which may be defined as total factor productivity (TFP) growth. From a 
macroeconomic viewpoint, TFP growth refers to the increase in output relative to the rise in the 
combination of joint inputs. In more practical terms one may also interpret TFP growth as “real 
cost reductions” of the inputs, where “real” refers to the fact that the quality of the inputs is 
assumed to remain constant (Harberger 1998). The latter source of growth, which is the only 
sustainable source of productivity growth in the long run, is not explicitly addressed in this study. 
But clearly TFP growth is strongly determined by technological developments, innovation and 
institutional factors such as the functioning of markets. These issues will come back at various 
places in the subsequent discussion, in particular in Chapter 5. 
 
The investment decisions concerning tangible and intangible capital, and the (re)allocations of these 
inputs between industries and firms, are taken in an environment, which is governed by markets in 
which supply and demand for factor inputs (labour and capital markets) and product and services 
(product markets) are matched. The environment is partly governed by local or national factors, but is 
                                                 
3 See, for example, van Ark (2002; 2004) for a more explicit treatment of intangible capital. 
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partly also under the influence of global developments which are often beyond the control of 
individual governments (“shocks”). Nevertheless, governments play an important role in setting the 
“rules of the game” (or institutions) of these markets. Firstly, macroeconomic policies influence the 
relative prices of capital and labour inputs, which determine the choice of technology. Secondly, the 
intensity of competition at those markets determines the threat of potential entries and is therefore an 
important source of the drive for both incumbents and newcomers to innovate. Thirdly, governments 
also need to create the rules of the game concerning technology creation and diffusion, including an 
effective patenting and licensing system that meets the demands of a world in which innovation 
spreads at an increasing pace. Finally, governments are key to developing appropriate supply side 
policies in the areas of education, research and physical infrastructure to provide a breeding ground 
for business to generate investment and productive use of resources. The role of the policy 
environment in relation to productivity growth and employment is discussed in more detail in Chapter 
5 of the study. 
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2. A Long Run Perspective on Employment, Income and Productivity 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The remarkable increase in world living standards over the past two centuries is directly related to the 
creation of more productive and more decent jobs. Although not everybody has become equally better 
off, the extent and broadness of this improvement is unprecedented compared to earlier times (Table 
2.1). For example, between 1500 and 1820 per capita income in the world increased at a meagre 
0.05% a year on average.4 During the first one hundred years following the first Industrial Revolution, 
per capita income growth in the world economy grew at 0.9 per cent per year on average, which was 
almost an 18-fold increase compared to the growth rate between 1500 and 1820.  Following a dip 
during the inter-war years, world per capita sharply accelerated to 2.9 per cent between 1950 and 
1973. Despite a significant slowdown and a rise in world income inequality since 1973, world income 
levels still grew substantially faster during the last quarter of the 20th century than during the 19th 
century.  
 
The remarkable concurrent fact to be noted in Table 2.1, is that the improvement in living standards 
was achieved while the world population also increased most rapidly. While population growth was 
less than 0.3 per cent per year between 1500 and 1820, it continuously accelerated since then to over 
1.8 per cent per year on average since World War II. This suggests that whereas growth up to 1800 
was largely of an extensive nature with population and output growth holding each other largely in 
balance. During the past two centuries growth has become intensive as output growth exceeded 
population growth and per capita income levels increased. Technological change, investment in 
physical and human capital, increased mobility of goods, capital and labour, and institutional 
innovations have been the main keys to this process. 
 
An implication of the intensive growth model is that the rise in per capita income has been largely 
driven by labour productivity growth, which is defined as the rise in output per unit of labour input. In 
turn the more productive jobs have led to higher wage levels, higher consumption of material goods 
and services, greater investments by individuals and government in education, training and health. As 
a result the nature of the jobs themselves changed towards a larger share of high quality (decent) jobs. 
However, although the evidence generally points in the direction of the creation of more productive 
and high quality jobs in the world economy, there are large and increasing differences in growth 
performance across countries. 
                                                 
4 These estimates and others reported in this section are obtained from Maddison (1982, 1995, 2001). Clearly 
per capita income is not a perfect measure of living standards, but this relationship is strongly positive at large 
(see, e.g., the U.N. Human Development Report) 
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Table 2.1: Per Capita Income and Population Growth Rates, 1500-1998  
1500-1820 1820-1913 1913-1950 1950-1973 1973-1998
Per capita income growth
Western Europe 0.15 1.11 0.76 4.08 1.78
Western Offshoots 0.34 1.59 1.55 2.44 1.94
Japan 0.09 0.78 0.89 8.05 2.34
Asia (excluding Japan) 0.00 0.12 -0.02 2.92 3.54
Latin America 0.15 0.88 1.42 2.52 0.99
Eastern Europe & former USSR 0.10 0.87 1.50 3.49 -1.10
Africa 0.01 0.36 1.02 2.07 0.01
World 0.05 0.88 0.91 2.93 1.33
Population growth
Western Europe 0.26 0.72 0.42 0.70 0.32
Western Offshoots 0.43 2.47 1.25 1.55 1.02
Japan 0.22 0.55 1.31 1.15 0.61
Asia (excluding Japan) 0.29 0.33 0.92 2.19 1.86
Latin America 0.06 1.43 1.97 2.73 2.01
Eastern Europe & former USSR 0.34 1.02 0.34 1.31 0.54
Africa 0.15 0.56 1.65 2.33 2.73
World 0.27 0.58 0.93 1.92 1.66  
Note: “Western Offshoots” include Canada, Australia, New Zealand and United States. 
Source: Maddison (2001), Table 3-1a 
 
The main purpose of this chapter is to show that process of intensive growth over the past two 
centuries, which implies that productivity and population growth have moved in tandem, can be 
associated with a huge transformation of the population and labour force in terms of its composition 
and quality. This transformation has been enabled by an improvement in social capabilitie s to exploit 
the growth potential, and the creation of an effective institutional framework to realise the potential. 
Cross-country and cross-regional differences in the success of building these social capabilities have 
been an important source of the inequalities in income and productivity and the creation of 
employment opportunities. 
 
Below we first introduce a conceptual framework that distinguishes between the potential for growth 
and the realisation of that potential (Section 2.2). It will specifically address the characteristics of 
countries which are behind the productivity leader in the world economy, and review the factors that 
have been identified as key to embarking on a catch-up process. In particular we will emphasise the 
importance of the social capabilities In Section 2.3 we focus in more detail on the major trends in 
population and employment indicators and the changes in composition of these indicators. We look at 
how demographic transition has changed the age structure and composition of the labour force, 
including an increased participation of women in the labour force in many parts of the world. We also 
show how - on the whole - labour intensity, which we define as actual total working hours relative to 
a hypothetical maximum number of working hours, has increased over time although there is 
substantial variation across regions. Finally in Section 2.4 we show how the quality of jobs has 
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drastically changed in particular because of strong increase in health and education, and discuss why 
the impact – although positive – of a greater stock of human capital on productivity does not appear as 
high as might have been thought. 
 
2.2 Growth Potential and Realisation  
 
Long term developments and outlook 
The rapid acceleration of per capita income growth since the early 19th century can not only been seen 
from the growth rates presented above but also from the changes in average US dollar-converted 
income for each country. The estimates in Figure 2.1 are converted at purchasing power parities of 
1990, so that differences in relative price levels across countries are taken into account.5 Although the 
staggering increase in average income in particular since 1950 hits the eye, it is also clear that the 
cross-country inequality in income has increased.  
 
Since 1950, rapid diffusion of technology and adaptation to implement those technologies in the 
economies have contributed to the strong acceleration in per capita income and productivity growth in 
Western Europe and Japan. Under the influence of decolonization and the integration in a global 
economic and financial environment, many low income countries also enjoyed an improvement in 
growth although mostly at a lower rate than in Western Europe and Japan. Since 1973 the diversity in 
performance has further increased. The collapse of the international economic arrangements of 
Bretton Woods and the oil crises of the 1970s have left the international economic environment much 
more vulnerable. In fact only East Asia improved its performance very considerably, while growth in 
the western world slowed down and in Latin America and Africa even declined. The Asian financial 
crisis and its aftermath, the increased threats to global security, and the worldwide slowdown since 
2000 have dampened the immediate prospects for further gains even more. 
 
Despite these sources of inequality, it should be stressed that overall world income per capita since 
1973 has increased at a rate higher than any of the earlier periods, except for the exceptional period 
from 1950 to 1973 described above. There are at least two reasons why it is reasonable to expect that 
this positive aggregate trend may continue. Firstly, as will be discussed below, the potential for 
growth partly depends on the technological opportunities before us. Over the past two decades the rise 
in Information and Communication Technology (ICT) has rapidly found its way around the world, 
and it is an important source underlying the process of structural change in the economy (Chapter 4). 
Although the productivity effects from ICT production have so far been mainly occurred in the U.S. 
and a limited number of other countries (including Finland, Ireland, Korea, Taiwan), the diffusion of 
ICT is taking place everywhere. This provides a great potential for productivity growth through new 
products (and services) and improved production processes (ILO 2001). Secondly, the literature on 
the economic effects of globalization generally shows that, on balance, the integration of economies 
in world trade, the rise of global capital markets and increased human mobility is doing more good 
than bad to a country’s growth potential. It has helped to allocate resources to their most productive 
uses, which on balance will make most people better off. Due to these forces, most of per capita 
                                                 
5 Hence one US dollar of income can buy an identical basket of goods and services in each country.  
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income growth for the world economy was driven by productivity growth, which has improved to 1.9 
per cent during the 1990s, up from 1.2 per cent for the period 1973-1990. 
 






































Note: GDP per capita is converted to U.S. dollars with purchasing power parities based on the Geary -Khamis 
index method. 
Source: Maddison (2001). 
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Table 2.2: Growth Rates of GDP, Total Labour Input and Labour Productivity, 1960-2000 
1960-1973 1973-1990 1990-2000 1960-1973 1973-1990 1990-2000 1960-1973 1973-1990 1990-2000
Major Europe (a) 4.7 2.4 2.2 -0.3 -0.1 0.2 5.0 2.5 2.0
Major non-Europe, of which (b) 5.2 3.1 2.7 1.5 1.4 0.9 3.7 1.7 1.8
  Japan 9.2 3.7 1.4 1.2 0.8 -0.6 8.0 2.8 2.0
  United States 4.2 2.9 3.2 1.6 1.6 1.6 2.6 1.3 1.5
Transition Economies 4.4 1.5 -1.9 1.8 -0.1 -1.6 2.6 1.5 -0.3
  CEE countries (c) 4.2 1.0 1.3 0.6 0.0 -1.7 3.6 1.0 3.1
  former USSR 4.5 1.6 -4.7 2.5 -0.1 -0.4 2.0 1.7 -4.3
Asia (d) 4.4 5.7 6.1 2.2 2.7 1.7 2.2 3.1 4.5
  East Asia 9.7 7.4 5.9 4.2 2.7 1.4 5.5 4.7 4.5
  South East Asia 5.6 5.4 4.3 2.4 3.2 1.7 3.2 2.2 2.6
  China 3.8 6.2 7.5 2.5 2.5 1.6 1.3 3.6 5.9
  South Asia 3.3 4.7 5.1 1.5 2.7 1.8 1.8 2.0 3.3
Latin America 5.6 2.9 3.1 2.3 2.4 1.9 3.3 0.4 1.1
Africa 5.0 3.1 2.5 2.4 2.7 2.6 2.6 0.3 -0.1
Middle East 8.9 2.7 3.8 2.5 3.4 3.1 6.4 -0.7 0.7
World 8.9 2.7 3.8 1.9 2.2 1.5 3.2 1.2 1.9
Real GDP Total hours worked GDP per hour worked
 
(a) excluding transition economies, including Turkey; (b) Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Japan and United States; (c) Central and Eastern European countries, excluding 
former USSR; (d) excluding Japan 
Source: Groningen Growth and Development Centre (http://www.ggdc.net/dseries/totecon.shtml) and ILO (2003), KILM 18. 
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An analytical framework of potential and realisation 
Although the potential for growth may be good and may even have strengthened over the past 
decades, it is of course the realisation of that potential and its distribution which matter most. 
Productivity growth is by no means automatic, even not when the opportunities for growth exist. 
Exploiting the opportunities requires that countries have sufficient potential to advance and fulfill the 
conditions to realise this potential (Abramovitz 1986).  
 
For the most advanced countries the potential to grow is largely governed by the pace at which the 
frontiers of knowledge can be extended. This pace is governed by the scientific, engineering and 
administrative possibilities to transfer latent knowledge into useful knowledge.6 Apart from the 
technological capabilities to adopt and adapt to new technologies, the importance of social 
capabilities is stressed as an important restrictive factor in determining the potential. In short, social 
capabilities consist of two main traits: 1) the capacities of individual human beings, i.e. human capital, 
and 2) the political, commercial, industrial and financial organisations and institutions. More 
specifically, the former includes the levels of general and technical education, and the experience of 
entrepreneurs and managers with large-scale organisations and practices (Abramovitz 1991, p. 20). 
This definition assigns an important role to both workers and entrepreneurs in generating the social 
capability to exploit technological opportunities. As we will argue throughout this report, social 
capability is also the key to avoid a trade-off between productivity and employment growth in some 
major sectors of the economy. Indeed sector-specific capabilities determine the innovative standard 
and growth performance of such different activities as livestock production or electronic goods 
manufacturing. 
 
Despite the importance of technological and social capabilities to generate the potential for growth, it 
is also important to establish the appropriate conditions to realise the potential. For this, countries 
need to invest in physical and human capital, support structural change and develop favourable 
macroeconomic conditions for growth (see also Figure 1.1 in Chapter 1). Lead times on obtaining 
results from investment in human capital through primary and secondary schooling, university 
research and – more in general – establishing an effective national innovation system are often quite 
long, and countries therefore require a coherent and stable set of institutions that support capital 
formation. Structural change requires instruments that support the mobility of labour and capital 
between low and high-productivity sectors of the economy. As change does not always benefit 
everybody in the short run, one is also in need of a policy framework that creates a balance between 
compensating the losers and rewarding the winners in such a way that one does not back out of 
needed reforms through rent-seeking behaviour. Finally, the macroeconomic policy framework can be 
more or less conducive to investment and growth through its fiscal and monetary institutions, 
structural policies of national government (e.g. through creating infrastructures on transport, 
communication and research) and the institutions and policies dealing with international economic 
                                                 
6 See Abramovitz (1986). This line of thinking has a strong resemblance to a more recent pathbreaking study on 
the concept of “useful knowledge” by Mokyr (2002), making a distinction between propositional knowledge – 
which refers to generalised, tested and documented principles of knowledge – and prespective knowledge – 
which consists of techniques, prescriptions and instructions which reside in human memory, artifacts or storage 
devices –. 
 17
relations (Abramovitz 1991). In summary, the realisation of the potential is highly dependent on the 
institutional framework of a country. 
 
Although the concepts of potential and realisation may be applied to advanced and developing 
economies alike, they may be particularly useful for the latter group of countries.7 The performance of 
countries that are behind “best practice” in terms of output and productivity performance can be 
analysed within the framework of the “catch-up and convergence hypothesis” (Baumol 1986; De 
Long 1988). Based on standard neo-classical growth theory, countries with a low initial income (or 
productivity) level are assumed to benefit from the implementation of new technologies made 
available by the technology leader(s). Given initially low levels of capital intensity, and with 
technology being regarded as freely available and easy to diffuse beyond national boundaries, the 
focus of economic development policies is on enhancing savings and capital investments. As new 
vintages of capital will embody the latest technology, they will bring about a renewal of the capital 
stock at a pace that is faster than in the advanced countries. In addition, developing countries save 
some of the costs and resources devoted to the research and development executed in the frontier 
countries.  
 
In this framework, catch-up towards the leader’s productivity and output levels will thus follow from 
initial backwardness. Hence productivity growth rates vary inversely with productivity levels, which 
necessarily implies that income per capita levels will converge. In other words, the potential for catch-
up may be seen as being positively related to the distance towards the leader. From our estimates we 
learn, however, that although some groups of countries – in particular Western Europe and East Asia 
– conform to the prediction of unconditional convergence, economic development has spread too 
sparsely to overcome widespread cross-country inequality (see Figure 2.2).  
 
                                                 
7 Incidentally most of Abramovitz’ own writings have focused more on advanced than on developing 
economies, apparently because Abramovitz argued that his framework – as is the case with growth theory in 
general – required the assumption of a social climate; an assumption which certainly does not hold for many low 
income economies (Abramovitz 1991, p. 62). 
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Figure 2.2: Unconditional relationship between per capita income levels (1960) and growth of 
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Note: GDP per capita is converted to U.S. dollars with purchasing power parities based on the Geary-Khamis 
index method. 
Source: Groningen Growth and Development Centre; for country detail, see 
 http://www.gggd.net/dseries/totecon.shtml and ILO (2003), KILM 18.    
 
Abramovitz (1986) states that although countries being backward in terms of productivity levels carry 
a potential for rapid advance, we need to look for reasons why countries are backward in the first 
place. Indeed despite low prices of labour and capital and plentiful technological and market 
opportunities, there are dozens of considerations that have withheld investors from making 
investments in low income countries. These can be related to a lack of technical congruence, meaning 
that the quantity and quality of (certain) factor inputs may be insufficient, or a lack of social capability 
to exploit the potential. 
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Table 2.3: Relative Levels of GDP per Capita and Labour Productivity Relative to the U.S., 1960-2000 
1960 1973 1990 2000 1960 1973 1990 2000
Major Europe (a) 58.8 65.5 63.0 60.0 48.0 66.1 78.4 82.1
Major non-Europe, of which (b) 77.9 88.3 91.8 89.6 71.6 82.5 88.3 90.7
  Japan 35.2 68.5 80.9 73.1 26.6 54.2 70.7 74.3
  United States 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Transition Economies 32.3 34.2 27.8 18.7 27.9 28.0 24.6 20.4
  CEE countries (c) 27.0 29.3 23.9 22.3 19.8 22.5 22.7 26.4
  former USSR 34.7 36.3 29.6 14.9 32.6 30.4 32.7 18.3
Asia (d) 6.7 6.1 8.5 10.9 6.0 5.7 7.8 10.4
  East Asia 12.5 21.8 43.0 56.4 13.6 20.0 35.6 48.0
  South East Asia 10.0 10.3 12.8 13.4 9.2 9.9 11.7 13.0
  China 5.9 5.0 8.0 12.1 5.0 4.3 6.3 9.8
  South Asia 6.4 5.0 5.5 6.1 5.9 5.3 6.1 7.2
Latin America 29.7 29.2 23.5 21.9 32.5 35.6 30.9 29.7
Africa 8.9 8.3 6.2 5.0 6.9 7.0 6.0 5.0
Middle East 22.0 32.4 20.0 18.8 23.2 38.2 27.3 25.2
GDP per capita (U.S. = 100.0) GDP per hour worked (U.S. = 100.0)
 
(a) excluding transition economies, including Turkey; (b) Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Japan and United States; (c) Central and Eastern European countries, 
excluding former USSR; (d) excluding Japan 
Note: GDP per capita and GDP per hour is converted to U.S. dollars with purchasing power parities based on the Geary-Khamis index method 
Source: Groningen Growth and Development Centre (http://www.ggdc.net/dseries/totecon.shtml) and ILO (2003), KILM 18. 
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Large differences in social capabilities between countries can explain why convergence of GDP per 
capita levels only applies to a small club of countries and is absent in many others. During the 1980s 
and 1990s a large body of theoretical and empirical research on economic growth has emerged 
stressing that convergence is conditional upon factors, such as a critical mass of educated people, a 
sufficient knowledge base in terms of inventions and innovations that can be codified and protected 
and a general set of institutions that is growth-conducive at large.8 Indeed these are major reasons why 
many OECD countries and countries in East Asia have shown significant convergence as appears 
from Figure 2.2. 
 
Still it would be too simplistic to assume that factors related to technological and social capabilities 
are sufficient to explain why some countries converge and other not. Firstly, it ignores that specific 
factor endowments such as natural resources, population size (domestic markets), geographical 
location (sea, land) and climate, fertility and amount of arable land can also explain growth 
differentials (see, for example, Sachs and Warner 1997; Bloom and Sachs 1998; Landes 1998).9 
Secondly, and more importantly, the way in which the potential has been realised in some of the 
countries that have grown most rapidly in recent times, has in fact been quite different from that in 
advanced countries. In particular concerning East Asia, there has been an intense debate about the 
impact of activist government policies on industrialisation and export promotion (World Bank 1993; 
Amsden 1989). Some studies have also pointed at the existence of a strong developmental state in 
these countries with authoritarian characteristics focused on centralized decision making (Sen 1999; 
Dore and Whittaker 2001).  
 
In summary, there appears to be a certain commonality in the technological and social needs for 
exploiting the growth potential, which are largely related to the technological and social capabilities 
of a society. The realisation of that potential may be also be dependent on the initial conditions at any 
time or place. This requires a certain cautiousness with overstating the effects from growth enhancing 
policies in supporting catch-up and convergence. As is clear from the discussion above the policy 
implications relate to measures supporting structural change (Chapter 4) and improvements in the 
institutional design (Chapter 5). 
 
2.3 Long run trends in population and employment 
How does the accelerated growth performance of the world economy relate to the dynamics of 
population and employment growth over the past two centuries? Four main trends in labour input 
growth can be distinguished: 
1)  As a result of the unprecedented high population growth, the absolute number of jobs has strongly 
increased across the world.  
2) The growth in jobs has gone together with significant changes in the composition of the labour 
force between own-account workers, family workers and wage earners, as well as between male 
                                                 
8 See, for example, Barro and Sala -i -Martin (1995), Knack and Keefer (1995), Aghion and Howitt (1998) and 
Hall and Jones (1999). 
9 See Easterly and Levine (2002) for a critical account of explanations based on a direct impact of geographic 
endowments on growth, arguing that such factors only work indirectly through institutions. 
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and female workers. In particular the female participation rate increased rapidly in many regions 
during the post World War II period. 
3) The intensity of labour in terms of actual working time compared to potential working time has 
significantly declined over time in advanced countries. This is partly related to changes in labour 
force participation ratios and to a sharp reduction in working hours per person. In developing 
countries, however, labour intensity has remained relatively constant. 
4) The rise in population and employment growth and the change in composition of the labour force 
has accounted for a substantial part of output growth in many regions. Population growth has also 
been a major source of technological change and innovation, and it has raised demand for 
intermediate and final goods due to specialization and higher incomes respectively. 
These four main trends are discussed in more detail below. 
 
ad 1) The demographic transition 
One of the most important consequences of the increased potential for growth over the past two 
centuries, has been the enormous increase in the carrying capacity of this planet. This made it possible 
not only to feed a much larger number of people but also to raise their living standards in an 
unprecedented way. Underlying this process is the demographic transition process, which has largely 
broken the traditional Malthusian view that income rises can only be accommodated temporarily as 
limited resources bring population growth down to a much lower sustainable growth rates.  
 
The demographic transition in Europe began around 1750, just before the first phase of the industrial 
revolution. As a result of improved nutrition, better hygienic conditions and higher living standards, 
(crude) death rates gradually declined below their traditionally “high” levels. As (crude) birth rates in 
first instance remained considerably above death rates, population growth accelerated (see Table 
2.4).10 But over time birth rates responded and started to decline as well, bringing population growth 
back to sustained growth rates. In the new demographic equilibrium low birth rates have adjusted to 
historically low death rates, life expectancy has roughly doubled and population size and density are 
much larger. In most advanced countries population growth is now quite stable at less than 1 per cent 
on average per year. In developing countries the transition began later. Many East Asian countries 
have already gone through the various stages of demographic transition, but others are still in the 
midst of the transition stages with continued high birth rates and death rates which have significantly 
fallen over the years.  
                                                 
10 Here we abstain from the effects of migration, although migration has also been an important force of 
population growth in parts of the western world for periods of time, notably North America and Oceania.during 
the 18th and 19th centuries. 
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Table 2.4 The demographic transition: average birth and death rates and population growth 
rates, 1870-1990 
1870-1913 1950-1973 1973-1998
birth death population birth death population birth death population
rates rates growth rates rates growth rates rates growth
World 0.8 34.7 15.5 1.9 25.9 9.9 1.7
Major Europe (a) 0.8 18.8 10.1 0.8 12.9 7.4 0.3
France 22.5 22.0 0.2 17.9 11.5 1.0 13.5 9.7 0.5
Norway 29.2 15.9 0.8 17.5 9.2 0.8 13.2 10.3 0.5
   Spain (b) 34.8 28.4 0.5 20.6 9.1 1.0 9.1 8.4 0.5
United Kingdom 31.2 18.7 0.9 16.5 11.7 0.5 13 11.4 0.2
Major non-Europe
United States (c) 29.1 15.0 2.1 20.9 9.4 1.5 15.4 8.8 1.0
Japan 29.4 20.3 1.0 19.2 7.7 1.2 11.6 6.6 0.6
Australia 31.9 13.6 2.4 21.4 8.9 2.2 15.0 7.3 1.3
Asia (d) 0.6 38.9 17.4 2.2 26.5 9.1 1.9
Korea 0.3 36.8 12.6 2.2 18.2 6.1 1.3
China 0.5 36.6 16.0 2.1 19.7 6.9 1.4
India (e) 39.2 30.3 0.4 42.3 31.4 2.1 31.4 11.5 2.1
Latin America 1.6 39.5 12.6 2.7 28.0 7.4 2.0
Mexico (f) 33.6 32.7 1.1 44.7 12.8 3.1 30.0 6.0 2.2
Chile 39.4 31.3 1.4 34.0 11.7 2.1 22.4 6.1 1.6
Africa 0.8 48.1 22.9 2.3 42.7 15.5 2.7
Birth rates is annual number of births per 1000 inhabitants; death rates is annual number of deaths per 1000
inhabitants
(a) 1870-1913: Western European countries only, excluding East Europe and Turkey
(b) 1870-1913 birth and death rates annual average of 1878-1913
(c) White Americans only; 1870-1913 birth rates annual average of 1909-1913; death rates annual average
of 1900-1913; black Americans death rates 1870-1913 is 23.6
(d) population growth Asia, excl. Japan
(e) 1870-1913: birth and death rates annual average of 1911-1913
(f) 1870-1913 birth and death rates annual average of 1900-1910 
Source: 1870-1913: Crude birth and death rates 1870-1913 from Mitchell, 2nd ed.
1950-1998: Crude birth and death rates from UN population prospects (1950-1975 and 1975-2000)
Population growth rates from Maddison (2001) and UN population prospects
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Table 2.5: Population size and age distribution, 1870-2000 
x1000 0-14 15-64 65+ x1000 0-14 15-64 65+ x1000 0-14 15-64 65+ x1000 0-14 15-64 65+
Major Europe 239,714 547,403 26.2 65.6 8.2 675,542 23.7 64.8 11.4 727,986 17.5 67.8 14.7
  Austria 4,520 42.3 55.9 1.8 6,938 22.8 66.8 10.4 7,581 22.8 66.8 10.4 8,101 16.7 67.8 15.5
  Denmark 1,888 33.4 60.8 5.8 4,269 26.3 64.6 9.1 5,060 22.6 64.0 13.4 5,322 18.3 66.7 15.0
  France 38,440 27.1 65.5 7.4 41,836 22.7 65.9 11.4 52,716 23.9 62.6 13.5 59,325 18.8 65.2 16.0
  Italy 27,888 32.5 62.4 5.1 47,125 26.3 65.4 8.3 55,473 24.2 63.7 12.1 57,560 14.3 67.6 18.1
  Hungary (a) 5,717 37.0 60.1 2.9 9,334 25.1 67.6 7.3 10,539 20.3 67.0 12.7 10,009 17.0 68.4 14.6
  Poland 17,240 24,817 29.4 65.4 5.2 34,038 24.0 66.4 9.6 38,696 19.2 68.6 12.2
Major non-Europe
USA 40,241 39.2 57.8 3.0 157,878 27.0 64.7 8.3 220,014 25.2 64.4 10.4 285,056 21.8 65.9 12.3
Australia 1,770 42.3 55.9 1.8 8,216 26.5 65.4 8.1 13,905 27.6 63.7 8.7 19,152 20.5 67.2 12.3
Asia 765,056 1,398,488 36.5 59.4 4.1 2,397,512 39.6 56.2 4.2 3,679,737 30.4 63.7 5.9
  China 358,000 554,866 33.5 62.0 4.5 927,809 39.5 56.1 4.4 1,275,934 24.8 68.3 6.9
  India 253,000 357,754 38.9 57.7 3.4 620,526 39.8 56.4 3.8 1,017,806 34.1 60.9 5.0
  Japan 34,437 33.7 61.0 5.3 83,672 35.4 59.6 5.0 111,545 24.3 67.8 7.9 127,005 14.6 68.2 17.2
  South Korea 14,347 18,850 41.7 55.3 3.0 35,314 37.7 58.6 3.7 46,821 20.9 72.0 7.1
  Phillipines 5,063 19,999 43.6 52.8 3.6 42,031 44.2 52.7 3.1 75,767 37.5 58.9 3.6
Latin America 39,973 167,097 40.0 56.3 3.7 321,906 41.3 54.4 4.3 520,229 31.9 62.6 5.5
  Brazil (b) 9,797 32.9 61.8 5.3 53,933 41.6 55.5 2.9 108,136 40.3 55.8 3.9 171,856 29.3 65.5 5.2
  Chile (c) 1,943 40.8 56.4 2.8 6,085 36.7 59.0 4.3 10,343 36.8 57.8 5.4 15,232 28.4 64.3 7.3
  Peru 2,606 7,627 41.6 55.0 3.4 15,169 43.2 53.2 3.6 25,964 34.5 60.7 4.8
  Colombia 2,392 12,575 42.6 54.2 3.2 25,382 43.4 53.0 3.6 42,087 32.8 62.5 4.7
Africa 90,466 221,214 42.0 54.8 3.2 408,160 45.1 51.8 3.1 795,671 42.7 54.1 3.2
  Nigeria 29,793 41.7 55.3 3.0 54,893 45.0 52.0 3.0 114,811 45.0 51.9 3.1
  Ghana 4,902 45.1 52.4 2.5 9,910 45.9 51.4 2.7 19,587 41.4 55.7 3.2
  Egypt 21,820 39.7 57.4 2.9 39,328 40.9 54.9 4.2 67,818 36.3 59.2 4.5
World 2,518,629 34.3 60.5 5.2 4,068,109 36.8 57.6 5.7 6,070,581 30.1 63.0 6.9
(a) 1869; (b) 1873; (c)1895
Sources: Population size and age distribution in 1870 from Maddison (1982, 2001), 1950-2000 from UN Population Prospects 




As a result of the changes in birth and death rates, the demographic transition has also led to major 
changes in the age distribution of the population (Table 2.5). Increased health and hygiene meant that 
life expectancy increased from less than 40 years at the beginning of the 19th century to almost 80 
years by the end of the 20th century (Maddison 2001, Table 1.5b). The demographic transition also 
significantly extended the working lifetime of people, which was supported by an improvement in 
working conditions. As the number of people above 65 increased as well, arrangements such as 
pension schemes were set up to provide elderly people with an income.  
 
During the past decades, the demographic transition has also been a cause of concern with respect to 
the “population problem” that several developing countries presently face. Indeed there is a 
substantive literature that argues that the carrying capacity of the planet cannot sustain a population of 
6 billion or more because of the exhaustion and dispersion of a one-time inheritance of natural capital, 
including topsoil, groundwater, and biodiversity (Daily and Ehrlich 1992).  
 
To resolve the apparent conflict between the positive and negative effects of the demographic 
transition one should stress that it is not population growth as such but underpopulation and 
overpopulation relative to the potential resources that is the core of the problem. Underutilisation of 
potential resources can hamper development, and so does overexploitation of scarce natural and 
material resources. In both cases lack of innovation and technological change is often the main 
problem. In situations where the potential for growth is seriously limited, or where the realisation of 
the existing potential is negatively affected by policy mistakes, economic uncertainty, civil insecurity 
or warfare, population growth can become a serious threat to even maintain a minimum level of 
subsistence. It can lead to countries being trapped in a mode of high population growth rates, “eating 
away” the minimum resources needed to create the technological and social capabilities. This creates 
a trade-off between, on the one hand, faster population growth and creation of unproductive and bad 
jobs and, on the other hand, a slowdown in income and productivity growth. The ultimate challenge is 
to break that vicious circle; an issue we will return to in Chapter 3. 
 
ad 2) The composition of employment 
Under the influence of the demographic transition the composition of the labour force has changed in 
an important. Using the distinction of employment in paid employees, own-account workers and 
unpaid family workers, the relative share of paid employees in total employment has strongly 
increased at the expense of self-employed and unpaid family workers (see Table 2.6).  
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Table 2.6: Employment Status in Agriculture and non-Agriculture  
Crude Agricultural Sector Non-Agricultural Sectors Ratio of
Activity own wage family own wage family own account
Rate (a) accounts earners workers accounts earners workers workers to
workers workers wage earners
Germany, Fed.Rep 1950 46.3 1,252,395     1,128,594     2,732,743     2,005,920     14,502,708   451,647        0.17
Germany, Fed.Rep 1990 50.2 389,000        227,000        375,000        1,090,000     27,127,000   170,000        0.05
Netherlands 1947 40.2 251,875        242,189        253,420        467,954        2,402,722     150,048        0.26
Netherlands 1994 46.6 131,000        108,000        25,000          596,000        5,770,000     62,000          0.11
Portugal 1950 39.0 439,773        950,592        173,550        240,739        1,344,662     25,650          0.20
Portugal 1992 48.2 376,000        104,000        49,800          706,100        3,424,100     32,000          0.22
Turkey 1955 50.7 2,642,915     244,235        6,551,849     685,652        1,380,068     116,933        0.58
Turkey 1990 31.1 3,370,900     582,048        8,594,745     2,146,437     8,408,679     276,532        0.29
United States 1950 39.9 4,385,794     2,031,646     913,913        5,187,543     47,263,303   199,057        0.11
United States 1994 45.8 1,729,000     2,083,000     50,000          9,213,000     117,241,000 136,000        0.08
Indonesia 1964 35.3 12,649,000   4,992,000     6,840,000     4,782,000     4,909,000     1,186,000     1.22
Indonesia 1992 49.1 20,191,581   5,038,455     16,818,163   14,156,720   17,733,415   3,630,064     1.00
Philippines 1965 41.5 2,979,000     826,000        2,247,000     1,343,000     2,848,000     291,000        0.57
Philippines 1994 47.3 5,802,000     2,368,000     3,078,000     4,139,000     9,100,000     678,000        0.53
South Korea 1966 29.7 2,213,080     440,890        1,898,600     1,011,670     2,123,530     274,800        0.61
South Korea 1993 . 1,662,000     197,000        986,000        3,790,000     11,500,000   1,068,000     0.42
Thailand 1960 52.7 3,455,337     352,853        7,526,087     673,055        1,279,833     456,749        0.88
Thailand 1994 46.4 5,745,600     2,193,900     4,460,900     3,941,800     10,308,500   1,582,600     0.54
Mexico 1960 32.4 2,686,833     3,296,465     100,828        1,193,836     3,965,161     10,174          0.30
Mexico 1991 37.5 3,942,974     1,981,744     2,246,565     5,669,406     14,895,825   1,722,080     0.50
Chile 1960 32.4 165,315        443,752        52,743          316,643        1,295,869     12,184          0.25
Chile 1994 24.7 300,840        446,130        61,940          1,097,770     2,976,540     105,000        0.40
Egypt 1947 34.1 1,535,553     1,426,761     1,152,228     878,821        1,325,493     122,689        0.76
Egypt 1992 29.2 2,130,800     1,191,900     2,212,200     1,769,100     6,714,200     380,800        0.32  
Employment as % of working age population 
Note: see appendix. Source: ILO, Yearbook of Labour Statistics, tables 1, 2A; various issues. 
 26
Two main developments account for the change towards a larger share for wage earners. Firstly, the share of 
agriculture in the total economy, in which own-account workers and unpaid family workers are traditionally 
highly represented, declined. Secondly, self-employed people who ran one-person businesses in all sectors of 
the economy are to a large extent replaced by more efficient large-scale production organisations hiring wage 
employment. Although there is a small counteracting effect from an increasing amount of self-employed 
entrepreneurs in business and financial service industries in advanced economies, this effect is small compared 
to the overall decline in own-account workers.  
 
Three additional effects underlying the employment transformation process need to be addressed. 
Firstly, economic growth has significantly reduced underemployment. Underemployment means that 
people cannot raise sufficient income from a fulltime job. Hence their capabilities, talents and skills 
are underutilized. However, despite its decline, underemployment has not vanished, in particular not 
in the urban informal sector of developing economies. Although the remaining number of 
underemployed persons is not easily obtained from labour statistics, a large share of self-employed 
people in manufacturing, commerce and services are an indication of underemployment and the 
existence of an informal economy. Relatively high rates of self-employed people to paid employees in 
the non-agricultural sector can serve as a good proxy for the extent of informal economy employment 
(see last column of Table 2.6). The issue of informal sector activity and its impact on productivity 
growth is discussed in more detail in Chapter 4. 
 
A second important change in the composition of the labour force concerns the age distribution. This 
issue is partly directly related to the demographic transition discussed above, but also relates to the 
lengthening of the education period of young people and the development of pension schemes for 
elderly people. As a result the labour force in advanced countries is concentrated in the age group 25-
64. This in itself has significantly raised productivity growth, as elderly people and children usually 
are less productive then adults in the middle -age group. It has also contributed to a better quality of 
jobs, for example through the decline in child labour.  
 
A third important development in the composition of the labour force concerns the changes in the 
share of female participation. Table 2.7 shows the female labour force participation rates, which are 
defined as the percentage share of the female labour force in the total female working age population 
from 15-64 years, along with the male participation rate.11 With regard to interpreting female 
participation rates some caution is required. In most developing countries women always contributed 
to family income, but much of it is carried out as informal labour. The labour statistics can easily 
understate their numbers. In the developed world, women with a paid job capture a larger share of 
total formal employment. 
 
                                                 
11 The rate is affected by enhanced education of women in the age group of 15-24. 
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Table 2.7: Crude male and female activity rates 
Male and female activity rates  1950  1990 
  Male Female  Male Female 
World  61.57 34.09  56.56 38.18 
More developed  61.18 30.60  57.32 41.66 
    Europe  62.04 32.55  56.22 40.90 
    Northern America  61.44 23.47  57.27 44.18 
    Oceania   62.35 22.47  57.03 40.14 
Less developed  61.74 35.87  56.36 37.17 
   Asia  62.44 38.19  57.95 39.63 
   Turkey  62.09 52.76  55.91 30.34 
   Africa  57.55 36.60  50.97 33.56 
   Northern Africa  57.63 16.87  49.23 19.08 
   Latin America and Caribbean 58.08 14.20  54.28 25.91 
Source: ILO, Economically Active Population, 1950-2010 
 
The table shows a rapid rise in female participation in the Western world from just over 30 per cent in 
1950 to 42 per cent in 1990. In developing countries the female participation only slightly improved 
over the past half century, although the rate was higher than in developed countries in 1950. Asia has 
a much higher female participation rate than Latin America, which is partly accounted for by the 
higher population density and larger agricultural sector in Asia. In low income economies with a 
relatively large share of industry and services and a high urbanization rate, female participation is 
restricted as large families occupy women with housekeeping and childcare. In Latin America the 
female participation rates were quite low in the 1950s but caught up considerably during the past 
decades. In Africa the female activity rate declined, which was the result of the biased age distribution 
in that region towards young people below 15 years old. In addition to the reasons mentioned above, 
the low female participation rates in Arabic countries are also related to cultural factors although the 
share of women has increased modestly.  
An important conclusion of this discussion is that changes in the composition of the labour force have 
had a direct impact on the development of productivity and income. The process of industrialisation, 
the rise of wage-dependent employment, the fall in underemployment, the concentration of the 
workers in the age group of 25 to 64 and the increase in female participation contributed to the 
creation of more productive jobs and brought an increasing number of people out of poverty. The 
important  question that remains is what the main reasons are that sparked off this transformation, and 
why – despite the overall trend of the past two centuries towards more productive and decent jobs – 
not all countries have been able to realise this transformation in a similar way. The focus on the 
quality of jobs sheds light on this issue, which will be discussed in more detail in Section 2.4 as well 
as in Chapters 3 and 4. 
 
ad 3) The development of labour intensity 
Although trends in population and employment growth are strongly related, a more detailed analysis 
suggests that labour intensity, measured as the total number of hours worked relative to a maximum 
potential number of working hours that the working population can put in, has significantly declined 
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over time. Two major indicators are of importance, namely the number of hours worked per person 
employed and the labour force participation ratio. 
 
Despite rapid employment growth, there has been a trend towards a strong decline in average annual 
working hours per person employed, in particular in OECD countries. Actual hours worked depend on 
regular paid hours, overtime, but also on various types of off-time, including time due to holidays and 
vacations, sickness and industrial disputes. Average annual hours also depend on the degree of part-
time labour in the economy and on the female participation rate (as women work more part-time than 
men).12  
 
Table 2.8 shows the number of hours worked by per person employed. In Europe and the rest of the 
OECD annual working hours declined by 1,000 hours between 1870 and 2000. Most of the decline 
during the early decades partly represented the shift from agriculture to non-agriculture and the 
introduction of labour laws that reduced working hours in factories. Between 1960 and 1975, the free 
Saturday was introduced in most countries. Since 1975 the further decline in working hours was 
caused by work time sharing, an increase in the number of holidays and vacation time and – in 
particular during the 1990s – a strong rise in parttime labour. The recent decline in working hours, 
however, seems largely a European phenomenon as working hours in advanced countries outside 
Europe have not declined as rapidly. Indeed the gap in average working hours between Europe and 
the rest of the OECD is now much bigger than before. 
 
                                                 
12 For example, due to the high amount of part-time jobs brought about by a large inflow of women on the 
labour market since the 1970s, the average working year in the Netherlands consisted of 1324 hours in 2002, 
which is among the lowest figure in the world. In many developing countries average annual working hours are 
almost double this amount. 
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Table 2.8: Average Annual Hours Actually Worked per Person Employed 
1870 1913 1960 1975 2000
Major Europe (a) 2911 2483 2094 1886 1622
Major Non-Europe (b) 2939 2605 2002 1924 1843
Transition Economies 2082 2007 1997
Asia
East Asia (c) 2426 2510 2405
SE Asia (d) 2200 2200 2208
China (d) 2200 2200 2200
South Asia (d) 2200 2200 2173
Latin America 2131 2066 1920
Africa 2200 2200 2200
Middle East 2200 2200 2200
World 2155 2120 2099  
(a) excluding transition economies; 1870 and 1913 also excluding Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Turkey and Spain; 
(b) Australia, Canada, Japan and United States; from 1960 onwards also including New Zealand; (c) South East 
Asia, South Asia, China and Africa are assumed at 2,200 hours 
Source: 1870 and 1913 from Maddison (1991); 1960-2000 from Groningen Growth and Development Centre 
(http://www.ggdc.net/dseries/totecon.shmtl) 
 
The quality of the estimates of working hours for developing countries are much weaker than for 
advanced countries. Given the fact that working hours in East Asia were not much higher than 2,500 
hours even during the 1960s, it is unlikely that today’s working hours for other countries are much 
higher than that. However, there are no signs of a similar fall in working hours as in western 
countries. 13 
 
Apart from a decline in working hours per person, the share of persons in the labour force (or 
economically active population) as a percentage of all persons at working age 15-64 has also declined, 
at least until the mid 1970s.14 Table 2.9 shows that labour force participation declined in most 
advanced countries between 1870 and 1960. This decline is mainly a reflection of a decline in unpaid 
family work (in particular women) and child labour (see below under ad 2)). Outside Europe the 
                                                 
13 This is supported by information for those countries for which we have reasonable data in 1960 and 2000. In 
Argentina average working hours decreased slightly from 2,073 to 1,903 hours and in Mexico from 2,150 to 
2,058 hours. In South Korea even an increase took place from 2,235 hours in 1960 to 2,487 hours in 2000, 
although a substantial decline was reported for Taiwan from 2,772 hours in 1960 to 2,282 in 2000. But for the 
developing countries together and for the world as a whole the fall in working hours per person is probably not 
very big. 
14 Alternatively we could also look at the employment/population ratio (defined as the crude activity rate), but 
the labour force participation rate excludes effects of differences in formal unemployment rates (which is the 
difference between employment and labour force) and the share of the age groups from 0-15 years and 65 years 
and older in the total population. To account for the effect of declining labour force participation rates due to 
increased education a comparison of labour force to the population of 25-64 years is a possible alternative. 
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labour force participation remained somewhat higher during the period, but this is mainly due to the 
considerably higher participation rates in Japan. 
 
Table 2.9: Labour Force Participation Rates (labour force/population 15-64) 
1870 1913 1960 1975 2000
Major Europe (a) 0.744 0.705 0.687 0.677 0.707
Major non-Europe (b) 0.748 0.735 0.683 0.679 0.776
Transition Economies 0.758 0.764 0.757
Asia 0.855 0.801 0.799
East Asia (c) 0.619 0.614 0.717
SE Asia 0.732 0.694 0.762
China 0.949 0.890 0.869
South Asia 0.793 0.738 0.739
Latin America 0.622 0.593 0.681
Africa 0.813 0.764 0.768
Middle East 0.619 0.548 0.528
World 0.782 0.749 0.769
(a): Excluding Transition Economies; 1870 and 1913 exclude Greece, Ireland, Portugal, 
Turkey and Spain
(b): Australia, Canada, Japan & United States; from 1960 onwards also incl. New Zealand
(c): excluding Japan
Source:  Population 15-64 for 1870 and 1913 from Mitchell; for 1960-2000 from UN World
Population Prospects, Age Distribution, 1950-2000; Labour force for 1870 and 1913
from Maddison (1982); for 1960-2000 from World Bank, World Development Indicators  
 
Between 1960 and 1973 labour force participation rates have declined almost everywhere in the world 
economy. In the advanced countries the decline was more moderate than before, although there was a 
substantial variation around the average of  67 to 68 per cent.15 In developing countries the expansion 
at the base of the population pyramid accounts for much of the slowdown in labour force participation 
between 1960 and 1973, in particular as schooling of young people in the age group 15-24 years old 
increased substantially. The fastest decrease in labour force participation rates between 1960 and 1973 
took place in China and South Asia, but remained at much higher levels than in Latin America and 
Africa. 
 
Since 1973 labour force participation rates have increased again. In the OECD countries this is related 
to a range of factors including a reform of welfare systems in many countries bringing more people 
back into the labour force, a rise in parttime labour and an increase in female participation rates. 
Female participation rates have also risen in many developing economies, so that participation rates 
increased in East and Southeast Asia and in Latin America. But with a continuous large young 
                                                 
15 For example, labour force participation rates in some Southern European countries, but also in Belgium and 
the Netherlands fell to below 60 per cent, whereas they remained relatively high in Scandinavian countries and 
the United Kingdom. Although Japanese participation rates also came down during this period, they remained 
high at around 72 per cent. 
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generation, the activity rates in other parts of the developing world have remained relatively low. 
When fertility rates fall under the replacement rate of 2 children per women, the activity rate will 
ultimately increase. Only the transition economies and the Middle East experienced a continued fall in 
labour force participation rates, which was related to the transition process and to the cultural reasons 
respectively. 
 
By combining the information from Tables 2.9 and 2.10 a rough estimate can be made of labour 
intensity by dividing the total number of hours worked relative to the maximum possible number of 
hours worked, which was put at 2,800 hours per year, times the total working age population of 15-64. 
The 2,800 hours estimate was obtained by assuming a 52-week working year at 6 days of 9 hours per 
week. Obviously this maximum number should not be interpreted as a desirable standard that should 
be aimed for. However, when relating the actual number of hours to the maximum potential some 
important observations can be made (Table 2.10). 
 
Firstly, whereas in 1870 the actual labour input was as little as 20 to 35 per cent below the maximum 
labour input, it was more than 50 per cent lower by the end of the 20th century. Indeed workers in the 
advanced world have traded off working time for leisure in a big way, which surely has contributed 
enormously to the quality of life in general and – more specifically – to the quality of jobs. Since 
1975, however, labour intensity has somewhat increased again in the OECD countries outside Europe, 
but the decline has continued within Major Europe. Indeed this suggests that the trade-off between 
work and leisure is perceived somewhat differently within the group of advanced countries.  
 
The transition economies have experienced the largest decline in labour intensity during the last 
quarter of the 20th century. In contrast to other industrialised countries, labour intensity in the 
European socialist economies substantially increased during the 1950s and 1960s. Hence the decline 
since the 1970s is partly a correction, but the negative employment record during the reform period is 
the main reason for the strong decline in labour intensity.  
 
The differences in labour intensity within the developing world are large. Strikingly actual versus 
maximum labour input in Africa and East Asia today is not much lower than it was in Europe and the 
U.S. in 1870. Hence it is hard to imagine that these two regions can raise labour intensity much more 
in purely quantitative terms. In contrast, labour intensity in Latin America and the Middle East is 












Table 2.10: Labour Intensity (actual total hours to maximum total hours of working age 
population) 
 
1870 1913 1960 1975 2000 
Major Europe (a) 0.668 0.550 0.528 0.456 0.441 
Major non-Europe (b) 0.790 0.638 0.458 0.437 0.477 
Transition Economies 0.531 0.572 0.436 
Asia 
East Asia (c) 0.598 0.673 0.742 
SE Asia 0.529 0.496 0.533 
China 0.602 0.552 0.595 
South Asia 0.502 0.438 0.456 
Latin America 0.443 0.394 0.386 
Africa 0.708 0.666 0.670 
Middle East 0.487 0.434 0.427 
World 0.561 0.533 0.559 
Note: (employment * actual hours worked) as % of (population 15-64 * 2,800 hours per year) 
(a): Excluding Transition Economies; 1870 and 1913 exclude Greece, Ireland, Portugal,  
Turkey and Spain 
(b): Australia, Canada, Japan & United States; from 1960 onwards also incl. New Zealand 
(c): excluding Japan 
Source: Tables 2.8 and 2.9  
 
ad 4) Employment and productivity growth 
How did the acceleration in population growth and the changes in the composition of employment and 
in labour intensity rates, described above, affect output and productivity growth? The demographic 
transition process initially raised the share of the age-group below 15 years old due to continued high 
birth rates (in combination with a decline in child mortality). Depending on whether the young 
population could be well educated and whether there was growth potential that could be realised, by 
the time these youngsters entered the labour force they turned out to be a demographic gift or a 
demographic burden. Table 2.11 shows that productivity was the main source of output growth in the 
industrialising nations of the Western world from 1870-1913. Still labour force growth accounted for 
up to 20 per cent of output growth in Europe, and almost 50 per cent in North America. East Asia also 
experienced a demographic gift from 1960 to 1973 and Southeast Asia from 1973 to 1990 when rapid 
labour growth and output growth coincided. 
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Table 2.11: Percentage contribution of labour force to output growth by major region, 1870-
2000 
1870-1913 1960-1973 1973-1990 1990-2000
Major Europe (a) 17% -6% -4% 8%
Major non-Europe, of which (b) 43% 30% 46% 34%
  Japan 45% 13% 23% -45%
  United States 44% 39% 56% 51%
Transition Economies 42% -4% 82%
  CEE countries (c) 15% -1% -129%
  former USSR 55% -5% 8%
Asia (d) 49% 47% 27%
  East Asia 43% 37% 24%
  South East Asia 43% 59% 39%
  China 66% 41% 21%
  South Asia 46% 57% 35%
Latin America 41% 85% 63%
Africa 48% 89% 106%
Middle East 28% 126% 81%
World 21% 81% 39%
Total hours growth as % of real GDP growth
 
(a) excluding transition economies, including Turkey; (b) Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Japan 
and United States; (c) Central and Eastern European countries, excluding former USSR; (d) 
excluding Japan 
Source: from 1960 onwards, see table 2.2; 1870-1913 from Maddison (1991). 
 
In many developing countries the demographic transition has severely biased the age structure. In 
some developing countries the age group of 0-14 makes up more than 40% of total population, and 
the age group 0-24 has reached levels of over 60 per cent of total population. Since 1973 labour force 
growth contributed most to output growth in Latin America, Africa and the Middle East. In some 
cases labour input even grew faster than output. But as output growth rates remained low, the 
potential demographic gift turned into a demographic burden in the regions. Indeed the larger gap 
between birth and death rates in developing countries has raised substantial problems because the 
opportunities for creation of productive employment have remained limited. 
 
When assessing the impact of the demographic transition on output and productivity it is also useful 
to make a distinction between growth rates and levels. The absolute level of the population mainly 
relates to the density of population which primarily reflects structural factors of an economy. In a 
broad sense, population pressure stimulates human creativity to respond to eventual oversupply of 
labour. For example, the increase in population density has been an important driver of labour-
intensive innovations in agriculture (such as weeding, manure, irrigation, etc.), which has significantly 
reduced fallow periods on land. Hence it strongly increased the carrying capacity of traditional 
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agriculture both in terms of increased food production and a rise in employment opportunities for the 
rural population (Boserup 1965).16 A higher population density also raises the payoff of infrastructure 
projects, such as road and rail, to move goods (trade) and people (migration) between densely 
populated regions. This has greatly contributed to increased specialization, which is an important 
determinant of growth. Finally, higher population density also means a concentration of human 
resources that leads to the creation of knowledge pools which are at the roots of formal and informal 
invention and innovation by human mankind (Boserup 1981; Simon 1996). The size of the domestic 
market also affects the opportunities to exploit economies of scale, and the choice between 
specialization on the basis of comparative advantage or the creation of a more diversified industrial 
structure. 
 
The growth rate of the population is primarily of interest from the perspective of its impact on 
productivity growth and living standards. Parallel to the growth in population, various other factors, 
such as changes in sexual behaviour, the introduction of new contraceptive technology, urbanization, 
the penetration of modern ideologies and enhanced social mobility of women, have contributed to the 
virtuous circle of smaller family units, a decline in poverty, higher incomes and increased 
consumption, leading to new opportunities for employment growth and income generation. Moreover, 
even though the absolute level of consumption has increased, the share of consumption in total GDP 
has usually fallen when income rise. Although the relationship is far from perfect, richer countries 
devote higher proportions of their national incomes to savings, which ultimately increases public and 
private investment and raises output and productivity growth (McGuckin, van Ark and Barrington, 
2000). 
 
What are the implications of a change in labour intensity for productivity growth? Unfortunately, 
there is still little evidence which looks directly at this relationship, but it is likely that there are 
various factors playing a role. In advanced countries, low labour intensity in Europe may well have 
had a positive impact on productivity growth as high wage cost have led to a substitution of capital for 
labour and a big degree of layoff of low-skilled workers. At the same time, however, much of the rise 
in part-time work is located in service industries, which are often characterised by slower productivity 
growth than manufacturing industries. Moreover under the influence of rapid technological change 
and more flexible labour markets, the U.S. economy has been more successful in raising productivity 
during the 1990s despite a slower decline in hours than in Europe.  
 
In low-income countries low labour intensity may be a sign of insufficient potential for growth, 
restricting productivity growth. On the other hand, however, high labour intensity (such as in Africa), 
with most labour remaining concentrated in agriculture and handicraft industries, is rather a sign of 
lack of structural change than of a realisation of opportunities. Hence it is necessary to take a better 
look at changes in the composition of labour and the quality of jobs. 
 
                                                 
16 This pattern of innovation does not immediately lead to higher labour productivity growth as it main ly caters 
for more people working the land to produce more output. Hence the Boserupian type of innovation mainly 
supports extensive growth, although it does raise the productivity of land. 
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2.4 The Role of Human Capital 
 
Apart from the expansion of employment and changes in the composition of workers, the work 
content and work environment also changed fundamentally in broad segments of the world economy 
during the past two centuries. Job content changed in response to increased efficiency, economies of 
scale and major technological and organisational changes.  
 
To describe the change in the quality of jobs in the long term, the primary focus must be on the 
improvements in health and education of the population and the labour force, which have been 
essential to enhance human welfare and economic development. In particular the substantial 
lengthening of life expectancy has greatly improved the quality of life in general, and that of job 
content more specifically. A longer expected lifetime increases the future returns on education and 
makes it worthwhile to at least temporarily give up working time and earnings in order to improve 
skills and raise earnings capacity for the future.  
 
The most widely available evidence on the improvements in education and health comes from the 
increase in life expectancy at birth and the rise in literacy rates. Nowadays both indicators are used – 
together with GDP per capita – in the Human Development Index of the United Nations. From a 
historical point of view, the improvement in these indicators has been unprecedented.17 Life 
expectancy for the world as a whole increased from 26 years in 1820 to 49 years in 1950 and 66 years 
in 1999. In most advanced countries it went up to close to 80 years, but even in the developing world 
it increased to well above 60 years, except for some regions, for example Africa – where it is still on 
52 (Maddison, 2001, p. 30). Literacy rates have also strongly improved although there is much 
variation in particular in the developing world, where it ranged between as low as 50 and more than 
90 per cent (see Table 2.12). Moreover, there is a striking difference between literacy rates of men 
and women in many countries, which directly links back to the discussion above on the variation in 
female participation rates across countries.  
 
To measure the impact of health and education on productivity, one may perceive the effort to obtain 
education as an investment that contributes to the creation of human capital. Human capital may be 
defined as: “The knowledge, skills, competencies and attributes embodied in individuals that facilitate 
the creation of personal, socia l and economic well-being” (OECD, 2001, p. 18).18 Although the 
overall evidence clearly points towards larger stocks of human capital over the past two centuries, the 
measurement issues are substantial.  
 
                                                 
17 See also Crafts (2002). 
18 Except from its impact on economic growth, education can also be seen as a means of greater personal 
fulfilment, as an instrument for social continuity and cohesion or as support to social mobility (Maddison 1974). 
In more recent work the concept of social capital has been introduced as a strong complementary factor to 
human capital. Whereas human capital reflects an investment that is primarily made and is largely appropriated 
by the individual, social capital deals with social relationships, norms of behaviour and mutual trust in many 
kinds of social and economic activities (OECD, 2001). 
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There are essentially four ways to measure human capital. Due to its wide availability, the first 
measure of schooling is the enrolment in education is mostly used. 19 However, there are major 
problems with this measure due to definitional problems and because enrolment is a measure of input 
rather than output of the education system. It measures the efforts to obtain education, but it does not 
tell us much about the output from the education process. Moreover it takes time before investments 
in education will yield their expected returns.  
 
Table 2.12: Literates as % of Adult Population (15+) 
increase increase
1970 2000 (%-point) 1970 2000 (%-point)
South and Eastern Europe
  Greece 79.2 96.0 16.8 94.7 98.5 3.8
  Spain 88.2 96.8 8.6 95.2 98.6 3.4
  Romania 89.7 97.2 7.5 97.0 99.0 2.0
  Croatia 85.5 97.3 11.8 97.5 99.3 1.8
Asia
  China 35.6 76.3 40.7 66.2 91.7 25.5
  Indonesia 44.0 82.1 38.1 68.9 91.9 23.0
  South Korea 80.1 96.4 16.3 93.7 99.1 5.4
  Malaysia 46.1 83.5 37.4 70.3 91.4 21.1
  Viet Nam 72.3 91.4 19.1 91.1 95.5 4.4
  India 18.5 45.4 26.9 46.8 68.4 21.6
Latin America
  Argentina 92.3 96.8 93.6 96.9
  Bolivia 45.8 79.4 33.6 70.4 92.1 21.7
  Chile 87.2 95.5 8.3 89.3 95.9 6.6
  Uruguay 93.4 98.2 4.8 92.5 97.4 4.9
  Mexico 69.8 89.4 19.6 80.0 93.3 13.3
  Guatemala 37.3 61.3 24.0 53.0 76.2 23.2
Africa
  Cote d'Ivoire 6.4 38.8 32.4 24.7 54.9 30.2
  Nigeria 10.2 55.8 45.6 30.6 72.4 41.8
  Malawi 19.6 46.5 26.9 58.1 74.5 16.4
  Uganda 21.5 56.9 35.4 51.4 77.6 26.2
  Zimbabwe 48.9 84.7 35.8 66.2 92.8 26.6
Middle East
  Morocco 8.1 36.1 28.0 31.7 61.9 30.2
  Saudi Arabia 17.1 67.2 50.1 51.9 84.1 32.2
  Yemen 2.3 25.2 22.9 26.8 67.5 40.7
Female Male
 
Source: UNESCO, Global Education Database 
 
The second measure therefore focuses on the output of the education system by looking at the 
educational attainment of the labour force (or working age population) which can be measured as the 
                                                 
19 See, for example, UNESCO, Global Education Database (http://qesdb.cdie.org/ged/index.html ). 
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years of education per individual, if possible corrected for the composition of primary, secondary and 
tertiary education. Table 2.13 shows the average years of education for a selected number of advanced 
and developing countries, showing the important progress made in both advanced and developing 
countries. 
 
Table 2.13: Years of Education per Person of 15 years and older 
1913 1950 1973 1984
France 7.0 9.6 11.7 13.7
Germany 8.4 10.3 11.6 11.9
Japan 5.4 9.1 12.1 13.6
United Kingdom 8.1 10.8 12.1 13.1
United States 7.9 11.3 14.1 16.2
OECD Average 7.3 10.2 12.3 13.7
China 2.2 4.0 5.7
India 1.4 2.6 3.9
South Korea 3.4 6.8 11.4
Taiwan 3.6 7.4 12.6
Asian average 2.6 5.2 8.4
Argentina 4.8 7.0 9.3
Brazil 2.1 3.8 5.6
Chile 6.1 8.0 9.8
Mexico 2.6 5.2 7.1
Latin American average 3.9 6.0 7.9
USSR 4.1 8.3 11.5
Source: Maddison (1989), Table 6.8; weighted for shares of primary, 
secondary and tertiary education  
 
However, both the measures of enrolment and attainment largely overlook the significant 
improvement in the quality of education. The third human capital measure, which has gained more 
popularity in recent decades, due to increased data availability, therefore focuses on direct measures 
of educational achievement, such as surveys of literacy or mathematical skills. Recently these efforts 
have been combined in the OECD Program for International Student Assessment (PISA), which 
covers OECD countries as well as an increasing number of non-OECD countries.20 Despite the virtues 
of these direct measures of educational quality, there are still important issues concerning survey and 
test limitations and international comparability of the measures (OECD, 2001). Moreover none of 
these measures deals with the skills and competencies that are gained after completing formal 
education, although some measures are included in the Adult Literacy and Life Skills (ALL) survey, 
including attitudes to teamwork, problem-solving, practical cognition skills and the working with 
information technology (OECD, Statistics Canada and U.S. National Center for Education Statistics). 
 
                                                 
20 See http://www.pisa.oecd.org/   
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The fourth measure of human capital avoids the issue of quality differences in educational attainment 
altogether by focusing directly on the market value of human capital which is measured as the 
earnings at different levels of educational attainment. This approach assumes that earnings 
differentials reflect differences in the returns to human capital creation, which may become 
problematic in particular when comparing countries with very different institutional arrangements in 
their labour markets (see Chapter 3). The major advantage of the latter measure, however, is that it 
can be relatively easily used in measuring the impact of education on output and productivity growth. 
 
Given the fact that human capital is widely accepted as an important means to strengthen the growth 
potential, there has been a huge research effort to measure the effects of education on growth. Again 
various approaches can be distinguished. 21  Firstly, with the availability of earnings measures, a 
substantial body of research has focused on measuring the private and social returns to education. 
Such measures reflect the private benefits relative to either the private or total cost of education, with 
the latter including both private and public expenditure on education. Table 2.14 shows measures of 
private and social benefits for a recent year (mostly in the 1970s or 1980s) for 42 countries 
(Psacharopoulos and Patrinos 2002). These measures confirm earlier evidence that (1) private returns 
to education exceed social returns (partly because the latter does not capture the social benefits of 
education); (2) returns on primary education exceed those on secondary and higher education; and (3) 
that returns are highest in lower and middle income countries.  
 
According to Temple (2001) one major problem concerning the measurement of returns to investment 
in education concerns the causal interpretation. Higher returns may be caused by differences in 
education, but they may also drive the decision on whether or not to take education in the first place. 
These issues are partly tackled in growth regression analysis which provides a way of testing the 
relationship between, on the one hand, years of schooling and, on the other hand, per capita income 
and productivity by using time lags on the variables in question. The evidence suggests a positive 
impact of education on growth but the size of the effect that is usually found is not very large. For 
example, Bassanini and Scarpetta (2001) show that for a sample of 21 OECD countries an extra year 
of average schooling raises output per capita by 6 per cent. The effect may be somewhat larger for 
lower income countries, but there is also substantial more variation across low income countries 
(Benhabib and Spiegel 1994). Other factors, related to social capabilities, interact with the effect of 
education on growth. Moreover in particular with large samples of countries most studies have relied 
on the somewhat imperfect measure of enrolment in schooling as a measure of human capital. 
 
The final approach to measure the relationship between human capital and growth is through applying 
a growth accounting framework. This approach is embedded in a production function framework 
relating human capital and physical capital to output, using their marginal products as weights to 
measure their impact on growth. The residual of the growth accounting function reflects the rise in 
efficiency (called total factor productivity) beyond the accumulation of physical and human capital 
inputs. Despite some serious limitations of the growth accounting approach, in particular the inability 
to test for complementarity of factor inputs and other social and technological capabilities, it is  
particularly useful in case very detailed measures of labour input and earnings differentials by skill 
                                                 
21 See Temple (2001) for an extensive review of these approaches. 
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Table 2.14: Returns to Investment in Education by Level (latest year) 
Social Returns
Primary Secondary Higher Primary Secondary Higher
OECD 13.4 11.3 11.6 8.5 9.4 8.5
Non-OECD Europe,
  Middle East and N-Africa 13.8 13.6 18.8 15.6 9.7 9.9
Asia (non-OECD) 20.0 15.8 18.2 16.2 11.1 11.0
Latin America & Caribbean 26.6 17.0 19.5 17.4 12.9 12.3
Sub-Saharan Africa 27.6 24.6 27.8 25.4 18.4 11.3
World 26.6 17.0 19.0 18.9 13.1 10.8
Private Returns
 
Source: Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2002), Table 1 
 
category can be obtained. An additional step can be made to extend the growth accounts with a set of 
accounts that treat the education sector more explicitly. For example, Jorgenson and Fraumeni (1992) 
calculate a measure of education output, with human capital being defined as the discounted stream of 
lifetime income of each person, given age, sex and level of educational attainment. Unfortunately the 
evidence from growth accounting studies concerning the effect of education on growth is limited in 
particular for developing countries, and the effects of education on growth that are found do not go 
much beyond to what the marginal product suggests, hence generating limited additional productivity 
growth. 
 
One issue that continuously interferes with analysing the impact of human capital on growth is the 
difficulty to measure possible spillover (that is, productivity) effects from education. Szirmai (1997) 
mentions five objectives of investments in education: (1) the promotion of growth and development; 
(2) the modernisation of social attitudes and mentalities; (3) political socialisation, increasing civic 
responsibility, national integration and consciousness; (4) reducing social inequality and increasing 
social mobility; and (5) contributing to personal development and freedom through emancipation. 
Although only the first objective directly considers economic development, the other four can 
contribute indirectly to improvements of the human capital stock and institutional change. Education 
feeds the social capabilities that are required for the realisation of the economic potential. 
 
The main conclusion to be derived from this discussion is that despite the world-wide improvements 
in the quality of education and health, the direct measured effects on economic growth are limited. 
Indeed whereas measures of education and health have converged between developing and advanced 
countries, and human capital creation has positively impacted growth about everywhere, it has not 
stopped the process of divergence in productivity and per capita income over the past two centuries. 
Clearly the creation of human capital is insufficient on itself to generate economic growth. 
 
To understand how the virtuous circle of creating more productive jobs through human capital 
creation can be started and sustained, further attention is required for the interaction between the 
creation of human capital and other factors impacting social and technological capabilities. For 
example, on the one hand engineers and natural scientists who play an important direct role in 
research and development activities. The economic returns on knowledge and skills enhanced by 
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education is largely sector and technology specific. On the other hand, the development of such 
specific skills also requires an amount of general knowledge. The optimal balance between general 
knowledge and creation of specific skills is very difficult to grasp. Goldin and Katz (1999) have 
analysed various types of technology-skill complementarities over the long run in the United States. 
They found that the factory system that came along with the industrial revolution and mass-
production techniques required large amounts of unskilled and cheap labour. Meanwhile the skills 
used in the traditional handicraft and manufacturing were disappearing rapidly because they became 
obsolete. More recently, however, technological change has become more and more skill biased 





This aim of this chapter has been to keep the reader primarily focused on the long run trends in 
productivity and employment related factors. The long term focus will help to understand what 
determines the potential for productivity growth, how this potential is realised and how it is related 
with the creation of decent jobs.22 It also avoids pitfalls which may arise when taking the short run 
issues as the point of departure. An exclusive focus on remedies that solve short run problem can lead 
to policy mistakes that negatively impact the ability to achieve the long run objective, namely a higher 
living standards for a larger share of the world population. 
 
This review of the long term development of the relationship between employment creation and 
economic performance shows that the rise in income and productivity over the past two centuries has 
gone together with large shifts in the composition of labour both in terms of quantity and quality. 
Although the evidence generally points in the direction of the creation of more productive and high 
quality jobs in the world economy, there are large and increasing differences in growth performance 
across countries. The analytical framework introduced in this chapter stresses the importance of social 
capabilities to exploit the growth potential, and the need for a balanced institutional framework to 
realised the potential. 
 
To understand the conditions under which this potential is not created or realised, the focus needs to 
be shifted to the medium run, during which many of the relevant institutions that support or frustate 
the virtuous circle of productivity, employment and povery alleviation are shaped. This will be the 
focus of Chapter 3. However, the lesson to be learned from the present chapter is that medium term 
considerations and policy measures associated with it should be seen in the light of the evidence from 




                                                 
22 Although there is continued discussion abou the precise definition of decent jobs, the following characteristics 
have been attributed to it: it provides productive and secure work; it ensures respect of labour rights; it provides 
an adequate income; it offers social protection; it includes social dialogue, union freedom, collective bargaining 
and participation (see http://www.ilo.org/public/english/region/ampro/cinterfor/publ/sala/dec_work/ii.htm)  
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In chapter two we focused on the long run trends of income, productivity, population and 
employment. We exemplified how in the long run productivity and employment growth are positively 
related. However, we also showed that the dynamics of growth have gone together with large shifts in 
the composition of labour both in terms of quantity and quality. These changes have important 
repercussions for the relation between productivity and employment growth at particular points in 
time, for particular countries, specific sectors of the economy, and certain groups of workers in the 
society. This chapter is centered around the question when and under which conditions the positive 
relationship between productivity and employment turns into a trade-off. These conditions are 
becoming most visible in a medium run perspective.  
 
In Section 3.2 we outline four ways to look empirically at the trade-off between productivity and 
employment. The first way is to simply focus on the frequency at which productivity and employment 
growth rates are negatively related. Secondly, we focus on how often an acceleration in productivity 
growth goes together with a deceleration in employment growth. Thirdly we look at the trade-off 
between productivity growth versus a decline in labour intensity. The fourth version of the trade-off 
relates productivity growth to a slowdown in the quality of employment. 
 
The chapter then continues by discussing the trade-off in the light of two approaches in the literature. 
We first refer to the theory of equilibrium unemployment (Section 3.3). This literature suggests that in 
the medium run – with a given state of technological and social capabilities – the relation between 
productivity and employment growth depends on the institutional environment which determines the 
flexibility of labour market arrangement.23 In particular labour market rigidities and product market 
regulations play a key role in this framework. Secondly, we focus on the debate concerning the 
changes in capital-labour ratios and their impact on labour productivity. It is shows that changes in the 
relative prices of capital and labour are driven by underlying changes in the composition of capital (in 
particular the increasing share of ICT capital) and labour (in particular higher skills) and related 
technological change which has been referred as skill-biased. 
Finally, Section 3.4 looks in more detail at the role of income distribution in relation to the 
productivity and employment growth. Although it is well known that personal income distribution is 
an important endogenous cause behind accumulation of human capital, there is virtually no literature 
on the relationship between personal income inequality and economic growth. We discuss how 
productivity and employment growth may be related to changes in the relative shares of capital and 
labour in national income, i.e. the functional distribution of income. The latter is the result of changes 
in factor prices, elasticities and technological change. Although some clearly distinct patterns can be 
discerned when comparing countries in Asia and Latin America, more research will be needed to 
understand the dynamics of these patterns in the light of differences in structural and institutional 
change in these countries. 
                                                 
23 See also Landmann (2002) for a more extensive overview. 
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3.2. The Trade-off between Productivity and Employment  
 
Essentially there are four ways to approach the trade-off between productivity and employment: 
1) The first and simplest approach is to see whether productivity and employment growth are 
negatively related. In particular we are interested in cases where productivity rises at the expense 
of employment reductions. This may also be referred to as “jobless growth”. Although 
productivity growth and employment growth tend to be weakly negatively related, a rise in 
productivity only coincides with a decline in employment in a very limited numbers of cases. This 
is most notably so in situations where extraordinary structural reforms take place correcting for 
major malfunctionings of the economic model, such as in the former socialist economies of 
Central and Eastern Europe during the 1990s. 
2) The second somewhat more subtle version of the trade-off is where the acceleration (or 
deceleration) of productivity growth goes together with a slowdown (or acceleration) in 
employment growth. There are many cases where this type of trade-off occurs, changing the 
fortunes of countries to jump on the virtuous circle of productivity and employment growth. 
3) Thirdly, the trade-off can be interpreted as a case where the growth in productivity goes together 
with a decline in labour intensity, i.e. a fall in working hours per person employed and/or a 
decline in the employment to population ratio. This implies that per capita income, as a proxy for 
living standards and poverty alleviation, increases more slowly than productivity. 
4) The fourth version of the trade-off is related to the quality of employment. If productivity growth 
primarily implies more jobs but of lower quality, in terms of lower real wages, a quality trade-off 
with potential impact on slower income growth may be the result. 
 
Productivity and employment growth 
Figure 3.1 provides an assessment of the long run interaction between employment and productivity 
growth for a cross-section of 66 countries, in which all parts of the world are included, from 1980 to 
2000. Although a weak negative relationship between productivity and employment growth can be 
distinguished, the world wide picture looks very diverse. More than two-thirds of the countries are in 
the northeast quadrant of the diagram, exhibiting both productivity and employment growth. Within 
this quadrant there is no positive or negative relationship. 
 
A closer analysis of the other quadrants suggests a distinctive concentration of certain “country 
clubs”. The four countries in the northwest quadrant (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary) 
and the two countries in the southwest quadrant (Romania and the former Soviet Union) are all 
transition economies, which experienced a rapid decline in employment during the 1990s. Following 
the fall of the Berlin Wall in late 1989, the imminent crisis that had built up from a faltering economy 
during the communist period called for rapid structural reforms. These reforms followed upon a crisis 
that fully emerged after the planning system collapsed. When borders opened up and markets 
liberalized, the lack of competitiveness of these economies became revealed. While many firms 
collapsed, only the most productive businesses survived. Many people lost their jobs, and on the 
whole growth rates of output and productivity turned negative or at best remained modestly positive. 
Hence the loss of jobs during the previous decade was not the result of productivity growth. On the 
contrary, it was the result of stagnating productivity levels during the communist era. Yet this process 
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of rationalisation appeared necessary to generate positive economic dynamics and renewed job 
creation.   
 






























Note: Employment growth measured as growth in number of persons employed 
Source: Groningen Growth and Development Centre 
(http://www.ggdc.net/dseries/totecon.shtml) and ILO (2003), KILM 18 
 
In the southeast quadrant a fair amount of countries can be found with positive or even very high 
growth rates of employment but negative productivity growth. These countries are mainly located in 
Africa, Latin America (Brazil, Venezuela and Peru) and the Middle East. High employment growth in 
these countries is primarily explained by high population growth but with slow growth in output and 
income per capita. Yet, some resource rich economies like South Africa and Venezuela are also 
characterised by economic stagnation. These countries failed to create enough productive jobs to raise 
average income levels, in spite of their resource abundance. 
 
Productivity and employment acceleration 
A more subtle version of the productivity-employment trade-off is to look at whether an acceleration 
in productivity growth is related to a deceleration in employment growth. Table 3.1 compares the 
acceleration and deceleration of productivity and labour input growth by major region in 1973-1990 
over 1960-1973, and in 1990-2000 over 1973-1990. 
 
A negative relation between the change in productivity and labour input growth rates is clearly 
confirmed. For the world economy as a whole, growth in output per hour strongly decelerated after 
1973 whereas labour input growth slightly accelerated. This relationship was found across regions, 
with the exception of Asia, where China accelerated productivity growth without reducing labour 
y = 1.8544 – 0.4491x 
R2=.1062 
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input growth, and India realised moderate productivity growth with a substantial rise in labour input 
growth rates. From 1990-2000 the cards turned, as a moderate worldwide acceleration in productivity 
growth was offset by a substantial slowdown in labour input growth. However, the slowdown did not 
always occur in regions with accelerated productivity growth. For example, Japan, the transition 
economies, East Asia and Africa showed a slowdown in both productivity and employment growth. In 
China, South Asia, Latin America and the Middle East, faster productivity growth was achieved at the 
cost of a slowdown in labour input growth. 
 
Table 3.1: Relationship between Acceleration/Deceleration in Labour Productivity and 
Employment Growth, 1960-1973, 1973-1990, 1990-2000 
1973-1990 1990-2000 1973-1990 1990-2000
over over over over
1960-1973 1973-1990 1960-1973 1973-1990
Major Europe (a) -2.5 -0.5 0.2 0.3
Major non-Europe, of which (b) -2.0 0.1 -0.1 -0.5
  Japan -5.2 -0.8 -0.3 -1.5
  United States -1.3 0.3 0.0 0.0
Transition Economies -1.1 -1.9 -1.9 -1.5
  CEE countries (c) -2.6 2.1 -0.6 -1.7
  former USSR -0.3 -6.0 -2.5 -0.3
Asia (d) 0.8 1.4 0.5 -1.0
  East Asia -0.9 -0.1 -1.4 -1.3
  South East Asia -0.9 0.4 0.8 -1.5
  China 2.3 2.3 0.0 -1.0
  South Asia 0.2 1.3 1.2 -0.9
Latin America -2.8 0.7 0.1 -0.5
Africa -2.3 -0.5 0.3 -0.1
Middle East -7.1 1.4 0.9 -0.4
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
World -2.0 0.7 0.3 -0.7
Total hours workedGDP per hour worked
 
(a) excluding transition economies, including Turkey; (b) Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Japan and 
United States; (c) Central and Eastern European countries, excluding former USSR; (d) excluding 
Japan 
Source: Groningen Growth and Development Centre (http://www.ggdc.net/dseries/totecon.shtml) and 
ILO (2003), KILM 18. 
 
The relative positions of Europe and the U.S. concerning the trade-off between productivity and 
labour input growth has been the subject of substantial debate in the literature as well as among policy 
makers. Up to the mid 1990s, labour productivity growth in the European Union was substantially 
higher than in the United States but with a much less impressive labour input performance. In fact 
labour input growth in Europe was negative up to the 1990s, whereas it increased on average at 1.6 
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per cent per year in the United States. This EU-US differential may be referred to as the Atlantic 
Divide (Siebert 1997; Nickell 1997). The situation in Europe improved somewhat during the 1990s as 
labour input growth accelerated but at the cost of a substantial slowdown in labour productivity 
growth. In contrast, in the U.S. productivity growth accelerated during the 1990s without a slowdown 
in employment growth.  
 
Figure 3.2: Relation between Acceleration of Labour Input Growth and Labour Productivity 











-7 -5 -3 -1 1 3



































-7 -5 -3 -1 1 3


























However, the comparison of the change in productivity labour input growth may still not tackle the 
trade-off issue in an adequate way.24 Firstly, in addition to the U.S., there have been many other 
                                                 
24 One issue, not dealt with here, is that a comparison of labour productivity growth and changes in 
unemployment will easily do away with the trade-off hypothesis on the Atlantic Divide. Whereas productivity 
y = -2.2664 – 0.7256x 
R2=.1324 
y = -0.1633 – 0.6452x 
R2=.1730 
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countries which have succeeded to accelerate both productivity and labour input during sub-periods. 
Figure 3.2 shows the frequency of the trade-off for the sample of 66 countries in our database. 
Countries in the northwest and the southeast quadrant concern a trade-off. Although the relation 
between the change in productivity growth and labour input growth is significantly negative, it is 
strongly dominated by a small number of outlie rs (including such countries as United Arab Emirates, 
Iran and Saudi Arabia).  
 
Change in trade -offs between change in productivity growth and labour input growth, number 
of countries 




 1973-1990 over 1960-73 
Labour input growth 
acceleration 
4  31  
Labour input growth 
deceleration 
5 26  
 1990-2000 over 1973-1990 
Labour input growth 
acceleration 
9 16 
Labour input growth 
deceleration 
28 13 
Trade-offs are in bold & italics 
 
The overview above shows that although the number of countries that have shown an acceleration in 
productivity growth significantly increased when comparing the last two periods (1990-2000 over 
1973-1990) with the first two periods (1973-1990 over 1960-1973), the number of cases showing a 
deceleration in labour input growth has also increased. Still the number of countries which showed 
both an acceleration in productivity and labour input growth (including Myanmar, Argentina, 
Denmark, Venezuela, Ivory Coast, Ireland, Malaysia, Israel and the United Kingdom) has increased 
whereas the number of countries which experienced a decline in both productivity and labour input 
growth halved. 
 
A second reason for not deriving too strong conclusions from this analysis, is because one not only 
needs to look at the rise in labour input, but also at changes in labour intensity, i.e. the share of 
employed labour relative to potential labour. In the next subsection we focus on the relationship 
between labour productivity and labour intensity. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
growth slowed down, and labour input growth slightly accelerated, unemployment rates in many European 
countries – notably in Germany - have continued to go up (Landmann, 2002, Figure 2). This suggests that 
despite a rise in labour hours, the potential for increasing labour input in Europe has remained unrealised to a 
large extent. 
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Productivity growth and labour intensity 
As the extent to which productivity growth can contribute to poverty alleviation is a key area of 
interest for this report, we are also interested in how productivity and labour intensity interact, as both 
together determine the development of per capita income. The relationship can be simple laid out as 
follows. The growth in income per head of the population (DO/P) is a function of the change in labour 
productivity  (DO/H) and labour intensity, expressed as the number  of working hours per head on the 
population (DH/P): 
 
DO/P  = DO/H * DH/P (1) 
 
Then, the change in working hours per person is decomposed into the change in hours worked per 
person employed (H/E) and the change in the share of employment in the total population (E/P): 
 
DH/P = DH/E * DE/P (2) 
 
The change in the employment/population ratio (E/P) can be further broken down into the number of 
persons employed relative to the total labour force (i.e., employed persons plus registered unemployed 
persons) (E/L), the ratio of the labour force to all persons aged 15 to 64 (i.e., the working age 
population) (L/P1564) and the share of the working age population in the total population (P1564/P) 
(see van Ark and McGuckin 1999): 
 
DE/P = DE/L * DL/P1564 * DP1564/P (3) 
 
In Table 3.2 we provide the breakdown as above for the periods (1960-73, 1973-90 and 1990-2000). 
As for many developing countries the formal unemployment rate has little meaning because of the 
incidence of underemployment we only look at the employment share in the working age population 
(DE/P1564).  
 
The Table shows some important differences across regions. In Europe the rise in productivity growth 
has not been fully translated in growth in GDP per capita. Between 1973 and 1990 productivity 
growth in Europe increased 0.6 percentage point faster than per capita income. This is in particular 
due to a continuous slowdown in working hours per person employed. In addition a slowdown in 
employment/population ratios (in particular in Northwest European countries) has further contributed 
to the gap between productivity and income growth rates in Europe.  
 
In Japan the gap between productivity and income growth rates became particularly large since 1990. 
But before 1990 growth rates in Japan were much faster than in Europe, and on balance labour 
intensity increased so that income growth was somewhat faster than productivity growth. The latter is 
also true for the United States, mainly because of continuous increases in the employment-working 
age population share. Hence the different trade-offs between work and leisure (or involuntary 
inactivity) within the OECD group of countries again emerge from this Table. In the transition 
economies the trade-off between productivity and labour intensity has been particularly strong during 
the 1990s. 
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East and Southeast Asia represent the clearest case of rapid productivity growth that avoided the 
trade-off with declining working hours and participation rates. In addition to productivity growth rates 
which were roughly double  that of the Western world since 1960, increased participation has added 
up to 1.5 per cent per year to the growth rates of per capita income, although the effect diminished 
somewhat during the 1990s. In Southeast Asia labour force participation growth turned negative 
during the 1990s, in particular because of the strong decline in employment since the Asian crisis.  
 
When looking at the other developing regions, the effects of increased labour force participation on 
GDP per capita are much smaller or zero, showing that the demographic transition has not 
materialized into a demographic gift.25 The share of the working age population to the total population 
has turned strongly positive in most developing countries during the 1990s, notably in Latin America, 
Africa and the Middle East. Instead of viewing this as a positive contribution to per capita income 
growth, we should stress here the dismal productivity performance. Indeed productivity growth in 
these regions could have been much higher, had the rise in the working age population been turned 
into a demographic gift as in East Asia. 
 
The estimates of trade-off between productivity growth and changes in labour intensity can also be 
viewed from a comparative perspective by focusing on relative levels. In Table  3.3 we present labour 
productivity and per capita income as a percentage of the U.S. level. The labour market indicators 
represent the labour intensity relative to the U.S., contributing positively or negatively to the per 
capita income gap. The estimates show that in Europe, lower working hours and lower rates of 
employment to working age population together account for 22 percentage points of the difference 
between the productivity and per capita income gap relative to the United States. In other OECD 
countries (Australia, Canada and New Zealand) this largely arises from lower labour force 
participation only. In East and South East Asia, per capita income gaps relative to the U.S. are mostly 
smaller than productivity gaps, whereas the opposite is the case for South Asia and in particular for 
Latin America.  
                                                 
25 It should be stressed that the zero-effects on hours worked are due to assumption that in many developing 
countries we assumed average working hours per person to remain unchanged. 
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Table 3.2: Decomposition of labour productivity growth into effects of working hours, labour 
force participation and GDP per capita, 1960-2000 
Country or area GDP per Effect of GDP per Effect of Effect of GDP per 
hour working person employment active capita
worked hours1 employed as a percent population 5
2 of working (aged 15 to 64)
age population as a percent of
(aged 15 to 64)3 total population4
Major Europe (a)
1960-73 5.0 -0.8 4.2 -0.2 -0.2 3.8
1973-90 2.5 -0.7 1.8 0.1 -0.1 1.9
1990-00 2.0 -0.3 1.7 -0.1 0.1 1.7
Japan
1960-73 8.0 -0.2 7.8 -0.2 0.4 8.1
1973-90 2.8 -0.3 2.6 0.2 0.2 2.9
1990-00 2.0 -0.9 1.1 0.2 -0.2 1.1
United States
1960-73 2.6 -0.3 2.2 0.2 0.5 3.0
1973-90 1.3 -0.2 1.1 0.7 0.1 1.9
1990-00 1.5 0.3 1.9 0.3 0.0 2.1
Other Major Non-Europe (b)
1960-73 3.4 -0.5 3.0 -0.7 0.6 2.9
1973-90 1.7 -0.3 1.4 -0.2 0.3 1.5
1990-00 1.8 0.0 1.8 -0.2 0.0 1.6
Transition Economies
1960-73 2.6 -0.3 2.3 0.7 0.4 3.4
1973-90 1.5 -0.2 1.3 -0.5 -0.1 0.7
1990-00 -0.3 0.0 -0.3 -1.9 0.4 -1.8
East Asia
1960-73 5.5 0.3 5.8 0.9 0.6 7.3
1973-90 4.7 -0.1 4.5 0.5 0.9 5.9
1990-00 4.5 -0.2 4.3 0.2 0.4 4.9
SE Asia
1960-73 3.2 0.0 3.2 0.0 0.0 3.2
1973-90 2.2 0.0 2.2 0.4 0.6 3.2
1990-00 2.6 0.0 2.7 -0.7 0.6 2.6
China
1960-73 1.3 0.0 1.3 0.4 0.0 1.7
1973-90 3.6 0.0 3.6 0.0 1.0 4.7




Table 3.2: continued 
GDP per Effect of GDP per Effect of Effect of GDP per 
hour working person employment active capita
worked hours1 employed as a percent population 5
2 of working (aged 15 to 64)
age population as a percent of
(aged 15 to 64)3 total population4
South Asia
1960-73 1.8 0.0 1.8 -0.7 -0.1 1.1
1973-90 2.0 0.0 2.0 0.2 0.3 2.5
1990-00 3.3 -0.1 3.2 -0.2 0.3 3.3
Latin America
1960-73 3.3 -0.2 3.0 -0.3 0.1 2.8
1973-90 0.4 -0.4 0.0 0.1 0.5 0.7
1990-00 1.1 0.0 1.1 -0.3 0.6 1.5
Africa
1960-73 2.6 0.0 2.6 0.0 -0.2 2.5
1973-90 0.3 0.0 0.3 -0.2 0.1 0.2
1990-00 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.3 0.5 0.0
Middle East
1960-73 6.4 0.0 6.4 -0.4 -0.1 5.9
1973-90 -0.7 0.0 -0.7 -0.2 0.1 -0.9
1990-00 0.7 0.0 0.7 -0.2 1.0 1.6
World
1960-73 3.2 -0.1 3.0 0.0 0.0 3.1
1973-90 1.2 -0.1 1.1 0.1 0.4 1.6
1990-00 1.9 0.0 1.9 -0.2 0.3 2.0
1  Calculated on the basis of actual hours worked per person per year.
2  Sum of columns 1 and 2.
3  Calculated on the basis of the ratio of employment to population 15-64
4  Calculated on the basis of employment force as a percent of the population aged 15 to 64.  
5  Sum of columns 3, 4 and 5.
(a): Western and Southern Europe, including Turkey
(b): Australia, Canada and New Zealand
Source: Groningen Growth and Development Centre (http://www.ggdc.net/dseries/totecon.shtml) 
and ILO (2003), KILM 18  
 51
Table 3.3: Decomposition of labour productivity level (U.S. = 100.0) into effects of working 
hours, labour force participation and GDP per capita, 1960-2000 
GDP per Effect of GDP per Effect of Effect of GDP per 
hour working person employment active capita
worked hours1 employed as as a percent population as percent of
as % a percent of of working (aged 15 to 64) of the U.S.5
of the U.S. of the U.S.2 age population as a percent of
(aged 15 to 64)3 total population4
Major Europe (a)
1960 46.2 3.0 49.2 1.7 6.5 57.3
1973 63.6 0.1 63.7 -1.5 1.6 63.9
1990 78.4 -6.1 72.3 -8.8 -0.6 63.0
2000 82.1 -11.2 70.9 -10.9 0.0 60.0
Japan
1960 26.6 1.7 28.4 4.6 2.3 35.2
1973 54.2 4.6 58.8 6.3 3.4 68.5
1990 70.7 5.3 76.0 0.7 4.2 80.9
2000 74.3 -3.9 70.4 0.3 2.4 73.1
United States
1960 100.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 100.0
1973 100.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 100.0
1990 100.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 100.0
2000 100.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 100.0
Other Major Non-Europe (b)
1960 51.0 1.6 52.6 4.6 -0.2 57.0
1973 57.1 1.0 58.0 -1.7 0.1 56.4
1990 60.9 0.2 61.1 -10.2 1.1 52.0
2000 62.8 -2.1 60.7 -12.7 1.4 49.4
Transition Economies
1960 23.6 2.1 25.7 4.7 1.9 32.2
1973 23.6 2.3 25.9 6.9 1.4 34.1
1990 24.6 2.3 26.9 0.7 0.2 27.8
2000 20.4 1.3 21.7 -3.8 0.9 18.7
East Asia
1960 13.6 3.2 16.8 -3.1 -1.2 12.5
1973 20.0 6.7 26.7 -3.0 -1.8 21.8
1990 35.6 12.4 48.0 -7.2 2.1 43.0
2000 48.0 13.4 61.4 -9.9 4.8 56.4
SE Asia
1960 9.2 1.1 10.3 0.7 -1.0 10.0
1973 9.9 1.7 11.6 0.5 -1.8 10.3
1990 11.7 2.5 14.1 -0.1 -1.3 12.8
2000 13.0 2.3 15.3 -1.5 -0.5 13.4
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Table 3.3: continued 
GDP per Effect of GDP per Effect of Effect of GDP per 
hour working person employment active capita
worked hours1 employed as as a percent population as percent of
as % a percent of of working (aged 15 to 64) of the U.S.5
of the U.S. of the U.S.2 age population as a percent of
(aged 15 to 64)3 total population4
China
1960 5.0 0.6 5.6 0.7 -0.4 5.9
1973 4.3 0.7 5.0 0.8 -0.7 5.0
1990 6.3 1.3 7.7 0.3 0.1 8.0
2000 9.8 1.7 11.5 0.4 0.4 12.3
South Asia
1960 5.9 0.7 6.5 0.2 -0.4 6.4
1973 5.3 0.9 6.2 -0.5 -0.8 5.0
1990 6.1 1.3 7.3 -1.1 -0.7 5.5
2000 7.2 1.1 8.4 -1.7 -0.6 6.1
Latin America
1960 32.5 2.7 35.2 -2.1 -3.4 29.7
1973 35.6 3.5 39.1 -4.7 -5.2 29.2
1990 30.9 1.9 32.7 -6.7 -2.5 23.5
2000 29.7 0.6 30.3 -7.5 -0.9 21.9
Africa
1960 6.9 0.8 7.8 2.2 -1.1 8.9
1973 7.0 1.2 8.2 2.1 -2.0 8.3
1990 6.0 1.2 7.2 0.6 -1.6 6.2
2000 5.0 0.9 5.9 0.1 -1.0 5.0
Middle East
1960 23.2 2.8 26.0 -0.6 -3.3 22.0
1973 38.2 6.5 44.7 -4.2 -8.2 32.4
1990 27.3 5.7 33.0 -7.6 -5.4 20.0
2000 25.2 4.3 29.5 -7.9 -2.7 18.8
1  Calculated on the basis of actual hours worked per person per year.
2  Sum of columns 1 and 2.
3  Calculated on the basis of the ratio of employment to population 15-64
4  Calculated on the basis of employment force as a percent of the population aged 15 to 64.  
5  Sum of columns 3, 4 and 5.
(a): Western and Southern Europe, including Turkey
(b): Australia, Canada and New Zealand
Source: Groningen Growth and Development Centre (http://www.ggdc.net/dseries/totecon.shtml) and
and ILO (2003), KILM 18  
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Productivity growth and better jobs 
Our final concern about the trade-off between productivity and employment is to the quality of 
employment rather than the pure quantity in terms of total hours worked. Productivity growth might 
be related to the creation of more jobs, but if these jobs are of lower quality, for example in terms of 
lower skill levels, a quality trade-off with potential impact on slower income growth may be the 
result.  
 
Labour quality can be measured in various ways. In Chapter 2 we focused on the measurement of 
labour skills in terms of literacy and educational attainment of the labour force. We concluded that the 
quality of jobs has substantially increased over the years, although the direct impact on productivity is 
hard to show. Another direct measure of labour quality, which also underlies the growth accounting 
methodology outlined in Section 2.4, concerns the payment to labour. The assumption is that the rise 
in real wages may be related to productivity growth, which in turn reflects a larger share of high-
skilled people in the labour force. 
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Note: real labour compensation is measured as total compensation of labour, adjusted for imputed income of 
self-employed (assume wages of employees) and deflated at the private consumption deflator.  
Source: Groningen Growth and Development Centre (http://www.ggdc.net/dseries/totecon.shtml) and ILO 
(2003), KILM 18.  
Private consumption deflator from OECD, Economic Outlook. 
 
 
Unfortunately, comprehensive measures of real wages (covering the total economy, all occupations 
and including all components of labour compensation) can only be obtained for a limited number of 
countries, mostly for OECD countries. Figure 3.3 shows the relationship between the growth in labour 
y = 1.0552 + 0.6526x 
R2=.5984 
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productivity (GDP per hour) and real labour compensation (total compensation deflated at the private 
consumption deflator) per hour from 1985-2000. 26 The chart shows a positive relationship between 
both measures, suggesting that productivity growth and real labour compensation move together in 
parallel. Figure 3.3. also shows that most observations are above the 45o-degree line. Hence in most 
countries labour productivity growth has increased faster than real wages since 1985. Only in 
Belgium, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and Turkey, real labour compensation grew faster. This 
implies that the rise in labour productivity during the 1990s has gone together with a higher rise in 
real capital compensation. We will return to this issue in Section 3.4. 
 
3.3 Labour Market Rigidities and Skill-Biased Technological Change 
 
The labour market literature on the theory of equilibrium unemployment suggests that the relation 
between productivity and employment growth can be either positive or negative depending on the 
time frame considered. In the short run, labour market disequilibria are related to the business cycle 
and arise as the demand for labour tends to be strongly inelastic. The elasticity in the medium run 
depends to a large extent on the institutional environment determining the exchange of labour effort. 
In the long run technological change determines the demand and supply of labour.   
 
In this section we will discuss two features of labour market rigidities that influence the trade-off 
between productivity and employment growth in the medium run. Firstly we discuss labour market 
equilibria under the assumption of structural unemployment and underemployment due to government 
intervention and positive costs of renegotiating labour contracts. Secondly we focus on the long run 
impact of technological change on capital, labour and skill ratios and their respective prices, in 
particular with respect to the complementarity of information and communication technology and 
skills. 
 
Labour supply and demand and equilibrium unemployment27 
Theoretically, explanations for structural unemployment can be separated into a supply-side and a 
demand-side part. On the supply side this boils to the principle that the (free) market clearing wage 
rate is some alternative source of income (e.g. a social benefit), so that the unemployed are not 
induced to search for a job. Unfortunately most of the theory in this area has focused on advanced 
countries, where labour supply and demand (in terms of total working hours) are assumed to be 
roughly equal in the long run. In advanced countries state benefits for unemployed induce an 
undersupply of labour in the medium run when these benefits exceed the rate of return to labour. The 
more generous and accessible the state benefit is, the more likely it is that people will opt for leisure 
above work. The same effect can arise from relatively high levels of income tax and social security 
payments which lower the level of net to gross income, and therefore reduce the attractiveness of 
offering labour over leisure.  
 
                                                 
26 The productivity measures and total labour compensation measures in nominal terms are derived from KILM 
18, and are based on GGDC estimates. 
27 For a more extended treatment of issues dealt with in this section, see Landmann (2002). 
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It is easy to see how productivity growth can enhance the supply of labour in these circumstances. As 
the marginal productivity of labour improves, higher wages raise the supply of labour. Decreasing 
unemployment benefits will in principle have the same effect, although it may have an offsetting 
effect on labour productivity growth as the relative price of labour falls and production may become 
more labour intensive (Blundell and MaCurdy 1999).  
 
On the demand side, insufficient labour demand may in theory be due to an institutionalized minimum 
wage rate which exceeds the marginal productivity of labour. In many industrialised countries 
minimum wages are set by state legislation. The minimum wage level results in a bottom line of the 
effective demand for labour by employers. Furthermore, company taxes and social security payments 
by the employers can raise labour costs and depress demand. This may also affect the supply side as 
the income gap between employees at the lower end of the market wage scale and the unemployed 
closes (Smith 2003).  
In developing countries state interventions in the labour market are often much weaker than in 
advanced countries. Under free labour market conditions, unemployment more often results from an 
oversupply of labour and an equilibrium wage level that falls below subsistence level. Such a free 
labour market outcome leads to a large amount of persons who are underemployed rather than 
unemployed, because the choice of supplying no labour at all is no option. Basically 
underemployment is the result of demographic growth exceeding the capacity of the economy to 
expand through innovations and creation of social capabilities that create new employment 
opportunities. The direct result of the rapid natural growth of the labour supply has resulted in the 
formation of large urban informal economy in the developing world (see also Section 4.4).    
 
The static disequilibria in the labour market described above are enforced by several inherent 
rigidities in the supply and demand for labour. In general relative prices of both skilled and unskilled 
labour adjust rather slowly to changes in labour supply and demand. Labour markets are often highly 
fragmented due to distinctive skill requirements and geographical and social bindings of workers. 
 
These dynamic disequilibria also occur because renegotiating a labour contract takes time and creates 
uncertainty due to imperfect information which incur additional costs. The costs of hiring and firing 
for employers may be too high to respond quickly to changes in wage rates or product demand. Hence 
employers keep workers employed at wages that exceed their marginal productivity because the costs 
of firing are even higher and the rate of return to labour is expected to rise in the future. But this 
argument also goes the other way as it may withhold employers from hiring additional labour. 
Employees may also hesitate to renegotiate their labour contract when they fear the risk of losing a 
job creating uncertainty in their future financial and social perspectives. The extent of negotiating 
power of employers and employees highly depends on the relative power of labour unions and the 
outcome of the political market (Booth 1995).   
 
In sum, most labour market rigidities result from institutional measures. These measures have often 
been introduced to protect labour against the risk of exploitation and sudden external shocks. 
However, they may also cause structural unemployment as labour demand falls short of its 
equilibrium level due to the relatively high labour costs incurred by legislation and taxation. The 
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amount of flexibility and rigidity in turn influences the response of employment to increases and 
decreases in productivity (Smith 2003).   
 
Factor-biased technological change 
Technological change supports productivity growth. In some cases technological change is neutral 
with respect to the demand of production factors, i.e. labour - skilled and unskilled -, capital and land. 
Many product innovations, for instance, are la rgely made possible through the opening up of new 
product markets and the creation of new sources of income, regardless of the relative amount of factor 
inputs needed in the production process. More often, however, technological change is considered to 
be factor biased (Hicks 1932; Autor, Krueger and Katz 1998; Acemoglu 2002).  
Suppose an economy has one relatively abundant factor (labour) and one relatively scarce factor 
(capital). It can be conceived that there is an incentive to direct innovations towards the abundant 
factor, economizing on the more expensive scarce factor. If there is a clear bias in technological 
change, it tends to enhance path dependency in innovation, that can be either labour saving or labour 
augmenting. A typical example of such a path-dependent growth process is the capital-intensive path 
followed by the USA and the more labour and skill intensive path of the UK and continental Europe 
during the 19th and early 20th centuries (Broadberry 1997). 
 
As a result of relative factor endowments and path dependent innovations, the response of 
employment to productivity increases can show large differences across economies. Biased or 
directed technological change can thus be induced by initial relative factor supplies. The elasticity of 
substitution of production factors also plays a role concerning the extent to which technological 
change is biased. Especially the supply of land and skilled labour can be quite inelastic even in the 
medium run, whereas the supply of capital and unskilled labour responds more easily.   
 
A good example of induced technological change concerns the specific direction of agricultural 
technological development. For example, most New World countries (North America and Oceania) 
are typically characterised by high land-labour ratios. As a result agricultural innovations have been 
directed towards mechanization. The use of new machines increased the use of the abundant factor 
land and saved on the relatively scarce factor labour. In contrast, in Asian countries with a rela tively 
low land-labour ratio, innovation efforts in agriculture have taken a path of applying labour intensive 
technologies, increasing yields per hectare of land. Clearly the focus of innovation was then on 
biological and chemical technologies centered around the introduction of new crop varieties that 
respond to fertilizers. Indeed employment growth in agriculture in Asia has been faster than in the 
New World. European countries have typically been positioned in the middle range of land- and 
labour-biased technological development in agriculure (Hayami and Ruttan 1985). It should be 
stressed, however, that in the long run these effects of directed technological change in agriculture are 
overshadowed by the structural change of the economy from agriculture to industry. As a result in 
almost all economies, productivity growth in agriculture is typically labour saving (van der Meer and 
Yamada 1989). 
 
With respect to the oversupply of labour in many developing countries displayed by the large number 
of underemployed persons, it has often been suggested that the industrialisation process of developing 
countries has been too capital-intensive given their relative resource endowments. This tendency is 
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partly related to the process of structural change itself and the (mostly) parallel process of increased 
openness for imports of foreign technology (Fei and Ranis 1997). Under the conditions of a rapid 
release of labour from agriculture in combination with the overall demographic transition, labour-
biased technological change would be the most optimal path of economic development for 
development countries. However, industrial technology has mostly been capital biased, partly because 
of the inherent role of machinery in industrialisation and because industrial technological 
development was largely based on the relative factor endowments of the traditionally industrialising 
countries. In an open economy environment, the relative prices of capital to labour have gone down. 
As a result increased global competition has forced economies to accumulate more capital and 
increase productivity. This relatively capital-intensive path of development has undoubtedly 
contributed to a trade-off between productivity and employment in developing countries. 
 
Policies to support labour-biased technological change, substituting productivity increases for more 
employment creation, do not appear to be a viable alternative for developing countries in the long run. 
Indeed worldwide technological development is strongly biased towards capital, and the quality-price 
ratio of the same products produced with labour-intensive technologies would be lower across almost 
the entire technological spectrum of labour-capital ratios, with the exception of some informal 
(relative closed) parts of the economy (see Section 4.4). As the global environment acts as a constraint 
that cannot be lifted, economic choices will be made within this constraint (Todaro and Smith 2003). 
More importantly, a growth path based on relative capital-intensive technologies can eventually also 
create more opportunities for welfare and employment improvement, in particular when countries 
export their products at comparatively low prices.  
 
Turning now to the most recent technology, namely information and communication technology 
(ICT), one can observe a large impact on the employment-productivity trade-off in the medium run. 
To fully understand the impact of ICT, the view of an homogenous labour market (where each 
labourer produces the same amount of output) needs to be dropped. As stated above, in reality the 
labour market consists of an aggregate set of (partly) separated markets with an enormous variety and 
complexity of labour activities. In particular one needs to distinguish between a market for unskilled 
and skilled labour, under the assumption that skilled people can perform unskilled work, but not vice 
versa.  
 
In the literature ICT is generally considered as a skill-biased technology (Berman et al. 1994; Autor et 
al. 1998). The increased use of ICT in the production of goods and services has thus caused changes 
in the demand for skilled versus unskilled labour and hence influenced their relative prices. The 
introduction and implementation of ICT in the production process often requires highly specialized 
ICT workers that are able to install hardware, software and build networks. Furthermore it requires 
skilled employees which can develop the most productive and profitable application of ICT. ICT is 
facilitated largely by a substantial supply of skilled labour, and as a result drives up the reward of 
skilled labour relative to the wages of the unskilled. ICT also substitutes for certain types of functions, 
because the computer takes over tasks that were previously executed manually. Hence manual 
administrative and accounting and computing tasks can be reduced. Various types of personal 
communication are being replaced by digital communication. Hence the application of ICT increases 
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the relative price gap between skilled and unskilled labour, as it saves on unskilled labour thereby 
reducing the unskilled wage rate. 
 
Some scholars have attributed (part of) the increased income inequality in several industrialised 
countries since the 1970s to the introduction of ICT (Levy and Murnane 1992, Borghans and ter Weel 
2003). DiNardo and Pishke (1997), however, cast some doubt on these views. They raise the question 
whether high wage differentials for on the job computer use really display a return to computer skills, 
or just reflect the fact that high-wage workers use more computers for their job. We can extend these 
concerns by pointing out that ICT is typically a General Purpose Technology that can, depending on 
the relative endowments and prices of factors, be applied and directed towards different factors of 
production, including unskilled workers. ICT also creates many possibilities to produce new products 
and services that are profitable primarily because they satisfy a latent demand and create new markets. 
Hence apart from the efficiency gains directly resulting from factor reallocations towards skilled 
labour, it can be perceived that ICT is also used in those product markets that use abundant and cheap 
unskilled or semi-skilled labour.  
 
As the basic skills to handle ICT can be rather straightforward for anyone who can read and write, 
Beaudry and Green (2002) suggest that developing countries can profit largely from the new 
technology. They argue that the large decrease in the price of ICT can create a comparative advantage 
for economies with rapid population growth to jump ahead in the adoption of computer and skill-
intensive modes of production. This strategy enables them to counter the relative scarcity of physical 
capital. In sum, it is still very hard to indicate in which respect ICT will eventually change relative 
factor demand. The employment growth effects of ICT are very diffuse, but there is an inherent 
possibility to apply ICT in such a way that it serves the economy-specific structure of factor 
endowments, including support for the creation of more productive jobs in countries starting with a 
surplus of low-skilled labour. 
 
Recently the ILO has addressed the opportunities of ICT for developing countries in terms of 
employment and productivity growth in their World Employment Report 2001 (ILO 2001). In 
analysing how new technologies influence the quantity, quality and location of work, it has looked at 
where jobs will either be lost or created. The report focuses on the growing fear that, if current trends 
persist, the new technologies will worsen national and global inequalities, especially the wealth gap 
between the world's rich and poor countries (the “digital divide”). The Report addresses the concerns 
and suggests new important strategies for development. In particular the importance of education, 
learning and training is emphasised and it is shown how these factors can help developing countries 
succeed in the information economy and the creation of decent work.  
 
The total supply of skilled labour depends to a large extent on the capacity of the educational system 
and the facilitie s that support learning and the acquisition of experience in the business environment. 
In general the relative supply and demand for skills is higher in advanced countries than in developing 
countries. For highly specialised skilled jobs, for instance in technical, medical and educational 
professions, demand and supply can be very uneven for a long period. Shortage of supply is caused, 
for example, by a low inflow of students or a shortage of training facilities in these professions. 
Educating people in highly specialised fields requires time and it is therefore hard to respond quickly 
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to a sudden upward demand-shock. On the other side of the skill spectrum, the market for unskilled 
labour is often characterised by oversupply and much more vulnerable to sudden downward shocks in 
demand. A possible undersupply of unskilled labour can be compensated by allocating skilled labour 
to low-skill jobs, which causes underemployment but possibly avoids unemployment. 
 
3.4 The Role of Income Distribution28 
 
An important determinant of the relationship between productivity growth and employment creation 
is the distribution of income within a country. Income distribution may be directly related to 
productivity as the former can be negatively affected by skill-biased technological change as 
described above in Section 3.3. On the other hand, we have argued in particular in Chapter 2 that in 
the long run increased social capabilities are strengthened by a broad and equal access to basic 
facilities such as education and health which would be supported by a more equal distribution of 
income. In combination with aggregate growth of GDP, a more equal distribution of income also 
raises the share of people in the middle -income class which includes those that have the highest 
income elasticity, the highest savings rates and who are the biggest investors in education. 
 
Recently much has been written about the distribution of income in relation to economic growth 
(Deininger and Squire 1996, Barro 1999, Melchior 2001, Sala -i-Martin 2002). This literature finds as 
much empirical evidence in favour as against the hypothesis of the inverse U-curve of income 
equality (Kuznets 1955). This hypothesis states that the relationship between income inequality and 
economic growth tends to be positive in early stages of growth and turns negative when countries 
become more advanced. Apart from the actual relationship, the causality of the relationship has also 
been a matter of fierce debate. 
 
Hence the relationship between personal income distribution and economic growth is conditional 
upon a range of other factors. From the perspective of this study, it is most useful to concentrate on 
the renumeration of the production factors labour and capital, i.e. the functional distribution of 
income, and its possible relationship to productivity growth. Compared to the literature on personal 
income distribution, much less has been written about the functional or factor distribution of income 
beyond classical and neoclassical growth theory. Along a path of balanced growth as stipulated in the 
neoclassical growth theory, the returns to private investment and the capital/output ratios are assumed 
constant. This implies that the income shares of accumulated factors, such as capital, remain constant 
in the long run. 29  
 
But when related to structural change, which requires a medium run focus, factor shares should be 
allowed to change over time. For example, during the early phase of structural change, when strong 
investment is required, it may be expected that the capital share will increase relative to the labour 
share. Later on when labour productivity increases and wages begin to rise, the labour share may 
increase again. This process is also strongly related to the different intensities at which sectors make 
                                                 
28 This section is largely based on the master thesis by Hedwig Duteweerd (2003), University of Groningen. 
29 Scitovsky (1964) and Lebergott (1964) are devoted to a general consideration of the determinants of factor 
shares in the long run. 
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use of production factors. For example, the agricultural sector is typically intensive in use of labour 
and land, while industry is intensive in use of labour and capital (see also Chapter 4). Much also 
depends on whether technical change is labour or capital biased, and whether it primarily uses skilled 
or unskilled labour.  
Unfortunately the evidence on functional income distribution is limited, and subject to major 
empirical problems. Essentially, the measures on labour income are derived from the national 
accounts, and capital income is obtained as a residual from value added and labour income. These 
measures are affected by inconsistencies concerning the exact methods to obtain labour compensation 
in the national accounts. Moreover, the capital income shares still include the operational income 
from self-employed persons, as the latter is not defined as wage income. A crude method, which is to 
impute the income of self-employed persons on the basis of the wage incomes of employees, has its 
obvious shortcomings. 
Despite these problems, a comparison of the development of labour income shares between a number 
of Asian and Latin American countries from 1960 to 1990, shows some interesting results (Figures 
3.4a and 3.4b). In 1960 Asian countries, on average, started off at similar or even somewhat lower 
labour income shares in GDP than in Latin America. But most Asian countries showed a strongly 
increasing trend in labour income shares between 1960 and 1990. For example, Japan, Korea and 
Taiwan all had labour income shares of between 60 and 70 percent of GDP around 1990. Two Asian 
countries stand out, namely India with a very high labour income share and Thailand a very low 
labour income share. In India the reason is obviously the dominant agricultural sector, which has 
accounted for more than 70 per cent of Indian employment until recently. The low labour income 
share in Thailand is probably due to the large number of farms with – for Asian terms - relatively high 
land-labour ratios and the smaller number of farm workers relative to other countries. However, 
during the process of structural change the labour income share has increased as in other countries.  
In contrast to Asia, Latin American labour income shares have not shown the same increase. Instead 
these shares mostly kept fluctuating around the original level of 40-55 per cent. In some countries (for 





                                                 
30 Obviously the labour income share typically goes up after an adjustment for the labour income of self-
employed persons. Preliminary calculations tend to show bigger adjustments for Latin America than for Asia, 
but these results may be affected by the imputation method, which allocated a too high labour income to self-
employed persons in many Latin American countries. The trends for Asia and Latin America described in the 
main text remain unchanged compared to the unadjusted series of capital income shares. 
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There are many reasons for the differences in levels and trends in capital income shares between Asia 
and Latin America. Some of these reasons are of an historical and institutional nature and relate to 
relatively high initial land-labour ratios, greater inequality in the distribution of land or – for example 
in the case of Venezuela – large mineral reserves. But the differences in trend are also related to the 
dynamics of the process of economic growth in Asia and Latin America. Although more research is 
needed to establish these patterns more precisely, some plausible hypotheses can be posed. 
 
Firstly, the relatively high income shares in Asian countries around the 1960s may in fact represent 
the first industrialisation phase, during which capital intensification became more important. As 
capital was still relatively expensive compared to the renumeration of labour input, which was largely 
drawn from the agricultural sector with low wage incomes, the capital income share rapidly increased. 
During the second industrialisation phase in Asia (during the 1980s and 1990s) the quality of labour 
rose, labour productivity and wages increased rapidly and eventually offset the relatively higher 
renumeration of capital. The latter incidentally became cheaper under the influence of technological 
change and international capital flows, which made capital a more abundant source of productivity. 
Secondly, in Latin America the growth process was slower and frustrated by several crises and 
imbalances in the growth process. Low-skilled labour remained the abundant source of production, 
and the relative price of capital to labour did not decline much. 
 
The striking conclusion of this comparison of labour income shares in relation to the patterns of 
productivity and employment growth described above is that, despite a relatively capital-intensive 
nature of production processes in many Latin American countries, they did not realise the same 
growth rates of labour productivity as many Asian countries during the period 1960 to 2000. The 
latter managed to raise the share of labour income, increase labour input while at the same time 
generating more resources to support output and productivity growth. These differences have had 
important implications for the direction of technological change, which in Asia has been typically 
focused on the complementarity of capital and medium and high skilled labour. In contrast, in Latin 
America technological progress is likely to have been more biased towards physical capital in 
combination with low skilled labour. Hence the trade -off between productivity and employment 
growth has been more strongly present in the latter case.  
 
In conclusion, low labour income shares are on themselves not indicative of a strong trade-off 
between productivity and employment growth in the medium run. But the change in such shares are 
indicative of structural changes, and the direction of technological change which determine the 




In this chapter we identified the conditions under which a trade-off may occur between productivity 
and employment growth. The empirical evidence showed that, at least in the medium run, such a 
trade-off can be widely observed. However, there are many instances where the trade-off has been 
tackled and turned into a positive relationship. In this respect, the 1990s have shown to be a somewhat 
better period than the 1970s and 1980s.  
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We also reviewed the literature on the role of labour market rigidities and factor input biases in 
explaining part of the trade-off. The degree of flexibility and rigidity appears to influence the response 
of employment to increases and decreases in productivity. Recent technological change, in particular 
ICT, has had a tendency to reduce the demand for low skills, although the general purpose technology 
nature of ICT has also generated potential for using low and medium skills in ICT applications. 
 
The comparison of capital and labour income distribution between Asia and Latin America showed 
how Asia, despite generally lower labour income shares, has been successful in raising labour 
productivity faster than in Latin America of the past four decades. Indeed technological change 
directed towards an increased use of skilled labour is not by definition detrimental to low income 
countries, but instead provides important opportunities to reform the economy towards a greater 
demand and supply of better paid, more productive and decent jobs. This reform process is part of the 
process of structural change, that will be discussed in Chapter 4, and is dependent on the institutional 








Underlying the process of long run aggregate productivity and employment growth (Chapter 2) and 
distortions to this process leading to trade-offs in the medium run (Chapter 3), is the process of 
structural change. In this chapter the role of structural change, which essentially represents the shift of 
resources from low to high productivity activities, will be examined in more detail.  
 
By decomposing trends in employment, productivity and output at sectoral level it can be revealed 
that the medium run trade-off mostly reflects a Schumpeterian type of “creative destruction”, as the 
jobs that disappear were often characterised by relatively low wages in sectors that show declining 
productivity. Job creation in the growth sectors aligns the possibility of productivity growth, rising 
real wages and improving labour conditions. This process leads to the virtuous cycle in which higher 
returns on labour can be used to further raise the skill-level of workers which again stimulates labour 
productivity. This way labourers benefit from structural change directly through higher incomes and 
indirectly via enhanced abilities. 
 
Unfortunately these positive effects of structural change are not always immediately visible. 
Structural change by definition implies imbalances and adjustment costs. Where new opportunities 
arise, some people will lose their jobs and other will find new employment. The faster the economy 
transforms, the faster capital and knowledge becomes outdated and economically worthless. The 
distributional effects of structural change can threaten the relative wealth of those in the traditional 
sectors of the economy. Persistent capital-biased patterns of production can offset the potential gains 
of labourers when the returns of investments only accrue to a small elite of capital owners and are not 
reinvested in the economy. On the other hand, an institutional bond between capital and labour might 
also improve workers’ wealth when the higher returns on capital are passed to them by way of higher 
wages or (due to technological changes) through lower prices of the products they buy. But if the 
labour market for highly productive jobs in the formal economy stays restricted to those who are 
already inside the formal labour market, large groups of labourers from the informal economy will not 
be able to benefit from the structural change process at all.  
 
The key question therefore is not so much whether structural change is favourable for economic 
growth or not, but rather which particular patterns of structural change help to minimise the economic 
costs of the trade-off between productivity and employment. It will turn out that the strength of the 
social capabilities base greatly determines the success of structural change in the long run and reduce 
the damage in the short run.     
 
In Section 4.2 the factors that determine sectoral employment opportunities are addressed and ordered 
systematically. This provides a framework that can be used to evaluate diverse patterns of structural 
change and their subsequent effects on employment creation and destruction. These characteristics 
determine the elasticity of labour input. Factor substitution possibilities and the potential to capture 
economies of scale appear to play a crucial role here.    
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In Section 4.3 the sectoral trends in employment and productivity are analysed. This section draws 
heavily on data from the GGDC/KILM database (Chapter 18). Special attention is given to the extent 
and timing of sectoral employment-productivity trade-offs. Further the development of employment 
and productivity on a 10-sector level and on a 60-industry level will be addressed, providing an even 
more detailed insight in the nature and consequences of the trade-off. Finally, the impact of 
technological change and especially the impact of ICT on the growth performance will be addressed.  
 
Section 4.4 deals with the role of the informal economy in the process of structural change. It is 
argued that the informal economy can potentially positively contribute to the dynamics of structural 
change. Firstly, it can be an important source of employment creation. Secondly, it can also become a 
contributor to economic growth by offering products and services for consumption at a lower price 
and quality to a poorer part of the population. Thirdly, the informal economy can also play an 
important role as a supplier at the lower end of the vertical (global) supply chain and as such 
contribute to productivity growth elsewhere in the economy. 
 
4.2. Opportunities and Constraints for Sectoral Employment Growth  
 
In the long run economic growth is essentially driven by technological and organisational (or social) 
innovations and by the capacity to adopt and adapt to innovations. However, employment responses 
to innovations tend to vary greatly by sector. Employment does not always flow in the direction of 
high productivity activities as it can also be scrapped through factor substitution effects. The 
analytical framework we use here focuses on the question which sector specific characteristics 
determine labour input elasticity. For each sector we need to analyse whether growth is labour-saving, 
labour-neutral or labour-augmenting and which particular forces determine this. Shortly the forces 
determining sectoral employment can be categorised in four groups: 1) factor endowment 
characteristics; 2) technical characteristics; 3) market characteristics; and 4) institutional 
characteristics. Although these forces are not fully independent, we will deal with these in respective 
order below (Vandenberg 2003). 
 
Factor endowment characteristics 
From a supply-side perspective, the relative endowments of production factors such as land, natural 
resources, labour and capital impact their relative prices. Labour abundant economies tend to develop 
production processes that are less capital-intensive than labour scarce economies. For example, 
historically the USA have become known as a typical capital-intensive economy, whereas the EU 
economies are traditionally biased towards a more intensive use of labour. Extensive agricultural 
development in Latin America as compared to the intensification of agriculture in Asia is also heavily 
influenced by the relative abundance of land in Latin America and its scarcity in Asia. Hence the 
relative endowments of land, labour and capital inputs are important in determining net employment 
growth via the relative factor prices.  
 
The precise employment effects also depend on the path of technological and organisational 
innovations by sector. On the one hand technologies can be developed in the direction of substituting 
the scarce factor, either capital or labour, to enjoy the lower factor costs (price-effect). On the other 
hand technological change can be directed towards the abundant factor, as the effect of a large market 
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size based on low comparative costs attract technological developments (market-size effect) 
(Acemoglu 2002). 
 
The effects of the endowment structure on the demand for labour is thus connected to technological 
change. Another important factor is the differential labour elasticity of unskilled and skilled labour. 
Although technological development is seen as the main factor that determines relative prices, the 
relative shares and prices are also affected by the international environment which is shaped by 




The production of some goods and services by nature require a labour-consuming process, whereas 
other goods and services require a large deployment of capital. This depends on the technical 
characteristics of the product (or service) and the production process. In contrast to scale -intensive 
and capital-intensive manufacturing industries such as the automobile, chemical and electronics 
industries, many social and personal services such as education and health care require large amounts 
of labour. In general, products that can be easily standardised and assembled allow for a great deal of 
mechanisation and automation. These production processes are typically capital-biased and make 
predominantly use of unskilled labour. The more differentiated, complex and creative the production 
process is, the more intermediate and higher labour skills are demanded. The latter development is 
characteristic of the rise of the knowledge economy during the past decade. 
 
But technological and organisational changes can bring about factor substitution which changes the 
capital-labour ratio. In general factor substitution can take three distinguished forms:  
1) Innovation substitutes labour for capital. This is especially the case with mechanisation and 
automation of production processes and results in a negative effect on employment growth. The 
incentives to save on labour input can result from an increase in the costs of labour (wages) 
relative to capital (rents and depreciation) or from opportunities of economies of scale depending 
on the possibilities for standardisation and also on the market characteristics such as size and 
growth prospects.   
2) A negative employment effect of labour-saving innovations can be reversed by a simultaneous 
increase in productivity and output, lowering the prices of the product and increasing demand. 
Hence expansion of production creates new employment which compensates the substitution-
effect. Especially in growing industries which capture large economies of scale, efficiency is 
often raised by increasing the output-input ratio via output growth rather than economising on 
inputs. Labour input elasticity is thus determined by counteracting forces as capital accumulation 
can both complement and substitute for labour. 
3) The third possibility is that technological change is complementary to labour. Labour-enhancing 
technological change mainly applies to skilled labour. This is known as technology-skill 
complementarity. An example of this type of technological development is the application of ICT 
that partly substitutes computers for people, but also requires more skilled labour to realise the 
productivity and output growth potential of ICT. During the post war era structural change mostly 
ran in the direction of higher technology activities that required a continuous upgrading of human 
capital levels. However, technology can also replace skills though. With the introduction of the 
factory-system in the nineteenth century, new technologies of mass production replaced 
traditional artisan skills as unskilled labour at the assembly line became the dominant source of 
employment growth. Skilled labour can thus be substituted for unskilled labour and vice versa. 
(Goldin and Katz 1999, pp. 693-694). 
   
Market characteristics 
So far we have regarded structural change largely as a supply-side driven process, based on 
innovations that raise efficiency and productivity. The dynamics of the market environment, such as 
changing demand patterns and preferences also enhances structural change and impacts on labour 
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input elasticity. The interdependence between the technical aspects and market characteristics is 
especially strong when there are possibilities to capture economies of scale. Scale is directly 
dependent on actual and potential market size and subsequent investment prospects, and demand 
characteristics of products are largely determined by the income levels of consumers.  
 
When income per capita increases, people change positions on their utility curves and develop new 
demand directed towards luxury goods and services. Particularly important in this respect is Engel’s 
law, stating that with an increase in income people spend comparatively less on primary products, 
putting a natural break on the growth opportunities of the agricultural sector. The demand for 
agricultural products thus stems largely from population growth, whereas luxury goods depend more 
on the income level of the population.   
 
In fast growing sectors of the economy, plenty of opportunities exist for producing more diverse 
goods and greater variety supporting growth and job creation. These industries continuously strive to 
capture larger shares of the consumer’s budget. Indeed there are striking differences between the mass 
production and consumption of standardised products produced in former socialist economies with the 
preferences of consumers being largely ignored, and the rise in demand for differentiated products in 
the western advanced world. Also the formal economy in many developing countries is undergoing a 
transformation away from producing low-quality standardized products to greater variety and 
variation in quality levels of products and services. These developments have required a large 
transformation in production organisations away from standardised production to more intensive use 




The impact of the institutional environment on labour input elasticity is very complex and much less 
visible than the influences of endowment, technical and market characteristics. Here we restrict 
ourselves to some major institutional effects by drawing a distinction between macro-institutions and 
sector-specific institutions. 
 
Labour market policy is a typical example of a macro-institution that embodies both general and 
sector-specific outcomes. Labour market regulations influence the cost-benefit calculations made by 
employers in their decision to attract or lay off employees. These decisions are conditioned by 
institutional factors, including wage regulations, taxes, insurance policies and employment protection 
rules. These rules determine the extent of labour market flexibility. In general the political choices 
concerning the extent of flexibility of the labour market are determined by how policy makers and 
interest groups think about the trade-off between the virtues of labour protection and economic 
competitiveness. 
        
Commercial and capital market institutions can also severely impact on the climate to trade and 
invest. This does not only concern the limited amount of capital in developing countries. This even 
may not be the main problem, which is more likely the immobility of capital due to costly and timely 
bureaucratic procedures, that obstructs capital reallocation (de Soto 1999). Capital-market 
imperfections can be reduced by institutional changes alternating the risk-calculations made by banks 
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or other lenders. Institutional change can enhance investment and stimulate entrepreneurship and 
structural change. An important example is the provision of short term loans to small scale enterprises 
in many developing countries. The investment climate directly impacts on the possibilities of the 
informal economy to raise productivity, output and enter the formal economy.  
 
Sector-specific institutions are linked to both positive and negative externalities of particular 
industries. The positive effects mainly relate to the support of firms in their innovative behaviour 
through facilitating co-operation between themselves as well as between firms and the public 
knowledge sector. Industries that are supported in their innovating process often experience positive 
employment effects, although it can be offset by too strong patenting laws that restrict diffusion of 
innovations to new firms.  
 
Well known examples of negative externalities are regulations with respect to the production and 
trade of military equipment, the preventive measures against pollution and restrictions placed on the 
production and trade of products that have a bad influence on society in general, for instance the 
discouragement of the consumption of tobacco and alcohol. Although the long run effects of these 
measures on employment growth cannot be easily determined (and might well be positive by inducing 
changes towards new types of production and consumption), in the short run these restrictive 
measures in general exert a negative employment effect on the sector in question. 
 
The role of government in subsidising and protecting employment in less competitive industries may 
impact employment positively in the short run, but are almost always ineffective in the medium and 
long run. A notorious example is the manipulation of the terms of trade of agricultural products 
between the advanced and developing world. It has hardly slowed down the declining share of 
agriculture in total employment, but seriously affected the potential of low income countries to exploit 
their comparative advantages. Flows of subsidies are largely influenced by lobbyist campaigns and 
the sensitivity of political power to live up to the demands of specific (social) groups. The fear of 
social unrest and social costs raised by growing unemployment figures is for many politicians a 
reason to protect uncompetitive industries. As political planning is largely determined by the terms 
stated for re-election, these measures tend to be directed at the short term. The question then is how 
short term protectionist tendencies can avoid frustrating the medium and long run perspectives for 
growth. This subject is too broad and complex, going beyond the scope of this paper, to conclude 
anything in general about the (un)desirability of economic protection.    
 
 
4.3. Sectoral trends in Employment and Productivity Growth 
 
Sectoral employment trends from 1950 onwards 
Structural change has occurred in nearly all countries in the world. Table 4.1 shows the general 
directions of the sector distribution of employment as well as the growth rates of employment can be 
derived from 1950 onwards. The first thing to note here is the enormous increase in absolute 
employment numbers between 1970-1990 when compared to the period 1950-1970, caused by the 
demographic transition and the post-war baby boom.  
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In all regions a considerable shift has taken place away from agriculture towards the non-agricultural 
sectors of the economy, i.e. industry and services. On balance the service industry attracted the largest 
share of the increasing pool of labour, whereas the employment trends in industry diverged quite 
substantially between the advanced regions on the one and the developing regions on the other hand. 
 
Table 4.1: The sectoral distribution of employment by region, 1950-1990  
  
Total Employment (1000)   percentage distribution (%) 
 
  Agriculture Industry Services Total Agriculture Industry Services 
Europe  
 
       
1950 100360 81015 72072 253447 40% 32% 28% 
1970 64120 123563 116581 304264 21% 41% 38% 
1990 42496 126345 179878 348719 12% 36% 52% 
North America    
1950 9389 26711 36767 72867 13% 37% 50% 
1970 4518 31731 61922 98171 5% 32% 63% 
1990 4128 37003 101348 142479 3% 26% 71% 
Oceania    
1950 1737 1678 1975 5390 32% 31% 37% 
1970 1964 2499 3865 8328 24% 30% 46% 
1990 2563 2857 7419 12839 20% 22% 58% 
East and South East Asia, excl. China 
 
   
1950 95191 15007 24729 134927 71% 11% 18% 
1970 104620 34240 54793 193653 54% 18% 28% 
1990 135283 62191 108063 305537 44% 20% 35% 
Asia    
1950 578785 51688 79082 709555 82% 7% 11% 
1970 699140 124841 167168 991149 71% 13% 17% 
1990 964963 263750 331787 1560500 62% 17% 21% 
Latin America and the Caribbean   
1950 32573 11559 16015 60147 54% 19% 27% 
1970 40107 21145 34140 95392 42% 22% 36% 
1990 44515 41364 89326 175205 25% 24% 51% 
Africa    
1950 87020 6553 11547 105120 83% 6% 11% 
1970 120347 14178 24324 158849 76% 9% 15% 
1990 167043 29384 69391 265818 63% 11% 26% 
World    
1950 809864 179203 217457 1206524 67% 15% 18% 
1970 930196 317957 408001 1656154 56% 19% 25% 
1990 1225709 500702 779448 2505859 49% 20% 31% 
Source: ILO, Economic active population, 1950-2010 
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In most developing countries the shift out of agriculture resulted in a decreasing relative share of 
agricultural employment, although the absolute number of jobs in agriculture has continued to 
increase. In Europe, North America and Oceania there was also an absolute decline in agricultural 
employment. The absolute decline in agricultural employment is considered to be an important 
turning point in the process of structural change. It means that agricultural productivity growth is 
sufficient to sustain the food supply of growing numbers of people without any additional labour 
input. This removes the increasing pressure of labour on a more or less fixed endowment of arable 
land and breaks the Malthusian threat of diminishing returns to agricultural labour and decreasing 
productivity rates (Fei and Ranis 1997). 
 
Industrial employment trends also show a distinctive pattern for the developed world and the 
developing world. In Asia, Africa and Latin America the relative share of industrial employment 
increased gradually. In contrast, the relative share of industrial employment in the developed world 
reached a turning point. In Europe the industrial share has declined since the 1970s, whereas in 
Oceania and North America this trend was already visible since the 1950s. The absolute numbers of 
industrial employment have also slowed down considerably and have even turned negative in a 
number of advanced countries although this trend has not shown up in the aggregate figures yet.     
 
The shift of employment towards services can be stated as a “stylised fact” of post war economic 
development (Kuznets 1965). The transfer of labour to services is a very diverse process though. 
Firstly, economic growth in general implies an increasing contribution of services as a response to an 
increased demand for trade, transport, communication and social services. This service employment 
growth effect can be considered partly as a classic type of economic development based on the 
integration of markets and the increase of scale enhancing specialisation and the division of labour. 
As a result many service activities have become independent activities, outsourced from the 
agricultural and industrial activities in which they were once embedded.  
 
Secondly, services can also arise as a result of the rise of the welfare state, giving a large role to 
health, education, government and social services. Finally, employment growth in the service sector 
can result from a lack of productivity growth in the rest of the economy. In particular demographic 
pressures in rural areas lacking sufficient employment opportunities, have caused large flows of rural-
urban migration. These migrants were mostly absorbed by the urban informal service economy. The 
service sector more easily absorbs hidden unemployment than the industrial sector, because of the 
possibilities of small-scale and low capital intensive work. 
 
There have been substantial discussions in the literature on the possibilities for the service sector to 
raise productivity. One argument is that there are inherent problems of increasing productivity growth 
in services (Baumol 1967). But there is increasing evidence that at least part of the service sector (in 
particular the market services) profited from technological and organisational innovations enhancing 
productivity growth.   
 
The productivity – employment trade-off in agriculture 
In figure 4.1 the relationship between employment and productivity growth in agriculture is visualised 
for three subperiods, 1961-1973, 1973-1990 and 1990-2000. The data, derived from the GGDC/KILM 
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18 database covering approximately 100 countries from 1961, display an increasing number of 
observations over time (due to larger data availability). For all periods there is a mix of developing 
countries and OECD countries covering all world regions. From the trendlines added to the scatter 
diagrams the eventuality of an employment-productivity trade-off can be derived. 
 
During the post war era the global trends in agricultural employment and productivity changed 
substantially in the direction of a trade-off. In the period 1960-1973 the developing countries in Asia, 
Latin America and Africa caught up with the developed countries in terms of labour productivity 
while avoiding the trade-off. In OECD economies the employment-productivity trade-off was already 
present during this period. In next two periods from 1973-1990 and 1990-2000 the trade-off becomes 
visible on a global scale, in spite of many exceptions.  
 
The trade-off is a clear case of factor substitution. The opportunities of mechanisation and the use of 
industrial inputs (high yielding varieties, fertilisers, etc) have led to specialisation and enlarged scales 
of production. This has caused capital deepening at the expense of labour, although there are large 
differences in the direction of technological change depending on the original land-labour ratios 
which highly differ between countries (Hayami and Ruttan 1985). Obviously the reversed expansion-
effect has not been large enough to prevent large employment losses. Especially in countries with low 
levels of population growth the demand for agricultural products has only increased marginally.  
 
The trade-off in the agricultural sector was strongest in the OECD and East and Southeast Asian 
countries grouped at the left end of the trendlines. High productivity growth rates went at the expense 
of employment. It must be noted, however that, because of the already relative low number of jobs in 




Figure 4.1: Employment and Productivity growth in Agriculture  
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Source: Groningen Growth and Development Centre and ILO (2003), KILM 18. 
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Whereas the East and Southeast Asian countries developed their productivity potential in the 
agricultural sector quite successfully - some countries like Korea and Taiwan have passed the turning 
point towards an absolute decline in agricultural employment -, many developing countries in Africa 
and Latin America have faced severe problems in turning structural change into faster growth. There 
are several reasons for this, related to factor endowment, technical, market and institutional 
characteristics described above  
 
Factor endowments in agriculture are biased towards cheap labour hampering factor substitution. Low 
wages prevented the introduction of machines and embodied technology. Lacking opportunities in the 
non-agricultural sectors also force people to gain a living in the rural areas. In this respect the 
agricultural sector also served to a certain extent as a safety net for unemployment, keeping people 
employed at (nearly) zero marginal productivity. In combination with continued population growth, 
these developments explain why employment in agriculture still increases.  
 
Although for most of the African countries, land-labour ratios were much higher than in Asia, 
indicating comparatively less pressure on resources, agricultural development failed. The 
demographic transition in Africa turned out to be a curse instead of a gift (see Chapter 2). Besides, 
many African and Latin American countries have specialised in quite one-sided production structures, 
depending heavily on labour-intensive cash crops such as coffee, or mineral resources such as oil or 
metal ores. Most of the primary products were continuously facing declining terms of trade. Lacking 
alternatives have pushed farmers to work even harder and produce more for already oversupplied 
international markets. As these countries are still before the turning point of relative to absolute 
employment decline, the pressure on land and the environment increases.  
 
During the 1990s the transition countries have moved towards the southwest quadrant in Figure 4.1, 
combining employment losses with negative productivity growth. This worst case scenario is the 
direct effect of the dismantling of the former large scale communal enterprises. The trend witnessed 
on the aggregate level is thus also visible at the sectoral level. Privatisation has led to a dismantling of 
capital, the breakdown of communal agricultural infrastructure, such as irrigation networks and 
scrapping of heavy machinery that were only effective in large scale farming. Foreign competition has 




Diversity in trade-offs in manufacturing 
In the manufacturing sector trends have become very disperse in recent decades. During most of the 
20th century manufacturing output growth profited strongly from continuous increases in demand and 
the large possibilities for mass-production and inherent economies of scale. Figure 4.2 even shows 
that for a more limited sample of 22 countries (compared to over 100 countries in agriculture) a slight 
trend towards a somewhat stronger positive employment-productivity relationship (hence no trade-
off) can be witnessed. At the same time, however, the number of countries in the northwest quadrant 
of the diagrams increased from 3 during the 1960-73 period to 12 countries from 1973-1998. The 
latter group mainly includes OECD countries in major Europe and North America, but also Japan, 
Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore. The absolute decline of manufacturing jobs marks the transition of 
industrial growth based on a combination of factor substitution and expansion towards a process of 
rationalisation and downsizing. In other words, the factor substitution-effect was not longer 
compensated by overall expansion. 
 
This transition was accompanied by fundamental changes in the industrial production organisation 
from mass-production to lean and flexible production formats. Parallel to this transition the business 
service sector also became gradually more specialised, which led industrial enterprises to outsource 
traditional in-house service activities such as administration and accounting. This trend adds to the 
shift of employment towards services. As a result of the economising on labour, labour productivity 
growth in manufacturing has continued to increase. 
 
As more and more countries beyond major Europe and North America have begun to build up a 
sizeable manufacturing industry, international competition has increased and caused further 
specialisation. In the past decades the newly industrialising economies in Asia (Korea, Taiwan, Hong 
Kong, Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia) and to a lesser extent the reforming Latin American 
economies such as Brazil, Mexico and Chile, have entered the world market for manufactures (Crafts 
2000). In line with their comparative advantage, the newly industrialising economies have specialised 
more in labour-intensive manufactures (Wood 1994). However, the characteristics of Asian industrial 
development have also changed gradually from labour-intensive towards capital-skill-intensive 
manufacturing. Modern high-productive sectors created new employment opportunities, whereas 
capital was substituted for labour in lower value added sectors. Indeed high productivity growth rates 
have spurred structural change and caused severe trade-offs in several industries. At the aggregate 
level, however, manufacturing employment in Southeast Asia continued to increase until the late 
1990s. 
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Figure 4.2: Employment and productivity growth in manufacturing, 1960-1998 
manufacturing 1960-1973















































Source: Groningen Growth and Development Centre and ILO (2003), KILM 18. 
 
Within manufacturing, which is a key recipient of technological innovations, structural change played 
an important role. In the developed world in general high value added and technology-intensive 
sectors increased at the expense of low value added, labour intensive and low technology activities. 
This brought about a substantial substitution of skilled for unskilled labour, as skilled labour is much 
better suited to fit differentiated technology intensive production processes. To shed more light on the 
impact of technology on structural changes within the manufacturing sector it is useful to review in 
detail the changes in the composition of the manufacturing sector.31  
In Table 4.2 we present industry data for manufacturing taken from the GGDC 60-industry database 
for the European Union, Japan and the United States (http://www.ggdc.net/dseries/60-Industry.shtml). 
We classified the employment, output and productivity figures in three different categories of low, 
                                                 
31 An alternative approach is to look at the export composition to reveal patterns of specialisation and 
competitive advantage in manufacturing, which will be applied in the next section. 
 77
medium and high technology-intensity.32 This classification runs roughly along the lines of unskilled 
labour-biased, capital and scale -biased and skilled labour-biased manufacturing industries.   
 
Table 4.2: Employment, output and productivity growth and shares in manufacturing 
industries classified by technology in the EU, US and Japan. 
 European Union United States Japan 
  1990 2000 1990-2000 1990 2000 1990-2000 1990 1998 1990-1998
        
Persons employed (in thousands)         
Low technology 9009 7346 -2.04 5191 4605 -1.20 4278 3803 -1.18 
   share in total 27.5% 26.5% -1.0% 26.4% 24.3% -2.1% 27.8% 26.5% -1.2% 
              
Medium technology 15664 13853 -1.23 8708 9041 0.38 6606 6363 -0.37 
   share in total 47,8% 50.0% 2.2% 44.3% 47.8% 3.4% 42.9% 44.4% 1.5% 
            
High technology 8109 6515 -2.19 5739 5275 -0.84 4531 4177 -0.81 
   share in total 24.7% 23.5% -1.2% 29.2% 27.9% -1.3% 29.4% 29.1% -0.3% 
            
Value added in constant prices (millions of Euro's, USD and billions of Yen)     
Low technology 259206 270754 0.44 254114 242832 -0.45 19869 16557 -1.82 
   share in total 42.9% 33.9% -8.9% 39.0% 15.5% -23.5% 32.6% 24.0% -8.6% 
            
Medium technology 265166 289847 0.89 231311 321921 3.31 31826 29254 -0.84 
   share in total 43.8% 36.3% -7.5% 35.5% 20.6% -15.0% 52.2% 42.4% -9.7% 
            
High technology 80454 237301 10.82 166004 1001377 17.97 9325 23166 9.10 
   share in total 13.3% 29.7% 16.4% 25.5% 63.9% 38.5% 15.3% 33.6% 18.3% 
            
Value added per person employed (in constant prices, thousands of Euro's, USD and millions of Yen) 
Low technology 28.77 36.86 2.48 48.95 52.73 0.74 4.64 4.35 -0.65 
Medium technology 16.93 20.92 2.12 26.56 35.61 2.93 4.82 4.60 -0.47 
High technology 9.92 36.43 13.01 28.93 189.84 18.81 2.06 5.55 9.91 
* EU excluding Belgium, Luxembourg, Greece and Portugal. 
Source: Groningen Growth and Development Centre (http://www.ggdc.net/dseries/60-Industry.shtml 
 
Low technology sectors are comprised of resource-intensive industries (such as the food processing, 
paper and basic metal industries) and of labour intensive industries (such as textiles, footwear, 
furniture and fabricated metal products). Medium technology sectors consist of scale -intensive 
industries (such as industrial chemicals, iron and steel industries and transport equipment). High 
technology sectors include  differentiated manufactures (such as machinery and equipment, engines 
and turbines, electronics) and the science-based manufacturing industries (such as pharmaceuticals, 
ICT production, office, computing and accounting machinery, aircraft and biotechnology).  
 
Several important trends can be derived from this way of classifying manufacturing industries. Firstly, 
structural change in all three countries/regions was directed heavily towards high technology sectors 
during the 1990s. The productivity gains in the high- technology sectors surpassed the low-tech and 
medium-tech sectors. In Japan the low-tech and medium-tech sectors even scored negative 
productivity growth.  
 
                                                 
32  This classification was constructed by the OECD. 
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Growth in the high-tech sector has been mainly due to the dramatic increase in value added in office 
machinery and accounting equipment, and electronic valves and tubes or semiconductor industry. The 
enormous growth rates of output did not generate much employment, however, as these industries are 
typically capital-biased. In all areas there was a clear loss of employment resulting in substantial 
trade-offs. Jobs in low and high technology sectors disappeared faster than in medium technology 
sectors, that is to say the scale -intensive industries.  
 
The dominant role of services in creating employment 
Figure 4.3 shows that, compared to agriculture and manufacturing, on balance the service sector 
contributed most to employment growth in the 22 sample countries. In the 1973-1990 period all 
countries witnessed employment growth in services. Again the East Asian countries did very well in 
terms of a combined employment and productivity growth, despite the effect of the Asian crisis in 
1998 on the figures for the 1990-2000 period. In the OECD countries employment increased 
modestly, whereas productivity growth lagged behind in comparison with the Asian countries.  
 
Compared to manufacturing, the service sector stayed somewhat behind in terms of productivity 
growth in most countries. This observation has given rise to a large debate on the so called 
“productivity paradox”. Apparently labour does not exclusively shift towards the most productive 
industries as most theories on structural change predict. In spite of lower productivity growth rates, 
the service industry was the largest contributor to net employment creation. How can this be 
explained? 
 
The most important reason is that the demand for such labour intensive services as health care and 
education has increased as a result of the increasing welfare levels in the developed countries. Market 
(or scale) characteristics thus tend to influence the flow of employment largely. Inherent technical 
characteristics make it that substantial trade-offs between employment and productivity are less likely 
to occur in a great deal of service industries. Health care, education and legal services for example 
require a lot of labour input and especially skilled labour. This is not to say that service industries in 
general are unable to economise on labour, as for example ICT provides many opportunities to 
automate previously manual activities. But the possibilities to raise productivity have generally be 
seen to be limited (Baumol 1967). 
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Figure 4.3: Employment and productivity growth in services 
services, 22 countries, 1973-1990
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Source: Groningen Growth and Development Centre and ILO (2003), KILM 18. 
 
Nevertheless there is a substantial variation in services productivity growth rates, suggesting that 
Baumol’s hypothesis is not an iron law. For example, concerning the development of services 
productivity an important distinction has emerged between the US and the EU in recent years. During 
the 1990s the U.S. realised a substantially higher productivity growth rate in services, namely on 
average 1.7%, against 1.0% of the EU countries in the sample. This growth in productivity growth 
was realised while avoiding an employment trade-off. In fact employment in services also grew 
stronger in the U.S., i.e. at 1.9% on average against 1.3% in Europe.  
 
But differences in services productivity growth are also substantial for non-OECD countries. For 
example, in the Philippines, Brazil and Mexico employment growth went along with negative labour 
productivity growth resulting in a (reversed) employment-productivity trade-off. For all of these 
countries this can be explained by labour flowing in the direction of the low productive urban service 
sector, as a result of increasing population pressure and lagging employment opportunities in (rural) 
agriculture and (urban) industry. In other words, here labour is  not pulled by high service sector 
productivity growth, rather it is pushed by lagging dynamics in other sectors. During the 1990s a 
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reverse pattern can be observed for Brazil. Employment shifts out of services towards industry, 
indicating that labour is released from the low productive service sector as industrial activity picks up. 
In Sweden the negative employment growth in services during the 1990s must be interpreted as part 
of a general decline in total employment.  
 
The most impressive employment performance in services can be seen in India. In contrast to its 
lagging industrial development, high employment and productivity growth in services show that the 
Indian service sector is a vital source for the creation of jobs. Undoubtedly this partly relates to the 
absorption of non-agricultural employment that cannot find its way into the formal (industrial) sector 
of the economy. However, there are also signs that the rise in internationally traded business services, 
such as the booming call-centre industry, has strong effects on the creation of new decent jobs in 
India. Cheap and abundant labour with a relatively high education level and English-speaking abilities 
appear to provide an important source of competitive advantage for India. Whether this develo pment 
path will prove to be successful in achieving sustained growth in the long run remains yet to be seen. 
 
In sum, increasing service sector employment can either indicate a successful transition of the 
economy towards higher productivity levels, or reflect a high inflow of workers in low productive 
industries, caused by the combination of demographic pressure and a disappointing productivity 
record in industry and services. The service sector comprehends very diverse activities from high 
productive and skill-intensive to low productive and low-skill activities, comprising also informal 
economy activities such as street vending, shoe shining and petty trading. Hence it is difficult to reach 
a uniform conclusion on the desirability of service sector expansion without focusing in some more 
detail on specific trends and structure of the service industries.    
 
In present-day national accounts, a distinction may be made between four groups of services, i.e., 
producer services (financial and business services), distributive services (trade, transport and 
communication), personal services, and social services (including health, education and government) 
(Elfring 1988). Communal, social, personal and government services have increased most in size in 
the developed economies. The employment share of distribution and business services also expanded 
considerably. As welfare expanded and governments enlarged their grip on the economy the supply of 
social and government services particularly increased. This trend was slowly reversed since the 1980s, 
however.  
 
Within the goods-related service sectors (producer and distributive services) major changes have 
taken place, as information and communication technology (ICT) have become an important source of 
productivity growth in industries, including financial and business services, distribution, 
transportation and communication. However, it is also an important source of productivity 
differences, as ICT is not being used to the same degree of intensity across countries. For example, 
the acceleration in productivity growth in U.S. services has, amongst other things, been ascribed to a 
successful implementation of ICT (Bosworth and Triplett 2002). In this respect, however, Europe 
clearly lags behind the U.S. (van Ark et al. 2002). 
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The role of ICT for employment and productivity growth 
The rapid rise in production and use of in ICT (see also World Employment Report 2002) stresses the 
importance of technological innovation contributing to productivity growth of both manufacturing and 
service industries. Service sectors like distribution, transportation and communication have largely 
profited from increasing scale and capital-deepening which in many cases has been combined with an 
expansion in jobs. With the spread of ICT and the knowledge-economy capital-deepening in the 
service industry increasingly tends to take the form of accumulating intangible capital, knowledge and 
skilled or semi-skilled labour.    
 
Now that ICT is generally viewed as the most important source of productivity improvements for the 
coming decades, a distinction between ICT-using and ICT-producing services and manufacturing 
industries has gained relevance. This distinction is used to determine whether the impact of ICT on 
economic growth fits the description of a general purpose technology (GPT). The impact of ICT is 
often compared with the impact of such other GPT’s as electricity and steam. Much debate concerns 
the question of the long run effects of the ICT revolution to figure out the future growth potential ICT 
carries.    
 
Table 4.3a: Productivity growth and GDP shares of ICT-producing, ICT-using and non-ICT 
industries in the EU and the U.S.  
  GDP per person employed 
Contribution to aggregate 
productivity growth GDP share 
 1990-1995  1995-2000  1990-1995  1995-2000  2000 
  EUb US   EUb US   EUb US   EUb US   EUb US 
Total Economy  1.86 1.07  1.40 2.49  1.88 1.08  1.41 2.52  100.0 100.0 
ICT Producing Industries 6.68 8.06  8.66 10.08  0.33 0.51  0.47 0.75  5.9 7.3 
ICT Producing Manufacturing 11.13 15.10  13.76 23.72  0.17 0.40  0.22 0.68  1.6 2.6 
ICT Producing Services 4.44 3.13  6.50 1.76  0.16 0.11  0.25 0.07  4.3 4.7 
ICT Using Industriesa 1.66 1.47  1.57 4.74  0.42 0.43  0.42 1.42  27.0 30.6 
ICT Using Manufacturing 3.13 -0.26  2.13 1.15  0.20 -0.01  0.13 0.05  5.9 4.3 
ICT Using Services 1.07 1.91  1.39 5.39  0.23 0.45  0.29 1.37  21.1 26.3 
Non-ICT Industries 1.61 0.24  0.72 0.49  1.10 0.23  0.48 0.36  67.1 62.1 
Non-ICT Manufacturing 3.84 3.00  1.49 1.36  0.51 0.31  0.18 0.13  11.9 9.3 
Non-ICT Services 0.57 -0.35  0.18 0.43  0.25 -0.15  0.08 0.18  44.7 43.0 
Non-ICT Other 2.72 0.70   1.92 0.58   0.34 0.07   0.21 0.05   10.5 9.8 
 
In Table 4.3 the productivity and employment growth rates of ICT-producing and ICT-using 
industries in manufacturing and services are shown.33 The earlier observation of the successful 
combination of employment and productivity growth in services in the US is largely confirmed. The 
negative employment effects of productivity growth in Europe have been considerably stronger than 
in the U.S. during the early 1990s. The initially negative employment effects in the ICT producing 
and ICT using industries, however, have turned positive during the second half of the 1990s.   
 
                                                 
33 See appendix 3 for industry grouping. 
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Table 4.3b Employment growth and employment shares of ICT-producing, ICT-using and non-
ICT industries in the EU and the U.S. 
  Persons employed 




 1990-1995  1995-2000  1990-1995  1995-2000  2000 
  EUb US   EUb US   EUb US   EUb US   EUb US 
Total Economy  -0.6 1.1  1.2 2.0 -0.60 1.11  1.22 1.98 100.0 100.0 
ICT Producing Industries -1.7 0.6  2.8 4.9 -0.06 0.02  0.11 0.23 3.9 4.9 
ICT Producing Manufacturing -4.5 -1.6  0.4 1.5 -0.06 -0.03  0.01 0.03 1.2 1.6 
ICT Producing Services 0.0 2.2  3.9 6.9 0.00 0.05  0.10 0.20 2.7 3.3 
ICT Using Industriesa -0.7 0.3  1.3 1.6 -0.20 0.09  0.35 0.46 27.3 28.7 
ICT Using Manufacturing -3.8 -1.6  -0.6 -0.8 -0.27 -0.09  -0.04 -0.04 6.1 4.2 
ICT Using Services 0.3 0.7  1.9 2.0 0.07 0.18  0.39 0.49 21.2 24.5 
Non-ICT Industries -0.5 1.5  1.1 2.0 -0.33 1.00  0.76 1.30 68.8 66.4 
Non-ICT Manufacturing -2.8 0.3  0.1 0.0 -0.34 0.02  0.01 0.00 11.1 6.8 
Non-ICT Services 1.0 1.9  1.9 2.1 0.41 0.96  0.87 1.08 45.8 50.5 
Non-ICT Other -2.9 0.3  -0.9 2.5 -0.40 0.02  -0.12 0.22 11.9 9.1 
Note: see appendix 3 for distribution of industries. 
a)  excluding ICT producing industries 
b) EU includes Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the 
United Kingdom, which represents over 90% of EU GDP and 85% of EU Employment. 
Source: Van Ark et al. (2003) 
 
On balance the ICT using industries in the US and EU have a slightly better record in both 
employment and productivity growth than “non ICT” industries. Within the ICT using industries 
services have clearly outperformed the manufacturing industries. The EU countries still lean more 
towards the “traditional” industries. The productivity growth records for the ICT industries are much 
better in the US, whereas the non-ICT growth performance in Europe is slightly more favourable 
(Bosworth and Triplett 2002). 
 
In sum we can conclude that technological advances, such as ICT, impacts on structural change in a 
favourable way, by generating both productivity growth and new employment opportunities 
simultaneously. The U.S. has clearly moved further into the direction of the technology frontier than 
the EU countries and it did not pay a price in terms of employment. Meanwhile the employment-
productivity trade-off continues in the traditional non-ICT sectors either by comparatively low 
productivity growth or declining employment levels.        
 
 
4.4 The role of the informal economy in structural change  
 
In the process of structural change outlined above we mainly focused on resources shifting from low 
productive to high productive sectors. We have argued that a successful transition from an agrarian 
based economy towards an industrialised economy also requires substantial progress in the traditional 
agricultural sector itself. Especially in the case of developing economies, however, the process of 
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structural change can lead to a dual economic structure in which traditional low-productive sectors 
persist next to modern high productive sectors in the urban centers (Lewis 1955; Fei and Ranis 1987).  
 
In economies undergoing rapid growth a lack of spatial and sectoral integration can often hamper the 
sustainability of economic growth and create barriers to social mobility and poverty alleviation. 
Dualism is almost symbolically reflected by the existence of a large informal economy, that is fuelled 
by a surplus of labour – often migrated from rural areas to the urban centers – left unabsorbed by the 
formal sector.34 In some countries this part of the economy comprises over 50% of the total 
economically active population.  
 
In this section we will deal with the specific role of the informal economy in the process of structural 
change. The crucial question is whether the informal economy can positively contribute to the 
dynamics of structural change. Here we argue the conditions under which this may be the case. In 
chapter 5 we will deal with the necessary -mainly institutional- conditions that facilitate the realisation 
of the informal economy potential.  
 
Development and characteristics of the informal economy  
In Chapter 2 we argued that the extent of structural change critically depends on the degree of growth 
potential and the conditions that contribute to its realisation. A high level of social capabilities (i.e. 
accumulated human capital and growth promoting institutions) critically contributes to the potential to 
reap the fruits of technological and organisational innovations. Underdeveloped social capabilities can 
lead to situations in which some aspects of modernisation are easily implemented whereas other 
aspects become an important drag on comprehensive social and economic development.  
 
Structural change must allow for the fact that for fundamental changes to take effect, a certain period 
of time is required. Building an effective system of education, reforming rigid and deep-rooted 
institutions concerning, for example, the property rights structure or changing forms of more informal 
traditional or cultural behaviour are time-consuming processes, and demand commitments that often 
go beyond the typical political (election) cycle of four or five years.  
                                                 
34 According to the resolution concerning statistics of employment in the informal economy, adopted by the 
Fifteenth International Conference of Labour Statisticians (ICLS), it consists of small scale production units that 
operate at a low level of organisation with little or no division between labour and capital. Labour relations - 
where they exist - are based mostly on casual employment, kinship or personal and social relations rather than 
contractual arrangements with formal guarantees. Moreover, these units possess the characteristics of 
"household enterprises": a) fixed and other assets do not belong to the unit but to the owner; b) units cannot 
engage in transactions or enter into contracts nor incur liabilities on their own behalf; c) expenditure for 
production and capital goods are often indistinguishable from household purposes. The ILO/ICFTU 
international symposium on the informal sector (1999) proposed a categorisation of the informal economy 
workforce into three broad groups: (a) owner-employers of micro enterprises, which employ a few paid workers, 
with or without apprentices; (b) own-account workers, who own and operate one-person business, who work 
alone or with the help of unpaid workers, generally family members and apprentices; and (c) dependent 
workers, paid or unpaid, including wage workers in micro enterprises, unpaid family workers, apprentices, 
contract labour, homeworkers and paid domestic workers. 
 (www.ilo.org/public/english/employment/skills/informal/who.htm) 
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The time lag for structural change to impact on growth, in combination with the effects of the 
demographic transition has resulted in an explosive growth of metropoles such as Mexico City, 
Jakarta, Calcutta and Lagos. These economies are confronted with large labour surpluses of 
underemployed people in the informal economy. Developing economies have only partly been able to 
absorb these surpluses by creating new employment opportunities.  
 
The basic function of the informal economy is that it provides cheap alternatives to products and 
services from the formal economy, because informal economy workers and entrepreneurs accept a 
lower rate of return and make less costs for reducing several types of risk and insecurity. Furthermore 
informal economy competition is tough which keeps prices down (Lejour 1998). Another important 
rationale for the existence of an informal economy is that there is a substantial demand for informal 
econmy products and services, although it is easy to see that these two conditions reinforce each 
other.   
 
The burden of turning informal activities into formal activities lies in the costs of becoming formal 
and is often frustrated by lack of proper institutions. The formalisation of businesses often requires the 
entrepreneur to accept and apply regulations concerning, among other things, the organisation of the 
production process, the hiring and firing of labour, minimum wages, business administration, 
insurance and responsibility. The implementation of these legislative prescriptions incur large costs. 
For the informal entrepreneur this investment is either an absolute constraint, or his/her cost-benefit 
analysis turns out to be negative.  
 
The capabilities of the entrepreneur also often do not live up to the legal requirements to execute a 
formal job and become, for example, a registered haircutter, cook or carpenter in the formal sector of 
the economy. In addition, having a good and extensive network is in many countries at least as 
important as objective personal capacities to gain access to the formal sector. Hence the costs of 
becoming a formal economy enterprise are often higher than the expected benefits (de Soto 2000). 
 
A rather specific type of informal sector employment concerns illegal economic activities. Apart from 
harsh criminal activities in drugs or weapon trade, a more common illegal activity is for instance the 
production of brand-copied wearing apparel. As illegal activities generate relatively high returns, they 
create incentives to bear the higher risk of getting caught. For people who live at subsistence level 
with hardly any perspective, these jobs are appealing.    
 
The lack of decent work in the informal economy is reflected by a low standard of living, large 
insecurity, limited economic perspectives and low social mobility. As informal businesses are missing 
access to the capital market it is hard to release their constraints. Legal permits are costly and in 
addition, they are sequential. To get legal permits requires other permits and so on. The same applies 
for the certificates required. Education requires an investment which often depends on access to the 
capital market in the first place. Hence the self-perpetuating forces underlying informal economy 
employment are quite strong.  
 
With respect to the productivity employment trade-off the informal economy characteristics are 
typically biased towards employment growth at the expense of productivity growth. The informal 
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economy is heavily biased towards unskilled labour. Nevertheless the role of small scale enterprises 
(SSE’s) is increasingly considered to be potentially growth-promoting. Informal small scale 
enterprises provide a substantial source of employment and an important source of income as these 
enterprises are easy to start up and cater widely for the employment of unskilled labour. Furthermore, 
it is a source of capital formation for small entrepreneurs. Facilitating small-scale entrepreneurship by 
reducing entrance costs for informal sector workers can be considered as a labour-biased development 
strategy that can offset the distortionary tendencies (underemployment) of capital biased technological 
change (Little, Mazumdar and Page 1987, Vandenberg 2003).  
 
The expansion of the informal economy35 
Only recently labour statisticians have begun to capture the informal economy in quantitative terms. 
Still there are major problems in defining informal economy employment and statistics often lack 
comparability. Nevertheless the ILO has published some preliminary results and estimates, including 
a percentage share of employment in the urban informal economy in total urban employment (Table 
4.4).  
 
Self-employed workers, most of whom are own-account and unpaid family workers, make up the 
major part of the rural and urban employment. In many developing countries the number of self-
employed in non-agricultural activities also increased. During the 1990s, own-account and family 
workers represented nearly two-thirds of the total non-agricultural labour force in Africa, half in 
South Asia, one-third in the Middle East, and one-fourth in East Asia and Latin America. A dramatic 
increase in self-employment has also marked the transition process in former centrally planned 
countries of Europe. In the 1990s own-account workers made up one-fourth of total employment in 
Poland, one-fifth in Romania and one-tenth in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovenia. 
 
In Latin America the urban informal sector was the primary job generator during the 1990s. On 
average 60% of the new jobs were created by micro-enterprises, own-account workers and domestic 
services. Informal economy employment increased by a yearly 3.9%, while formal economy 
employment grew by only 2.1%. In Africa, urban informal employment was estimated to absorb 61% 
of the urban labour force and to generate more than 93% of all additional jobs in the region in the 
1990s. In Asia it was estimated that the informal sector typically absorbed between 40 and 50% of the 
urban labour force (before the 1997 financial crises), displaying large differences between the newly 
industrialising countries (less than 10%) and countries such as Bangladesh, Nepal and Pakistan (over 
60%). 
 
Table 4.4: Percentage of total employed in the urban informal sector  
    Total Male Female 
Benin  1999** 46 50 41 
Ethiopia 1999* 50.6 38.9 64.8 
                                                 
35 Large parts of this section are directly drawn from the ILO website: 
www.ilo.org/public/english/employment/skills/informal/who.htm. Apart from table 4.5, all other figures 
mentioned are taken from ILO Key Indicators of the Labour Market (KILM) 1999; ILO Panorama Laboral 99 
and  ILO, World Labour Report 1997-98; statistics compiled by Jacques Charmes for POLDEV, 1998.  
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South Africa  1999** 21.3 16.1 28.4 
Tanzania  1995** 67 59.7 85.3 
      
Brazil  1997** 27.3 27.4 27.1 
Mexico  1999** 29.7 30.8 28 
Peru  1999* 53.8 48.9 60.6 
      
India 2000** 51.3 53.7 40.6 
Philippines  1995** 17.3 15.8 19.4 
Nepal 1999** 64.8 60.0 75.7 
Pakistan 1997** 61.2   
      
Turkey  2000* 10.2 10.4 9.4 
Russian federation  1999* 4.5 4.4 4.7 
Georgia  1999** 14.2 20.7 7.4 
Lithuania  2000** 41.3 49.6 26.5 
Ukraine  1997** 4.9 4.5 5.3 
* according to harmonised definition of the ILO; ** according to the national definition 
Source: ILO Compendium of official statistics on employment in the informal sector, STAT Working 
paper, pp. 16-28 
 
The share of women in the informal eoconomy is relatively high at between 60 to 80% of total 
informal sector employment. Women comprise most of unpaid family helpers and home-based 
workers. The recent widespread strategy of firms in the formal sector in advanced and developing 
countries to subcontract production and services to family enterprises and home-based labour has 
contributed to the linking of women's home-based labour to the formal production system under 
informal, flexible employment arrangements.36 
 
A potential positive contribution to creating better jobs? 
Given the imbalances in the process of structural change reflected by the expansion of employment in 
the informal economy in many developing countries, the challenging task ahead is to turn this large 
pool of human potential into a more productive one, with higher rewards that can generate incomes 
through which labour conditions and living standards can be improved. 
 
It is therefore useful to distinguish between informal activities that play a role in the vertical chain of 
formal production (complementary activities) and those that are merely substituting for and thus 
competing with formal activities. Examples of the latter type are, for instance, street vending, food 
stalls, the production of low-quality apparel and shoes or simple mechanical work. They are 
sometimes perceived as a threat to formal economy counterparts, and there can be legal as well as 
                                                 
36 Women tend to be concentrated in a narrower range of activities or occupations (typical activities are food 
processing, garment sewing, domestic services), in tasks that require less or no skills and pay less. Moreover, in 
addition to constraints faced by workers and producers in the informal sector with regards to access to assets, 
markets, services and regulatory frameworks, women face additional gender-specific barriers such as 
restrictions to entering into contracts, insecure land and property rights and household and childcare 
responsibilities. 
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illegal actions directed against these activities to depress their competitive pressure. On the other 
hand, activities that are considered to be complementary to formal production processes play a 
different role in the economy. One can think of informal transport services, the production of 
intermediary goods or informal types of education and learning, which are not at hand in the formal 
sector, that are required to smoothen the vertical chain. The lowering of entrance costs for these small 
scale enterprises, either in the formal or the informal economy, may create beneficial spillover effects 
to the formal economy. 
 
Although the arguments above are still somewhat speculative, the importance of the informal 
economy in nurturing small entrepreneurship, job creation and market integration deserves attention. 
Once small informal businesses are enabled to develop, by gaining access to important facilities such 
as capital loans, market information, simple technology and sufficient protection of property rights, 
the urban informal economy can even create a modest surplus that can in turn be used to develop 
business linkages with the formal economy. Ultimately this will lead to a decline in inequality in 
income and wealth as it helps to create a sizeable middle class that stimulates social and political 
stability and enhances effective domestic demand. 
 
Clearly a large informal sector is in itself not a sign of favourable economic development. On the 
contrary, it primarily points at the existence of a dual economy. But given the very existence of the 
informal sector, and the problems to match demand and supply of labour in the formal economy, there 
is no other option than to focus on its growth potential meanwhile fighting intolerable excesses in 
human deprivation and poverty. The challenge is to formalise informal economy employment by 
creating the right facilities. In the process of building commercial and financial institutions to enhance 
economic integration, SSEs can perform an important intermediate role. This strategy should focus on 








Despite large achievements in world economic growth over the past two centuries, which has brought 
increased welfare to the average population in an increasing number of countries, there have been 
winners and losers in the process. In the preceeding chapters we have aimed to find systematic 
patterns in terms of (groups of) countries and industries that either benefited or suffered from 
economic growth. In particular we focused on the question to what extent the long run achievements 
in productivity and per capita income growth have created circumstances of trade-off between 
productivity growth and job creation in the medium run.  
 
Firstly, we found an increased diversity in productivity performance between developing and 
advanced countries over the past decades, but also greater diversity within the two groups of 
developing and advanced nations themselves. Secondly, we found that countries which have 
generated productivity growth on a sustainable basis (that is, in the long term and widespread across 
the economy) have been more successful in keeping labour force participation rates up (or even 
increased them) than countries that have undergone slow growth. Thirdly, we found that in the 
medium run trade-offs between productivity and employment growth frequently occur across sectors. 
However, industries that are most susceptible to technological and organisational innovations, despite 
the labour-saving bias of many of today’s new technologies, are more likely to generate productivity 
growth together with the creation of more productive, higher skilled and better paid jobs, than 
industries that are not characterised as innovative. Finally, the trade-off in productivity and 
employment growth in developing countries is often worsened by the demographic transition and 
insufficient absorption capacity of the modern sector, for which the informal economy can play an 
important role as a (temporary) buffer for creating less productive jobs. 
 
It should be clear from this assessment that during the process of structural change shifts in benefits 
from the fortunes of growth are unavoidable. Even in situations of very rapid growth (as, for example, 
in the East Asian countries during the 1960s and 1970s) when almost all groups and industries in the 
society benefit from growth in terms of higher incomes and faster productivity growth, there are those 
that benefit more than others. The question posed in this final chapter therefore is not how to avoid the 
trade-off between employment creation and productivity growth. Instead one should consider which 
policies contribute to creating an environment that tackles  the social and economic disadvantages of 
trade-offs in the medium run without affecting the long run opportunities to realise the potential for 
productivity growth with job creation.  
 
Following the framework outlined in Chapter 1, the description of the policy framework needs to 
focus on the institutional design governing the investment decisions concerning tangible and 
intangible capital, the decision-making concerning the demand and supply for labour, and the 
(re)allocations of these resources to industries and firms. These decisions are normally taken in an 
environment, governed by markets in which supply and demand for factor inputs (labour and capital 
markets) and product and services (product markets) are matched. Governments play an important 
role in setting the “rules of the game” (or institutions) for these markets.  
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Below we begin with a brief overview of theoretical perspectives on policies that enhance 
productivity growth and job creation. We then focus on two broad policy areas. These are the 
incentive structure, which depends on the regulation and functioning of markets, and the national 
innovation system, which relates to the network of actors that are involved in the creation of 
knowledge and human capital, technological change and organisational innovation. An effective 
national innovation system can be seen as crucial for the generating of social capabilities.  
 
It should be said beforehand that there obviously are no universal policy prescriptions to be taken 
from the analysis below. Institutions are strongly path dependent and embedded in the social, cultural 
and historical roots of any society. In fact much of the recent institutional literature strongly 
emphasises the endogeneity of institutional change (North 1990; Aoki 2001). Hence there is no single 
institutional design that has been most effective in supporting change. In addition, throughout this 
report we stressed the importance as regards the stage of economic development a country finds itself 
in. For example, Rodrik (2003) argues that early stages of growth often require a limited number of 
reforms “that need not overly tax the institutional capacity of the economy”, whereas in the long run 
the challenge is to construct “a sound institutional underpinning to maintain productivity dynamism 
and endow the economy with resilience to shocks over the longer term” (p. 3). 
 
5.2 Theoretical Perspectives on Productivity-Enhancing and Employment-Creating policies37 
 
In a market economy the main policy instruments available to promote and support faster growth are 
to encourage private enterprises to find new possibilities for doing (particular kinds of) business and 
create more employment opportunities by:  
(1) direct modification of the costs and benefits of alternative investment decisions (e.g., through 
taxes, subsidies or legislation of different kinds), and/or 
(2) changes to the institutions that condition private sector decision making, for instance, the extent of 
competition in different product markets; the levels and types of skill produced by national 
education and training systems; the levels and institutional forms of support for basic and strategic 
research; investment in transport infrastructure; legislation governing labour and financial 
markets, etc.  
 
The most well established theoretical perspective relating to enterprise behaviour, and government 
policies attempting to influence that behaviour, derives from neo-classical theories of economic 
growth. The prototype enterprise in the neo-classical view is seen as profit maximising, making 
decisions about production, employment and investment in response to price signals in perfectly 
competitive markets where all risks relating to unknown future outcomes are internalised. From this 
perspective the argument in favour of policy interventions is to seek to correct different kinds of 
market failures, externalities, spillovers, etc., that inhibit an optimal allocation of resources. It is 
further argued that policies should be so designed as to minimise distortions to market signals, for 
example, that as far as possible they should be generally applicable in nature rather than intended to 
encourage particular kinds of economic activity (as would be the case with sector-specific or 
                                                 
37  The following sections are largely based on Mason, O’Mahony and van Ark (2003) & van Ark (2003). 
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technology-specific policies). In practice many supporters of this view of the enterprise would not go 
as far as to advocate positive policy interventions to correct perceived failures on the grounds that the 
policy makers do not have sufficient information to correct these without inducing other distortions. 
On the other hand, neo-classical economists tend to be strongly in favour of negative interventions, 
i.e. those that remove government influence in the market place such as deregulation of product or 
labour markets. 
 
Similar issues have arisen when studying the impact of more flexible labour markets, with less 
stringent hiring and firing rules, limited regulations concerning administrative permits, etc., on output 
and employment creation. In principle, flexible labour markets support the (re-)allocation of labourers 
from less to more productive industries, in particular when the wage structure (at least to some extent) 
reflects differences in productivity performance across the economy. But the outcomes clearly differ 
across countries depending on the nature of that country’s wage bargaining and training institutions, 
its pattern of industrial specialisation and the types of market structure that predominate (OECD 
2003).  
 
A different focus on employment and productivity-enhancing policies has come from evolutionary 
theories of economic growth in which enterprises are seen as profit seeking (rather than profit 
maximising) and operating in conditions of unquantifiable uncertainty rather than quantifiable risk 
(Nelson and Winter 1982). From this perspective the central aim of policy is not so much (or not just) 
to remove market imperfections, but rather to provide conditions that support inventions and 
innovations. There is increasing agreement that this needs to be done, not just by encouraging the 
production of new economic knowledge, but also by taking steps to facilitate and speed up the 
distribution of knowledge within national economies (David and Foray 1995). This approach provides 
a rationale for public policies and programmes intended to influence the behaviour of enterprises in 
terms of, for example, external knowledge search and exchange, international co-operation and R&D 
collaboration with universities, research institutes and other enterprises (see, for example, Dosi et al. 
1988; OECD 1999).  
 
In the light of these different perspectives on enterprise behaviour and public policy interventions, the 
remainder of this chapter considers both actions that governments can take to improve the operations 
of markets and actions which in principle may help to strengthen innovation processes and speed up 
technological change. Thus, mindful of the scope for wastage of public resources in efforts to directly 
influence enterprise behaviour, the main emphasis will be on evaluating changes in public policies 
which help shape the social-institutional context for private sector decision-making and support the 
creation of social capabilities. Examples relate to education and training, infrastructure of different 




5.3 The Impact of Markets on Productivity and Employment Creation 
 
The regulatory environment in which firms operate is likely to impact on their ability to instigate 
productivity improvements and generate more employment, either through a better allocation of 
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inputs, more technology transfer or a greater ability to generate spillovers. In many studies a 
distinction is made between product and labour market regulations. Economic theory suggests that, all 
else being equal, a greater degree of product market competition creates greater opportunities for 
comparing performance and increases incentives to search for and implement cost-reducing 
investments in new technology and changes in work organisation (Nickell 1996; Nickell et al. 1997). 
Similar expectations about incentives apply to firms operating in a context of relatively low costs in 
terms of adjusting labour quantities and qualities in ways that harmonise with the adoption of new 
technologies and new modes of work organisation. 
 
In the past many existing institutional settings or regulatory arrangements have originally been set up 
with the motivation to smooth the functioning of the markets, by streamlining rules on competition, 
business conduct, labour markets, consumer protection, public safety, health and so on. However, 
regulations may also become a drag to the extent that they limit the efficiency of market functioning, 
reduce entry of new firms and delay exits.  
 
There has been an increasing awareness of the need for an innovation-specific focus on (de)regulation 
and its impact on growth and productivity performance in the knowledge economy. For example, in 
the context of ICT diffusion, McGuckin and van Ark (2001) have argued that too tight regulations 
may hamper the spread of ICT in European countries compared to its widespread use in the United 
States, where regulatory reforms started much earlier and were pursued more vigorously than in 
Europe. Indeed the opportunities to exploit new technologies are to a large extent determined by the 
regulatory environment. Most notable examples of industries that have witnessed large-scale 
regulatory changes are the former publicly regulated sectors, such as telecommunications and 
electricity production and distribution. But market-oriented industries have also been deregulated, for 
example in transportation, retail trade and the financial sector.38 
 
Although there is substantive evidence of a strong relation between the diffusion of new technology, 
such as ICT, and regulation, no such relation can be found between productivity growth acceleration 
and the regulatory arrangements on product and labour markets (see, for example, van Ark 2003). In 
fact a direct linear relationship between productivity and regulation at the macroeconomic should not 
necessarily be expected. A better case can be made for a quadratic or U-shaped relationship, which 
would suggest some optimal midway point for the relationship between regulation and total factor 
productivity (TFP) growth.  
 
Also in the area of employment protection legislation (EPL) the relation to productivity is not always 
straightforward, and is often dependent on other institutional factors, such as the wage bargaining 
system of a country, and the macroeconomic context within which wages are set. For example, a 
recent OECD study shows that strict EPL has a relatively small impact on productivity and R&D 
intensity in countries such as Germany and Austria with centralised wage bargaining procedures and 
well-established apprenticeship and continuing training systems which provide support for firms to 
                                                 
38 For example, Hubbard (2003) studies the use of ICT and regulatory reforms in US trucking. Regulations in 
trucking and retail trade in OECD countries have been assessed by Boylaud (2000). OECD (2003) reviews the 
relation between regulation, innovation and productivity growth. 
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upgrade the skills of their existing employees in response to technological change (OECD 2003). 
Conversely, the negative effects of EPL on productivity may be strongest in countries such as 
Belgium, France or Portugal ‘where the adjustment costs associated to EPL are not offset by the 
possibility of adjusting wages or use of internal training’ (OECD 2003, p.112). 
 
In fact, in  order to evaluate the effects of strict employment protection legislation (EPL) on 
productivity and employment growth, a wider view of predominant labour market institutions in a 
given country needs to be taken than just to focus on the flexibility of the labour market. For example, 
in many countries (large) enterprises still operate internal labour markets which are characterised by a 
longstanding preference for external recruitment to be confined to a range of entry-level jobs and for 
the bulk of more senior positions to be filled through internal promotion. Common rationales for 
employers to maintain internal labour markets centre on the benefits to employee motivation, the cost 
savings from lower labour turnover and firms’ efforts to maximise returns from job-specific and 
company-specific training. If such effects can be reached, in particular in unstable institutional 
environments, the negative effects of strict EPL on productivity will be reduced.39  
 
Another important matter is that the relation between regulation and productivity is likely to be highly 
sector specific. For example, at industry level strict employment protection legislation is likely to 
have strong negative effects on productivity in low-technology industries if employers are restricted in 
their capacity to shed labour following the introduction of labour-saving technologies. Strict EPL is 
also likely to depress productivity growth and R&D intensity in high technology industries with 
relatively low levels of market concentration where technologies tend to evolve and/or be replaced 
very quickly. By contrast, the negative impact of strict EPL on R&D intensity is likely to be less in 
high- or medium- technology industries with relatively high levels of market concentration. OECD 
(2003) cites the examples of electronic components and aircraft as industries of this kind which are 
characterised by cumulative innovation processes rather than rapidly changing technologies, and thus 
stand to benefit from progressive development of existing employees’ skills. An analysis of industry 
specific regulations for the OECD suggests that in the airline industry, countries with a less regulatory 
environment have higher output and employment growth, but the effect on productivity growth is 
ambiguous. In the retail sector, in contrast, less regulations have raised output growth but not 
employment growth, hence suggesting a positive impact on productivity growth (Broersma and van 
Ark, 2004).40 
 
In summary, under the influence of structural reforms the relation between productivity and 
employment can go both ways. As stressed above, inadequate institutions can lead to a misallocation 
of resources even under a regime of free markets. Moreover, structural reforms may differ in terms of 
the timing gap between implementation and the resulting impact on productivity and employment. For 
example, reforms in retailing can initially lead to longer opening hours of shops, thus requiring more 
labour without creating much more throughput. Only once the consumer has changed his behaviour in 
response to the new opportunities, will retail output increase and the quality of retail services improve. 
                                                 
39  See, for example, Wachter and Wright (1990) and Eyraud, Marsden and Silvestre (1990). 
40 See also Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003). 
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Indeed the rise of a middle class in emerging economies is a driving force behind changes in demand 
patterns with a positive impact on productivity performance in the longer run. 
 
 
5.4 Technology, Innovation and Human Capital Policies 
 
Governments also need to create the “rules of the game” concerning technology creation and diffusion 
and the formation of human capital. Although technology creation is of particular importance for 
moving the productivity frontier and improving best practices, technology diffusion particularly 
contributes to reducing the productivity gap between average and best practice firms, including best 
practice abroad. Policies which are focused on the former are therefore more likely to focus on the 
support of R&D, a properly working patent system and the training of graduates, in particular in 
sciences. The latter is oriented towards facilitating knowledge flows, by supporting national and 
international co-operation between firms, and between the business sector and public and private 
knowledge institutes, as well as the support of in particular intermediate skills and vocational training. 
 
However, in practice, policie s towards technology creation and diffusion cannot (and perhaps, should 
not) be so easily disentangled. For example, it might be argued that small/medium size economies, 
like many developing nations but also smaller countries in Europe, can benefit to a la rger extent from 
international knowledge spillovers and therefore need less domestic R&D than larger economies. But 
others have argued that even in smaller countries more domestic R&D will facilitate the adoption of 
foreign technologies (Jacobs, Nahuis and Tang 2002). In addition, it may be argued that knowledge 
intensive industries are strongly tied to local knowledge networks, and that absorptive capacity and 
complementary investments in physical and intangible capital are always important (Kleinknecht and 
ter Wengel 1998; Fagerberg and Verspagen 2000).  
 
Indeed from the perspective of social capabilities, an increase in absorptive capacity refers to both 
technology creation and diffusion. It strengthens the ability to assimilate new knowledge and 
successfully apply it to the commercial production of product or services, which is therefore in itself 
an important driver of technology diffusion. Absorptive capacity strongly relates to the level and 
growth of intangible assets created by firms and the society as a whole, including human capital 
creation and organisational changes. 
 
During the 1980s and 1990s, the interest in the role of investments in human capital and research and 
development and its impact on knowledge creation and economic growth has strongly increased 
(Romer 1990, 1994; Lucas 1988). Due to the public good characteristics of knowledge creation, 
enterprises are unable to appropriate all the external benefits of their investments and therefore private 
rates of investment in research and innovation will be lower than would be socially optimal. In 
principle, this is another form of market failure that provides a rationale for government policies 
designed to encourage higher levels of private investment in knowledge production. Later versions of 
endogenous growth models concentrated more on the dynamic process linking innovation and growth 
within a Schumpeterian framework of creative destruction (Aghion and Howitt 1998, Aghion et al. 
2001). In recent years, there has also been increased attention for the complementarity of investment 
in high-tech inputs (such as ICT) and organisational changes. These can be defined as changes in the 
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strategies, structures and practices of organisations, and may involve a number of elements including 
changes in organisational structure, in the work process or new forms of work organisation, 
innovative human resource practices, new industrial relations practices, new business practices and 
new management techniques (European Commission 2003, p. 58). These studies generally confirm 
strong joint effects of technology use (such as investment in ICT capital) and skill creation, which 
supports the hypothesis of skill-biased technological change (Berman et al. 1998; Autor et al. 1998). 
Clearly, investment in organisational changes are largely at the discretion of individual firms rather 
than the government, but the latter can again play a crucial role in creating the appropriate external 
conditions for making such investments worthwhile. 
 
Many of the actors that play a role in strengthening the innovation and knowledge base can be brought 
together in the framework of a national innovation system (NIS), which consists of actors and 
institutions, including the business sectors, the government, the education system, universities and 
research organisations, the financial system and the labour market.41 Within the NIS, linkages among 
the actors are very important, just as incentives given to firms to undertake innovative activities. From 
a policy viewpoint, the advantage of the NIS approach is that it recognizes the systemic nature of the 
process of technological change and its links with the economic, cultural and social environment. In 
line with the evolutionary approach to economic growth, the NIS approach also allows to address 
“system” failures, which depend on external factors, rather than only market failures to innovation. 
Such system failures may include incentive conflicts between various agents, weaknesses and 
asymmetries in some parts of the innovation system that do not match with other parts of the system 
(Gu 1999). This approach therefore requires a greater degree of co-ordination to support innovation 
that goes beyond the removal of market failures. At the same time it must also recognize the 
uncertainties on the outcome of policy interventions in the innovation process. 
Although the NIS literature originates from advanced countries, much of it may be especially relevant 
for developing countries, where market failures and imperfect or missing markets may play a greater 
role in hampering the innovation process. Some of the development economics literature has stress the 
importance of technological capabilities for growth, but the link of the NIS approach to policy making 
is still largely missing. One of the specific problems in extending the NIS approach to developing 
countries is the need to recognize the phase of the transition process in which a particular country 
finds itself, as this determines the contours of the NIS. This requires a good knowledge of the 
historical deve lopment, social, economic and political aspects of the network of institutions related to 
the innovation process. Gu (1999, pp. 43-48) provides a useful summary of the key notions 
concerning the innovation process in a developing country: 
1) Industrialisation requires fundamental transition of the traditional technological and 
institutional attributes to become innovative and dynamic; 
2) National innovation systems are specific to the development phase of a country and specific 
characteristics of the country; 
3) Extraordinary “enhanced learning” is the key for a successful catching up which requires and 
is supported by a rapid development of a development country; 
4) The role of the market in promoting learning and generating change needs to receive special 
attention; 
                                                 
41 See, for example, Lundvall (1988) and Freeman (1995). 
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5) For developing countries, learning to innovate is more closely related to capital investment 
than in advanced countries. 
 
There is some useful literature on the role of national innovation system in developing countries, in 
particular in East Asian countrie s. The emphasis in this literature on the role of learning is very 
striking, and so are the different mechanisms through which (foreign) knowledge is obtained. For 
example, in terms of knowledge inflows, licensing, industrial targeting and the innovation role of 
large firms have been the main instruments in Korea, while FDI was the key catalyst to support 
learning in Taiwan (Kim 1997; Mowery 1998; Gu 1999).  
 
However, national innovation systems approaches often still have a rather exclusive focus on the 
production of goods. Although such a focus may be relevant for many industrialising countries, 
national innovation systems in advanced countries should be more focused on services. In advanced 
countries, the latter is the key sector for employment generation, and the potential for productivity 
growth in these sectors has been insufficiently realised. In a recent study, den Hertog et al. (2003) 
review the evidence on the importance of innovations in services, including organisational 
innovations and changes in firm strategies and marketing. They suggest to support innovation in 
services and service functions in advanced countries in a number of ways. Firstly, existing innovation 
policies, such as R&D policies and extension services by government, can be deepened by making 
them more services-friendly through focusing on aspects of non-technological innovation. Secondly, 
policies can be broadened by extending technology diffusion programmes to service firms and by 
supporting management programmes that can promote an “innovation culture” in service industries. 
There is also a need for promoting links between service firms and public and private research 
organisations in the areas of non-technological innovations.  
 
However, not just the distinction between goods and services is a relevant aspect in considering the 
use of the NIS approach in advanced and developing countries. The type of innovation process itself 
is also relevant. For example, Edquist et al. (2001, p. 124) argue that industries (both manufacturing 
and services) in which there is emphasis on process innovation tend to be more strongly characterised 
by labour-saving technological change than is true for sectors which have high levels of product 
innovation. Hence a negative impact of innovation on employment creation tends to be more strongly 
negative in the former group of industries than in the latter. 
 
Finally, “horizontal policies”, which are policies not directly related to innovation, are at least as 
important to improve innovation activity across the economy. As human capital is a key input in the 
innovation process, there is a clear role for the government to provide an adequate formal education 
system, to support training and mobility of researchers and facilitate co-operation. The impact of 
education on growth and innovation has been a major topic of debate in the literature, and this direct 
relation has been disputed. 42 However, there is considerable evidence that education strengthens social 
capabilities and increases the adaptive capacity to adjust to new technologies. Hence education will 
certainly indirectly contributes to growth.  
 
                                                 
42 See Temple (2001) for a review. 
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As mentioned above, the design of policies intended to speed up the rate of technological change 
typically require a strong element of judgement, regardless of whether the policies are sector-specific 
or horizontal in nature, and therefore there is considerable scope for government error in formulating 
and implementing such policies, just as there is in efforts to correct market imperfections. Hence there 
is widespread agreement about the need for caution in efforts to improve productivity and growth 
through public policy interventions. Indeed, many evolutionary economists caution against any hint of 
policy makers returning to previous efforts to ‘pick winners’, rather the aim should be to ‘encourage 
winners to emerge by strengthening the innovation process in general’ (Metcalfe and Georghiou 
1998). To be able to create such an environment, Rodrik (2003) argues that many of the “first-order 
economic principles” in neo-classical economic analysis, such as protection of property rights, 
contract enforcement, market-based competition, appropriate incentives, sound money and debt 
sustainability, remain the most useful tools for this. The point is that such functions of good 
institutions do not map into the form that the institutions take. According to Rodrik … “reformers 
have substantial room for creatively packaging these principles into institutional designs that are 
sensitive to local constraints and take advantages of local opportunities” (ibid, p. 3).  
 
In conclusion, the role of institutions and policies to create the virtuous cycle of productivity and 
employment, growth which has been the key theme of this report, should neither be overstated nor 
understated. On the one hand historical circumstances, local constraints and opportunities, changes in 
the nature of technological progress, and the mobility of labour and capital in the world economy are 
factors that are largely beyond the reach of policy makers. On the other hand, the willingness to 
embark on a process of economic modernisation that is aimed at creating an environment that is 
receptive to institutional changes that support structural reforms and innovation provides the key to 
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Appendix 1: Concepts of productivity, labour input and labour force participation 
 
The key performance concepts used in this study are labour productivity growth and levels, labour 
input growth and labour force participation. The measures are largely derived from the KILM 
database, especially from Chapter 18 on productivity and unit labour costs.  
 
Labour productivity is a typical single factor productivity measure, which relates a measure of output 
to a single measure of input, labour. It is the most widely used measure of productivity, and is mostly 
measured in terms of value added over employment or value added over total working hours. Labour 
productivity measures have their own specific uses, for example, as a measure to identify the 
contribution of productivity – next to labour force participation – to the improvement in average per 
capita income, which makes it a particularly useful for the purpose of this study.43 
 
Labour productivity can be expressed in different ways both on the output as well as on the input side. 
On the output side, a distinction can be made between productivity measures that relate gross output 
to one or several inputs and those that use value added to capture movements in output. At the 
macroeconomic or sector level, which is applied here, value added measures are more widely 
available, and – without information on intermediate inputs – most desirable as they avoid double 
counting of output when aggregating the results across sectors. On the input side, a distinction can be 
made in terms of output per person employed or per hour worked. Internationally consistent measures 
of hours worked are much harder to come by than measures of employment, in particular when 
developing countries are included (see ILO, 2003, Chapter 18). But even comparisons of output per 
person employed can be affected by differences in treatment of self-employed workers, workers in the 
informal sector, unpaid family workers, etc. The latter issues concerning employment estimates have 
also an impact on the comparability of measures of labour force participation. The precise definitions 
are provided in Appendix 2. 
 
The most obvious and comprehensive source for productivity measurement at the level of the total 
economy or for individual sectors is the national accounts. National accounts are based on 
international conventions concerning measurement of output and inputs laid down in the UN System 
of National Accounts (SNA, of which the latest version refers to 1993) and – for Europe – the 
European System of Accounts (ESA, of which the latest version refers to 1995). Unfortunately, the 
practical implementation of SNA conventions in the national accounts statistics is not quite the same 
across countries. In particular many developing countries have not yet adopted the new SNA. At the 
aggregate level of total GDP the impact of such differences is usually fairly small, but it may be 
bigger for output measures at the sector level. 
 
Data on labour input mostly needs to be derived from other sources than from the national accounts. 
Although the SNA 1993 and ESA 1995 recommend the measurement of employment and hours 
                                                 
43 An important alternative measure is total factor productivity, relating a measure of output to a bundle of 
inputs). Total factor productivity measurement is a better way to distinguish between contributions to GDP from 
efficiency improvement and contributions from inputs, such as labour, capital and intermediate inputs. See, for 
example, van Ark (2003) 
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worked within the framework of the national accounts, such measures are not as well standardised as 
for employment estimates from labour force survey or enterprise statistics. Labour input measures 
from the labour force survey are usually most consistent across countries, and have the advantage that 
they can be combined with measures of unemployed in the labour force and population in different 
age categories. 
 
The measurement of working hours represents a particular problem for international productivity 
comparisons. If available, one may use information on working hours from labour force statistics, but 
a good alternative is to use a “composition method” for the estimation of actual working hours. This 
implies a combination of enterprise-based statistics for measurement of hours of paid employees in 
the business sectors, and labour force statistics for the measurement of hours of self-employed 
workers, government employees, and working time lost due to vacation, sickness, etc. Although 
differences in measurement of working hours probably have less impact on comparisons of 
productivity growth than on relative productivity levels, even in the former case it can matter 
substantially.  
 
Information on labour quality, for example, on the skill composition of the labour composition, 
always needs to be derived from sources other than national accounts, in particular the labour force 
survey. Due to comparability issues, it is usually not possible to make international comparisons for 
more than three skill categories, and much of this work will remain limited to OECD countries. For 
example, on the basis of the Eurostat Labour Force Survey, one can make a distinction between low 
skills (pre-primary, primary and lower secondary education), medium skills (upper secondary 
education) and high skills (total tertiary education). It should be noted, however, that Eurostat does 
not attempt to harmonise the skill divisions across countries, taking data delivered by the member 
countries as given. There are also problems with classifying vocational training between the 
categories. Each country may experience different levels of vocational training and also, when 
classifying these workers to skill groups, may deal differently with them.  
 
Measures of productivity levels for this study are also obtained from KILM 18. Such measures are of 
great interest for a wide range of purposes. For example, they indicate the gaps countries face 
compared with the productivity leaders at aggregate or at industry level, and hence inform policy 
makers about the potential for catch-up and convergence (Abramovitz, 1986). Productivity level 
measurement may also inform the debate on policy reforms that may be needed to enhance 
productivity performance.  
 
Many of the issues on measurement of relative productivity are not all that different from those 
described above for productivity growth measurement. However, the sensitivity for measurement 
issues concerning GDP, labour and capital input is considerably larger for level estimates than for 
growth estimates. For example, nominal GDP levels are strongly affected by issues concerning the 
measurement of capital formation, military production, the treatment of financial intermediate 
services and adjustment for non-observed parts of the economy.  
 
An important additional issue is that comparisons of productivity levels across countries require the 
conversion of output and factor inputs, expressed at their own national prices denominated in national 
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currencies, into values at common prices denominated in a common currency. For aggregate 
comparisons of productivity levels, currency conversion factors for value added are usually obtained 
from expenditure-based purchasing power parities (PPPs). 
 
This study also makes use of measures of output and labour input by industry (Chapter 4). In practice, 
the quality of measures of output and productivity differs highly across industries and between 
countries. Griliches (1994) showed a striking difference between the acceleration of labour 
productivity growth in ‘measurable’ sectors of the U.S. economy (agriculture, mining, manufacturing, 
transport and communication, and public utilities) and the slowdown in ‘unmeasurable’ sectors (like 
construction, trade, the financial sector, ‘other’ market services and government) over past decades. 
Apart from this rise in measurement error at the aggregate level due to a shift towards the 
unmeasurable sectors of the economy, one may also observe an increase in measurement problems in 
the ‘unmeasurable’ sector itself. This component of the rise in measurement problems may – at least 
in part – be related to the increased use of ICT.  
 
One way to summarise measurement problems at industry level is by distinguishing between 
measurement problems with regard to output in manufacturing (which is the major industry of the 
‘measurable’ sector of the economy) and output in services (which dominate the ‘unmeasurable’ 
sector) vis-à-vis measurement problems concerning the inputs (production factors and intermediate 
inputs) in manufacturing and services. This approach shows that the measurement problems tend to be 
largest at the level of output measurement in services. 
 
However, it should be stressed that major advances in measurement of macroeconomic statistics have 
been made in recent years. Many statistical agencies have undertaken activities to improve 
measurement of output and inputs. Furthermore, the System of National Accounts 1993 (SNA 1993) 
and the European System of Accounts (ESA 1995) do allow for the development of satellite accounts 
which may include knowledge accounts and social accounting matrices (such as SESAME) that link 
knowledge with demand. These developments provide important new avenues for the analysis of 
productivity. Indeed there is certainly no reason for “measurement nihilism” as if the data do not tell 
us anything, in particular not when we take into account reasonable margins of uncertainty. 
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Appendix 2: Labour Force Categories in the Process of Economic Modernisation 
 
The subdivision of the labour force44 in the ILO statistics can be used to describe the changes that 
have occurred in the world of work during the past two centuries:  
1) Paid employees. Employees who receive a salary or a wage. This is the group of people 
working in the typically modern production organisation of wage employment, either in 
small, medium or large scale businesses or in the greatly extended government sectors of 
education, health care or administration.  
2) Own-account workers. This is the most diverse employment group. Firstly, a large part 
consists of farmers exploiting their own farm business. The share of this group in total 
employment is declining rapidly during the process of economic growth, and after a certain 
point the number of farmers also declines in absolute terms. Secondly, a large part is made up 
of other self-employed persons in industry and services. In particular in developing countries, 
these jobs are often in the sphere of the urban informal economy which are generally low-
productivity activities in small scale handicraft industry, retail trade and personal services. On 
the other hand, economic growth leads to a new category of small enterpreneurs in some parts 
of the economy, for example in business services. Apart from begin characterised by 
relatively high productivity levels, increased entry of this group of small enterpreneurs can be 
a potential source of strong productivity growth. Finally, the employers, by definition a much 
smaller but also very diverse group, are included here either as an entrepreneur in informal or 
formal sector business. 
3) Unpaid family workers. These people contribute to a family business and obtain a share of 
family income instead of a formal wage. Unpaid family workers are mainly found in the 
agricultural sector and to a lesser extent in retail trade. The category of unpaid family workers 
is often dominated by women, who take care of a substantial part of family income in various 
ways in the family businesses, involved in farming, household manufacturing or the service 
industries of commerce, transport and tourism. One of the great problems of labour 
statisticians is to value and standardize the economic contribution of all the work that does not 
formally pass the labour market (see also the discussion on the female labour participation 
rate in Section 2.3). 
                                                 
44 The labour force refers to the so-called economically active population and consists of all employed and 
unemployed people. Employed are those who are reported to have a job for at least one day a week  (in a 
survey) for which they receive income. Unemployed are those who want work and search for work, but are not 
occupied yet. In this respect they are distinguished from the economically inactive population, mainly consisting 
of children, retired, women involved in housekeeping and childcare and disabled. 
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ISIC Rev. 3 ICT-producing industries 
  
 ICT-producing manufacturing 
30 Office, accounting and computing machinery 
313 Insulated wire and cable  
321 Semiconductors and other electronic components 
322 Communication and broadcasting equipment 
323 Radio and TV receivers 
331 Medical and measuring equipment and industrial process control 
 ICT-producing services 
64 Post and telecommunications 
72 Computer and related services 
  
ISIC Rev. 3 ICT-using industries 
  
 ICT-using manufacturing 
18 Wearing apparel, dressing and dying of fur 
22 Printing and publishing 
29 Machinery and equipment 
31, excl. 313 Electrical machinery and apparatus, excluding insulated wire 
33, excl. 331 Precision and optical instruments, excluding ICT instruments 
351 Building and repairing of ships and boats  
353 Aircraft and spacecraft 
352+359 Railroad equipment and transport equipment 
36-37 Miscellaneous manufacturing and recycling 
 ICT-using services 
51 Wholesale trade 
52 Retail trade 
65 Financial intermediation 
66 Insurance and pension funding 
67 Activities related to financial intermediation 
71 Renting of machinery and equipment 
73 Research and development 
741-743 Professional business services 
  
ISIC Rev. 3 Less-intensive ICT-using industries 
  
 Other Manufacturing 
15-16 Food products, beverages and tobacco 
17 Textiles 
19 Leather, leather products and footwear 
20 Wood and products of wood and cork 
21 Pulp, paper and paper products 
23 Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 
24 Chemicals and chemical products 
25 Rubber and plastic products 
26 Non-metallic mineral products 
27 Basic metals 
28 Fabricated metal products 
34 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 
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Appendix 3 (continued) 
  
 Other Services 
50 Repairs  
55 Hotels and restaurants 
60-63 Transport and storage 
70 Real estate activities 
745-749 Other business services (non-professional) 
75 Public administration and defense; compulsory social security 
80 Education 
85 Health and social work 
90-93 Other community, social and personal services 
95 Private households with employed persons 
99 Extra-territorial organisations and bodies 
  
 Other Industries 
01-05 Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 
10-14 Mining and quarrying 
40-41 Electricity, gas and water supply 
45 Construction 
Source: van Ark et al. (2002) 
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